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Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the Korean film industry has experienced a 
series of prodigious shifts, including a sudden growth of domestic film ticket sales. Although 
scholars have performed diverse research focusing on the causes and effects of the shifts, most 
findings from their studies are not helpful in identifying the core implications of given 
phenomena because they were on the basis of unverifiable premises. In this study, substantive 
meanings of those changes will be investigated by challenging the key question of the 
phenomena, namely, from where do increases of Korean film ticket sales come?  
In answering the question, this dissertation claims the following two points. First, as the 
production of culture perspective suggests, film distributors, the central organizations of the film 
industry’s gatekeeping system, have played pivotal roles in augmenting domestic film 
consumption. Second, in analyzing distinctive distribution patterns in the Korean film market, 
economic sociological perspectives, which underscore social and historical influences on the 
market and market players, have many advantages over classical economic views. 
The analyses that provide empirical evidence have two parts, one for the buyers’ and the 
other for the sellers’ side of the film industry. On the buyers’ side, the analysis starts with an 
assumption that sales of a certain product in the market are determined by the extent to which 
buyers favor that product. Hence, the first analysis examines whether or not consumers’ 
preference levels toward Korean films have significantly improved. The results show that 
audiences’ preferences for Korean films have considerably improved but not significantly 
enough to claim that improved preferences triggered the Korean film’s box-office expansion.  
On the contrary, the analysis on the sellers’ side reveals several systematic patterns 
among film distributors. First, unlike American films distributed by Hollywood studios that have 
already had their unique distribution patterns, Korean films developed their discernible 
distribution patterns in more recent years. In addition, due to the growing number of domestic 
film productions, the competition levels among Korean distributors have significantly increased, 
but, nevertheless, the competition levels between Korean and American distributors have 
stagnated. More important, this study confirms that avoiding large-scale Hollywood films helped 
Korean films to obtain better box-office receipts. Consolidating all these empirical results, this 
study suggests the fundamental meanings of the recent shifts in the Korean film market. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
As DiMaggio mentioned (1977:436), “long-term change in the quality of a society’s 
popular culture is easy to notice, but difficult to characterize.” Most people can easily recognize 
that the contents and styles of the cultural products that they encounter in everyday life (e.g., 
clothes, popular music, and bestseller novels) are quite different from those of the products that 
their parents’ generation encountered. Also, temporal differences are noticeable in the ways in 
which people have consumed these products and the meanings that society has attached to these 
consuming behaviors. Nevertheless, it is not easy to identify what the kernels of the shifts are, 
and why and how the shifts were made. 
 That is exactly the case of the Korean film industry. Since the late 1990s, a string of 
important and unexpected events have occurred in this particular domain, and as a consequence, 
many aspects of the industry have significantly shifted. As mentioned above, these changes are 
not difficult to notice, but their significance is less straightforward. Surprisingly little effort, both 
in and out of the film industry, has been made to characterize them. Many reasons exist for this 
lack of effort, but the following two are most noteworthy. 
 The first reason is due in large part to the explosive increase of domestic film audiences 
in the early 2000s. The opening of the distribution market to major Hollywood studios in 1988 
made the domestic film ticket sales seriously shrunk until the mid-1990s. As Table 1.1 illustrates, 
the total audience number for domestic films in 1993 marked the record low, 7.7 million, but 
since then, it suddenly expanded more than ten times within thirteen years. In other words, its 
revival in the 2000s was so rapid and dramatic that people in the film industry were overly 
excited at increasing box-office revenues, tacitly believing that increased ticket sales are 
irrefutable evidence for the industry’s development. Second, and more important, many people 
consciously or unconsciously believed that such a large spike in ticket sales was a natural 
outcome of the refined quality of Korean films. After Korean-style blockbusters had several 
significant successes in the late 1990s and early 2000s1, mass media began to trumpet the 
                                                 
1 Table 1.1 presents the best- and the second best-selling movies in each year (1999 thru 2006). The annual 
best-selling movies in this period were completely dominated by Korea domestic ones, and many of those were so-
called Korean-style blockbusters (e.g., Shiri, Joint Security Area, Taegukgi, Silmido, The Host, etc.). 
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remarkable improvement of Korean movies, and most expert groups eagerly agreed. Such a 
belief swiftly spread and became an unassailable “fact.”  
Whether the quality of Korean films has truly improved or not, insistence on the relation 
between upgraded Korean films and increases in domestic film ticket sales is problematic in 
many senses. More than anything else, the quality of commercial films is difficult to measure 
because it is subject to consumer tastes. For the same reason, comparing the quality of different 
movies is hardly feasible. Of course, in terms of enjoying movies, some common denominators 
exist among audiences, and if filmmakers detect and follow these trends, their movies are likely 
to receive better reviews as well as more viewers. However, the probability of accomplishing this 
goal is contingent on an individual filmmaker’s inspiration and acumen; it cannot be 
corroborated at an aggregate level. Because many other factors directly affect the commercial 
success of individual films, good movies are not always guaranteed to draw large audiences (De 
Vany 2004; Marich 2005).  
 Under these circumstances, the ultimate goal of this dissertation is to define the nature of 
the changes that the Korean film industry has experienced since the late 1990s. As a matter of 
fact, many studies have examined diverse aspects of Korean film industry and its shifts, but most 
of them rely, to some degree, on the two dubious premises mentioned above: first, that increases 
in domestic film audience numbers are undeniable evidence arguing for the development of the 
Korean film industry and, second, that the improved quality of Korean films is the single most 
important factor in increasing box-office ticket sales. Consequently, those studies have failed to 
raise key questions, which are inevitable in identifying the implication of this shift. For instance, 
given the global dominance of Hollywood movies, do the increases in domestic film 
consumption indicate that Korean films have defeated American films in the Korean market? 
This question, an important one, directly relates to more diverse and sensitive issues regarding 
the industry’s past and future.  
In the past, especially when the Korean government began to allow the Hollywood 
studios to run their distribution business in the Korean market, many people anticipated that the 
Korean film industry would completely break down. If the Korean market was inundated with 
American films, the domestic film audience would certainly decline, and investments in new 
Korean films would dry up. As described above, though the Korean film industry was in a 
serious crisis during the 1990s, it recovered in the 2000s. Considering that the total audience 
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numbers for Korean films surpassed even those for American films, can we conclude that past 
predictions were incorrect and that Korean films prevailed in the Korean market? What did these 
shifts suggest regarding the future of the Korean film industry? Given the uncertainties and risks 
run by film businesses, were these shifts sufficient to maintain the momentum of the Korean film 
industry? Or, at least, can these shifts erase lingering concerns about the future stability of 
Korean film markets?   
 Answering these questions is crucial in achieving the ultimate goal of this dissertation. 
However, a more fundamental question must first be addressed, namely, where did increases in 
Korean film audiences originate? Put another way, what factors directly affected the growth of 
domestic film audiences? As noted earlier, the increases of the domestic film audiences have 
been the key when discussing the overall changes of the film industry for the last decade, and in 
many cases, their ultimate reason for increases has been ascribed to the refined quality of 
domestic films. However, we cannot conclude that the improved quality of domestic films is the 
main cause of an abrupt increase in box-office receipts. Considering the complex changes that 
have affected the Korean film industry over the past decade, it is naïve to believe that the 
improved quality of film is a necessary and sufficient condition for box-office growth. By 
exploring more conclusive and verifiable reasons for the domestic box-office increase, we can 
reject the unjustified presumptions used in many previous studies and progressively raise more 
diverse questions. 
 
1.1 Sociological Approaches to Commercial Films and Film Consumption 
 The characterization of changes related to the consumption of cultural products is 
complex; however, two common and substantive reasons for this difficulty exist. First, the most 
distinctive feature of products traded in cultural markets is that they do not have intrinsic 
qualities or straightforward utilitarian values (Hirsch 1972). As a result, extreme uncertainty 
makes their patterns of production and consumption difficult to predict. Second, market 
participants have developed unique systems within their own industry to cope with these 
uncertainties. Consequently, today’s cultural industries have complicated structures that connect 
with numerous parts of society.    
 While investigating any observed shift in this domain, each researcher must resolve 
problems that occur because of these two barriers. First, since cultural industries have an 
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extremely large and complicated structure, the researcher may be unsure on which part of the 
industrial structure he or she should focus. Examining every possible aspect of a cultural industry 
is neither feasible nor efficient. Therefore, we have to narrow the range of possibilities using 
pertinent theoretical approaches and then concentrate more on those selected areas. Second, the 
economic rules that apply to ordinary consumer products are seldom applicable to cultural 
products due to the lack of straightforward qualities or values. To make sense of each cultural 
industry’s peculiarities, we must find alternative analytical frameworks, especially with regard to 
making and sustaining the market. 
 To resolve these problems, this dissertation employs two sociological approaches. Thanks 
to the sociology of culture and empirical studies on cultural industry, more straightforward 
approaches to complicated cultural shifts are now possible. For instance, the production of 
culture perspective operates on a simple assumption that some cultural patterns and their changes 
are observable because they are repeatedly produced and maintained by individuals and 
organizations in the markets. Naturally, this perspective pays special attention to the milieus 
where cultural products are produced, traded, and consumed (Crane 1992; Peterson and Anand 
2004). 
 However, the most critical aspect of this approach is its extraordinary interest in 
intermediary roles, which connect producers and consumers or steer the direction of production 
and consumption patterns. Because cultural products do not have intrinsic qualities or utilitarian 
values, cultural industries need various types of individuals and/or a wide array of organizations 
that specialize in defining, evaluating, and filtering the non-utilitarian characteristics of these 
products. So-called “gatekeepers,” such as critics, reviewers, curators, disc jockeys, editors, 
function as one of the most representative examples. In fact, the exact roles performed by these 
gatekeepers in each industry differ significantly, along with the extent to which they influence 
production and consumption. Nonetheless, scholars commonly agree that gatekeepers often play 
a vital role in both changing and maintaining patterns of production and consumption for cultural 
products (Crane 1992; Hesmondhalgh 2002; Hirsh 1972).  
One example of a gatekeeper, films distributors in the Korean market, will be the main 
target of analysis in this dissertation. Although the function of film market distributors is not 
exactly that of a conventional gatekeeper, they are still important organizations located at the 
center of the gatekeeping system (Crane 1992). For example, one of the distributor’s main 
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functions is to decide which films are released to the market. Also, in most cases, distributors 
control the timing and the scale of film releases, key factors that affect competition in film 
markets.  
 Second, another sociological view that will be the basis of this dissertation is economic 
sociology, or more specifically, the sociology of markets. Unlike standardized neoclassical 
notions of market where supplies and demands meet each other to determine price, the 
definitions of market in economic sociology are quite flexible depending on types of products or 
idiosyncrasies of individual markets spun off from the characteristics of those products (Fligstein 
and Dauter 2007; White 1981; Zelizer 1978). Also, instead of orthodox economic assumptions 
about atomized market players and their rational behaviors, economic sociologists believe that 
both sellers’ and buyers’ behaviors are substantially affected by relational contexts in which 
individuals are embedded. Given the peculiar features of cultural products, these discriminating 
approaches to the definition of market and to actors’ behaviors are indispensible for 
understanding markets where cultural products are traded.  
 Indeed, competition occurring in the film market is unique for many reasons. One of the 
most salient features that makes the distribution market competition more distinctive is that 
competition can be generated only among those movies whose screening periods overlap with 
each other. Thus, monitoring other distributors’ behaviors as well as their movies is the primary 
job of individual distributors. Based on their observations, each distributor determines their own 
distribution strategies, and at the aggregate level, these individual distributors’ strategies together 
define the characteristics of distribution and competition patterns for the entire market. As the 
sociology of market perspectives stress, the rules shared by market players are an essential 
component in reproducing transactions among those players, and furthermore, in sustaining the 
market itself. If we can find some consistencies from distributors’ release and competition 
patterns, it indicates that distributors are sharing ordered rules, whether spoken or unspoken. By 
the same token, if we can observe significant changes in those patterns, this implies that the basic 
rules which guide the distributors’ behaviors also shift. Centering on the patterns of distribution 
and competition created by Korean distributors and the shifts of those patterns over time, first, I 
perform a series of analyses regarding how the behavioral changes of these distributors relate to 
the increase in domestic film ticket sales. Based on these analyses, then, I discuss the core 




1.2 Chapter Organization 
In the chapter immediately following this section, I discuss the unique features attached 
to commercial films and their markets as the foundation for upcoming analyses. Then, I 
determine on which particular sector of the film industry we need to focus and how to interpret 
the players’ behaviors in that sector to provide answers to the main question of this study. That is, 
how the two sociological approaches, briefly mentioned above, can help to develop analytical 
frameworks for this dissertation will be discussed. 
 Chapter 3 provides a historical background of the Korean film industry along with the 
film law amendments that played critical roles in changing the nature of film market 
competition. It depicts the condition of the film industry before recent shifts, especially focusing 
on the opening of the distribution market in the 1980s and its aftermath. Then, it explores the 
shifts that have occurred in the Korean film industry since the late 1990s and clarifies the 
importance of these shifts in Korean film history by providing more detailed data.     
 Then, we move on to empirical analysis of the film market, which consists of two parts 
covering the buyers’ and the sellers’ sides. In Chapter 4, which deals with the buyers’ side, I 
examine the validity of the premise used in many previous studies. If the improved quality of 
domestic films provides a conclusive reason for increased box-office ticket sales, we can assume 
that it substantially affected audiences’ preferences for Korean films. Thus, this chapter will 
discuss shifts in audiences’ preferences for domestic films and the implications of these shifts.  
 The following three chapters discuss shifts on the sellers’ side. In Chapter 5, I analyze 
whether individual types of films, classified by the country of origin of both the filmmaker and 
distributor, have unique distribution patterns. If they have some distribution patterns, then I will 
examine how those patterns are different depending on the type of films and how they have 
changed over time, especially focusing on Korean films and American films distributed by 
Hollywood studios. 
 Chapter 6 addresses changes in competition patterns, i.e., matched distribution patterns 
between two types of films. As the number of screened films changes, competition levels 
between pairs of film types also change because yearly distribution spots are limited. Given the 
increased number of domestic films in the market, I investigate how competition levels among 
Korean films and between Korean and American-distributed American films have changed. 
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Chapter 7 delves into the causes and results of changes in distribution and competition 
patterns by focusing on the audience numbers that each film obtained. When observing shifts in 
patterns of distribution and competition, it is reasonable to assume that motivations and 
outcomes related to these behavioral shifts exist. In the film market, the strongest motivation to 
cause distributors’ behavioral changes is to obtain more viewers. Thus, this chapter examines 
whether or not Korean distributors achieved better results in their box-office ticket sales in the 
wake of changing distribution and competition patterns.  
 After reviewing the findings from each analysis chapter, the final chapter provides 
answers to the central question of this dissertation: what are the key implications of the shifts that 
the Korean film industry experienced during the last decade?  In addition, it will reevaluate the 




1.3 Tables and Figures 
Table 1.1 Box-Office Top Performers between 1999 and 2006 
Year Rank Title Country of Origin Ticket Sales (in Seoul) 
1999 1st Shiri Korea 2,448,399 2nd Mummy US 1,114,916 
2000 1st Joint Security Area Korea 2,447,133 2nd Gladiator US 1,239,955 
2001 1st Friend Korea 2,678,846 2nd My Sassy Girl  Korea 1,735,692 
2002 1st Marrying the Mafia  Korea 1,605,755 2nd The Way Home Korea 1,576,943 
2003 1st Memories of Murder  Korea 1,912,725 2nd The Matrix Reloaded US 1,596,000 
2004 1st Taegukgi Korea 3,509,563 2nd Silmido Korea 2,569,826 
2005 1st Welcome to Dongmakgol Korea 2,435,088 2nd Malaton Korea 1,552,548 
2006 1st The Host Korea 3,571,254 2nd King And The Clown  Korea 3,440,976 
 







Figure 1.1 Domestic Film Audience Number Changes in the Korean Market 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Approaches to Commercial Films and Their Markets  
 
 Commercial films are relatively new commodities jointly created by modern technology 
and shifting patterns in leisure time consumption. They have many unique characteristics that 
distinguish them from ordinary consumer products traded in the marketplace, and these 
differences have been frequently underscored in various types of literature. To begin with, this 
chapter reviews several key features of commercial films of which we should be mindful in any 
film-related study. Then, it will discuss idiosyncrasies of film markets directly related to these 
features. Finally, it addresses two issues in creating appropriate analytical frameworks for the 
current research question. Given the wide-ranging and multilayered structure of film industries, 
one issue relates to the identification of a particular area of the Korean film market on which to 
focus (i.e., what to see), and the other issue concerns the choice of theoretical tools to be used for 
understanding actors’ behaviors and interactions in this area (i.e., how to see). 
 
2.1 Distinctive Features of Commercial Films and Their Markets 
 Apparently, one of the reasons that motion pictures draw attention from a broad range of 
academic disciplines is that they stand at the point where art and commerce meet. Their 
marketability depends on both artistic excellence and commercial appeal (Björkegren 1996; 
Guback 1969; Holbrook and Addis 2007; Lampel et al. 2006; Wasko 1981), and this is one of 
commonly observed characteristics in the consumption of cultural products. In a groundbreaking 
study, Hirsch (1972) defines cultural products as those that “serve an esthetic or expressive, 
rather than a clearly utilitarian function” (Hirsch 1972:641). This definition illustrates the key 
properties of commercial films.  
 The first part of the definition implies that evaluating the quality of films is intrinsically 
difficult. Because feature films are, in economic terms, experience goods (Cooper-Martin 1992), 
consumers do not know whether a certain movie is good or bad until they actually watch it. Even 
after watching a film, personal evaluations of that particular film can differ widely because films 
cater to individual tastes (Jarvie 1970; Jowett and Linton 1989; Kim 2004a). The result of these 
characteristics is differentiated consumer behaviors in search of their preferable movies. For 
instance, film audiences tend to trust their friends’ comments more than advertisements or 
information available in news media (Faber and O’Guinn 1984).  
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Second, the lack of movie’s utilitarian function often imposes a great importance on the 
large amount of capital in making and selling films. When the level of consumer demand is 
difficult to estimate (i.e., high demand uncertainty), producers are supposed to allocate the 
maximum amount of available resources to the first reel of their films in order to expand possible 
demand by appealing to more diverse consumer tastes. Spending seemingly unreasonable 
amounts of money on film production, e.g., casting high-profile actors and directors or 
employing cutting-edge visual technologies, is somewhat indispensible to becoming a notable 
film. In a similar context, skyrocketing increases of marketing expenses in recent years can be 
seen as a natural outcome originating from the industry’s typical efforts to deal with the demand 
uncertainty (Hesmondhalgh 2002; Marich 2005). 
 These unique characteristics of commercial films inevitably cause idiosyncrasies in the 
film market, three of which must be discussed when setting up research on film market shifts. 
First, many general rules obtained by economic analysis are not applicable to the film market. 
For instance, price competition in the exhibition market can seldom be instituted due to the 
absence of a fixed or cognitively shared quality of films among consumers (Jowett and Linton 
1989; Nelson 1970). Additionally, the forces of supply and demand cannot drive the market 
owing to the uncertainty of demand. These factors imply that film market analyses should 
incorporate unique but extensive analytic frameworks that do not rely solely on economic 
approaches. 
 Secondly, all these distinctive features of commercial films eventually serve as catalysts 
that generate various types of uncertainties in the film market, the result of which is the 
pervasive consciousness that film businesses are risky and unpredictable (De Vany 2004). To 
alleviate such uncertainties, film industry players have developed typical market or industry 
structures, such as “oligopolistic order” (Crane 1992; Strick 1978) or “vertical integration” 
(Litman 1998). Thus, special attention should be given to the particular efforts that each film 
market makes in order to handle this high uncertainty and to stabilize the process of film 
production and consumption. 
Last, the dominance of the international film market by Hollywood movies is the primary 
factor that has determined the modus operandi of many local markets. Since the early twentieth 
century, the United States has maintained the world’s largest film industry and home market 
(Guback 1969; Segrave 1997). We may take the dominance of Hollywood movies in 
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international markets for granted since, as noted above, commercial films require a large amount 
of capital as well as the accumulation of diverse technologies. We should notice that local market 
participants confront disparate uncertainties and quandaries; they depend on the extent to which 
American films are dominating the local market. Industrial structures and their strategies for 
survival against Hollywood films (e.g., protectionist policies and government subsidiaries) in 
each country differ accordingly. Therefore, when dealing with local film markets, these peculiar 
conditions that constrain market participants’ behaviors should come into consideration first. 
 
2.2 Creating Analytical Frameworks: “What to See” and “How to See” 
 2.2.1 What to See 
Due to the unique features discussed above, analyses of commercial film markets have 
many complications; therefore, they require a differentiated analytical framework from those for 
ordinary consumer products. An additional barrier to the analysis of changes in the film industry 
is its complex and wide-ranging structure, a natural outcome of the process of coping with 
diverse uncertainties (Becker 1982; Crane 1992; Hirsch 1972). In searching for the factors that 
caused increases in Korean film consumption, I find that this complicated industrial structure 
requires the investigation of many candidates or suspects (e.g., production systems, consumer 
behaviors, institutional shifts, and so forth.). As Lieberson (2000) suggests, analytical 
frameworks that deal with cultural changes should be multilayered and multifaceted. 
In reality, however, most theories and analyses tend to focus on particular aspects of the 
film industry, which does not necessarily mean that they contradict the universal research 
principle stressed by Lieberson. Analyzing many components of the film industry within a single 
theoretical framework is either impossible or impractical; therefore, they need to single out 
typical subdivision(s) of the film industry based on their research tradition and interest. In other 
words, although most theoretical approaches to film markets account for separate areas of the 
industry, they still need to locate a typical sub-area that plays a critical role in bringing about film 
market shifts. Only in this way can they efficiently deploy their arguments and, in turn, 
differentiate their arguments from others.  
 In this regard, the first task in developing an analytical framework to answer the initial 
question of this dissertation (i.e., how do Korean film audiences grow?) is to decide which 
particular area of the film industry will be my focus. The following section will introduce 
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conventional research topics that apply sociological approaches to cultural industries and their 
changes. Then, I will argue that areas emphasized by “the production of culture perspective” are 
the best, if not the perfect, fit for current research agenda given the features of films and their 
market discussed so far.     
 
 2.2.2 Sociological Approaches to Cultural Industries and Their Changes 
 Top-down and Bottom-Up Debate 
 Among ongoing debates in the sociology of culture, one of the fiercest and most 
longstanding is whether producers or consumers determine the contents and forms of cultural 
products and their incessant changes (Griswold 1992a; Harrington and Bielby 2001; McPhee 
1966; Mukerji and Schudson 1986). Due to its long history and broad attention from various 
social science subfields (See Lampel et al. 2000), the details of actual research questions on this 
issue have been somehow different from one study to another. But at the center, they are asking 
essentially the same thing, namely, who has the power to shape and change the pattern of cultural 
consumption? If slightly revised, however, this debate is covering the exactly same issue 
mentioned in the previous section, i.e., when we detect shifted patterns of cultural product 
consumptions, on what should we focus?  
 The core of Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument, often treated as the origin of top-down 
sociological approaches, was that the culture industry1 can contribute to the reproduction of 
capitalistic order by disseminating mass products that serve the ruling class ideology (2002 
[1944]). The implication of their argument is that because a small number of social elites control 
the systems of culture industry, the contents and styles of cultural products, and even the ways of 
consuming them, are designed in the interest of these few individuals. In the process of cultural 
consumption, mass audiences are likely to be homogenized through the acceptance of whatever 
the culture industry offers because they lack the power to intervene in these systems.  
 This stance was reflected in the mass culture debates of the 1950s and 1960s. Many 
theorists of mass culture, in accordance with the traditions of the Frankfurt School, argued that 
only a unified culture industry could generate notable innovations or significant shifts in the 
                                                 
1 Because Horkheimer and Adorno (2002 [1944]) used the term “culture industry” instead of a term that is 




consumption of cultural products (MacDonald 1957 [1953]). In response to such innovations, 
consumers of cultural products could only remain passive as cultural industries are constantly 
monitoring small changes in consumer tastes and considering those shifts when determining the 
direction of future innovation (DiMaggio 1977; Peterson and DiMaggio 1975). 
 As opposed to these industry-driven approaches to consumption, scholars from a variety 
of academic disciplines have emphasized the activeness of consumers. Most notably, Gans 
(1974), from the perspective of liberal pluralism, argued that individuals’ views of the world are 
shaped not by mass-mediated images but by their own local cultures and experiences. Although 
cultural studies in general emphasize the interplay between the cultural industries and their 
consumers, they tend to focus more on the consumer’s side in approaching to patterns of cultural 
product consumptions. On one hand, they admit that complex cultural industries not only provide 
cultural products but also define the milieu in which these products are consumed. On the other 
hand, however, they insist that consumers hold the power in cultural industries because only 
consumers determine which products or practices become popular (Ang 1990; Fiske 1989). From 
the perspective of mass communication studies, Turow (1984) distinguished a public from an 
audience. While an audience is a construct created by mass media producers and distributors, a 
public consists of real individuals who have subjective tastes and make decisions that determine 
whether or not they use certain media materials.   
 These audience-focused, or bottom-up, perspectives commonly point out that the 
process of cultural creation or cultural change cannot be read as a series of unilateral 
mechanisms. The fact that only a small proportion of music records and feature films survive in 
the market demonstrates that audiences have substantive power to resist or modify given cultural 
products in favor of their own tastes and interests. Furthermore, when a new cultural trend or a 
shift in the existing culture is found, investigations on the interactions among audiences or 
between audiences and products must precede or at least cooperate with industry side analyses.      
 
 The Production of Culture Perspective 
 The production of culture perspective begins with the observation that culture does not 
emerge as a fully developed or premade entity; instead, someone somewhere creates it (Peterson 
1979). Creative cultural products result from collaboration and division of labor by many 
individuals and organizations, which makes the processes of culture creation observable and 
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measurable (Hesmondhalgh 2002; Peterson 1976). Naturally, researchers using the production of 
culture perspective focus on how elements of culture are shaped in the processes of production, 
distribution, preservation and consumption (Peterson 1976 and 1979; Peterson and Anand 2004; 
Smith 2001). 
 This view is quite different from the sociological perspectives that preceded it. Many 
sociologists clearly distinguish between high and popular culture, or industry and audience, 
applying different theoretical tools to each. However, the production of culture perspective does 
not require such a distinction (Schudson 1987). Its major goal is to show “how culture is 
produced” (Peterson 1976:670). Insofar as the processes of production and consumption of 
culture are observable, additional characteristics defining that particular culture have no practical 
importance in doing research over it.  
 This view is also free from evaluation of culture (Harrington and Bielby 2001). Indeed, 
conventional sociological concerns about popular culture began with one particular question; is 
popular culture good or bad for high culture or an entire society? (Gottdiener 1984; Harrington 
and Bielby 2001). Accordingly, many sociologists had to speculate as to the influences that a 
certain type of culture would have on the general public. Their findings often forced them to take 
up one of two conflicting positions. However, evaluating the influence of culture or cultural 
products is not a main concern for a research taking the production of culture perspective, which 
focuses solely on the organizational and market settings in which cultural products are created.  
 One of the features that most distinguishes this sociological approach from others is its 
presumption that the characteristics of cultural products are more closely related to the industry 
structure in which they are created than to society as a whole (DiMaggio 1977; Lizardo and 
Skiles 2009). Regarding top-down versus bottom-up debate, DiMaggio (1977) points out that 
one group of scholars in the debate assumes that only a small group of industry leaders 
monopolizes an industry (e.g., broadcasting), while others presuppose that competition is perfect. 
However, industrial structures that create particular cultural products are different from one 
another. The best way to understand the patterns of cultural consumption and their changes is to 
directly analyze the elements and the structures of the culture-producing industry (DiMaggio 
1977; Peterson and Berger 1975).   
 Although most studies rooted in this perspective have a strong tendency to concentrate 
on the processes by which production and consumption of culture actually take place, they do not 
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overlook the multilayered and multifaceted structure of culture-producing industry. They 
simultaneously consider a variety of external and internal factors directly and indirectly related 
to these processes. On one hand, this tendency calls broader attention to the constraints outside 
of markets or industries, such as laws, technologies, and organizational settings (Peterson 1982 
and 1985; Peterson and Anand 2004). On the other hand, it places extraordinary stress on those 
playing a gatekeeping role within cultural industries, such as critics, curators, and disc jockeys 
(Harrington and Bielby 2001; Smith 2001).  
 A large number of studies from the production of culture perspective have paid attention 
to the role of gatekeepers, even though it does not directly fall into the domain of production or 
consumption. Gatekeepers who play intermediary roles are inevitable in sustaining any cultural 
industry for two reasons. First, demand for a particular cultural item can easily change due to the 
absence of a utilitarian function; thus, producers in a cultural industry are likely to suffer from 
demand uncertainty (Gans 1964; Hirsch 1972). Therefore, independent players who can rapidly 
and accurately read changing consumer tastes have to guide the direction of future production. 
Second, consumers have similar problems when finding items to fit their taste because most 
cultural products are experience goods. A consumer’s dilemma is to find the most suitable 
product without actually consuming these items. Therefore, consumers must rely on a third party 
to provide product information based on his or her prior experiences, regardless of whether or 
not this individual is an expert.  
 In this regard, gatekeepers expedite the circulation of cultural products between 
producers and consumers by defining, evaluating, and filtering non-utilitarian values of cultural 
products. Although their responsibilities appear uncomplicated and peripheral, they have a great 
deal of power in cultural industries because they define what products should be produced 
(Alexander 1996; White and White 1965) and consumed (Basuroy et al. 2003; Griswold 1992b; 
Zuckerman and Kim 2003). Given the importance of contents and styles in the cultural industry, 
it would be no exaggeration to say that they have the potential to change the entire structure of 
the cultural industry. Therefore, when detecting shifts in the production and consumption of 
cultural products, we must prioritize the investigation of a gatekeeper’s behaviors.      
 Distributors are, in this sense, a very significant player in the film market. Although film 
distributors may not represent typical gatekeepers, they are at the center of a gatekeeping system 
(Crane 1992) because they determine not only what films are in and out of the market but also 
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the characteristics of competition in markets.2 Hence, we have many reasons why we should 
focus primarily on distributors and their intermediary roles for the investigation of the Korean 
film market shifts.   
  
 2.2.3 How to See 
 Once we have chosen film distributors as the main subject of this study, the next task is 
to have a theoretical lens through which to observe distributors’ behaviors and various film 
market phenomena related to them. In other words, we ought to be equipped with an appropriate 
theoretical view that helps us to figure out how film markets are operating and on which 
particular activities of film distributors we need to focus.    
 Although the review of a few critical features of commercial films at the beginning of 
this chapter is helpful for better comprehending of the cautionary notes when conducting film-
related studies, it is not enough yet. Since idiosyncrasies of films tend to raise more questions 
than provide tips for appreciating the variety of phenomena in the film market, just recognizing 
those characteristics does not do any good in processing the arguments of this dissertation. For 
instance, if supply and demand do not determine price and if price in and of itself has no 
significant influence on competition among films, on what basis do film market players compete 
with one another? In spite of these ambiguities surrounding film markets and film market 
players, why do clear distinctions exist between winners, who receive most rewards, and losers 
at the box office? (Frank and Cook 1995) 
 In searching for the answers to such questions, the following sections highlight the two 
points. First, analyzing film markets and distributors’ behaviors only within economic 
frameworks is not an effective strategy because many features of films and their markets do not 
match well with conventional economic assumptions (Hesmondhalgh 2002; Towse 2005). Given 
the characteristic of the film market that we have discussed thus far, economic sociological 
views, especially those from the sociology of markets, are more useful in investigating the real 
phenomena happening in the distribution market. 
 Second, what makes the film market competition more unique is the fact that only 
movies playing in theaters during the same period can compete with one another. That is, 
                                                 
2 This will be discussed in more details later in this chapter and in Chapter 5.  
 18 
 
competition among movies occurs along the temporal axis, and this is the reason why the 
distributors, who determine the release timing of individual films, are the key competitors in the 
film market. As the sociology of market perspectives argue, the rules that control market players’ 
behaviors are one of the most crucial factors that defines and sustains any market. Therefore, 
repeated patterns observed in distributors’ release decisions should be the primary object when 
scrutinizing film markets and their shifts since those can hint at what rules are pervasive among 
market players.       
 
 2.2.4 Economic Sociological Views on Markets and Market Players  
 Among the many differences between orthodox economics and economic sociology, the 
most important ones for this dissertation are the definition of markets and assumptions about 
actors’ behaviors in market settings. In neoclassical economics, a market is a system or an 
institution that provides demand for supply to meet or in which buyers and sellers interact with 
each other to determine equilibrium output and price (Case and Fair 1992; Lie 1997). Most 
economists treat the market only as a mechanism to solve economic problems, such as price 
settings or the allocation of scarce resources; therefore, they have not provided many 
specifications about market properties.  
 While mainstream economists’ market knowledge rarely deviates from the standard 
definition presented above, concepts of the market in economic sociology vary depending on the 
positions of individual scholars (see Fligstein 2001; Friedland and Robertson 1990; Podolny 
1993; Trigilia 2002; White 1981). However, they commonly emphasize the idea that the market 
is a socially defined construct. In economics, markets exist beyond the influence of history and 
society because they are a conceptual and functional tool developed by humans to exchange 
goods and services. In economic sociology, markets must be extracted from and supported by 
societies. Hence, the existence of markets and their modes of operation are highly contingent on 
various invisible but substantive forces (e.g., power, culture, etc.) within a society (Portes 2010; 
Zelizer 1978).     
 These contrasting perspectives from two academic traditions are closely related to 
differentiated assumptions about individual actors and their behavior in a market setting. In 
economics, actors are fictional and disconnected individuals. Their behaviors are always rational 
and self-interested with the ultimate goal of maximizing utility or profit by means of exchange. 
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In addition, their decisions are independent from other actors and drawn by fixed preferences 
(Hirsch et al. 1987; Smelser and Swedberg 1994; Swedberg and Granovetter 2001).  
 In economic sociology, actors are part of groups or larger societies. Therefore, their 
behaviors are strongly motivated and/or constrained by other actors’ behaviors and social facts 
(e.g., norms, morals, culture, institutions, etc.). In general, sociologists refute economists’ 
assumptions as to the rationality of economic actions by emphasizing the concept of 
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985). According to economic sociological views, actors are 
embedded in networks of social relationships that continuously influence economic actions 
(Swedberg and Granovetter 2001). Within the context of orthodox economic frameworks, there 
are many occasions in which an actor’s behaviors may look irrational and inexplicable; however, 
these behaviors can be fully understood if interpreted through the concept of embeddedness 
(Smelser and Swedberg 1994; Swedberg and Granovetter 2001).  
 Then, what characteristics of economic sociology can best help us to analyze complex 
shifts in the film industry? In other words, why does economic sociology, compared to 
mainstream economics, provide us with advantages when analyzing phenomena in the film 
market? The first reason can be found in assumptions about preference and its relation to actors’ 
behaviors. In economics, preferences (or tastes), along with the scarcity of resources, restrict 
actors’ behaviors. Because actors operate independently, preference is a unique and isolated 
property of each individual. According to economists, knowing an actor’s preference makes his 
behaviors predictable because this preference rationally determines his behaviors (Guillén et al. 
2002; Smelser and Swedberg 1994).   
 However, economic sociologists rebut that idea. Although preference strongly affects an 
actor’s behaviors, these behaviors are not solely determined by preference. For instance, if fixed 
preference always determines actors’ behaviors in the film market, the analysis of the box-office 
shifts would be much simpler because the number of ticket sales for a certain movie is exactly 
the same as the number of people who favor that movie. In such a case, box-office hits can be 
completely attributed to the matter of producer’s or director’s talents that appeal to audience 
preferences, and additional analyses beyond the qualities of films may not be necessary. 
However, watching a movie is a typical social activity since the majority of viewers do not go to 
theaters alone. Many known and unknown factors can interrupt and weaken the connection 
between individual preferences and the movies he or she watches (Etzioni 1988; Sen 1977).    
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 The second reason concerns the relationship between the market and society. Economic 
sociologists believe that markets are also embedded in society, whereas economists perceive 
markets as independent from society (Lie 1997; Trigilia 2002). An understanding of markets as 
embedded implies that the appearance and the sustainability of markets rely heavily on external 
factors, such as morals, culture, institutions, and so forth because, as noted above, these external 
factors strongly affect market players’ preferences and behaviors. Therefore, economic 
sociologists argue that preferences and behaviors related to economic issues cannot be simplified 
into individual matters since they are, to a considerable degree, conditioned at the higher social 
and historical levels (DiMaggio 1990).              
 For instance, we can think about the culture of Hollywood film consumption as a 
significant external factor in film markets. Indeed, Hollywood films’ popularity and dominance 
in overseas markets were not created in a short period. In today’s international film market, the 
reason why audiences consume American films is not necessarily because American films have 
superior qualities or provide more fun (Gans 1962). For various reasons, people in overseas 
markets began to favor American films, and as the preferences toward American films have been 
stably reproduced generation after generation, consuming American films, without regard to their 
real quality or contents, became a natural part of everyday life in many societies. This unique 
culture—or the taken-for-grantedness—related to Hollywood film consumption substantially 
influences interactions among film markets players. Without considering these types of external 
factors to which economists are often reluctant to pay attention, no analysis can successfully 
detect the mechanisms that drive patterns of film consumption. 
 The final and the most important reason that the economic sociological perspective is a 
better fit for the film market analysis is found in its definition of markets and emphasis on 
market rules. As illustrated earlier, economic definitions of the market are simple and stringent. 
Therefore, if a market’s features do not conform to these definitions, as in the case of commercial 
film markets, other rules and mechanisms rooted in these market definitions cannot apply. 
However, the definition of the market in economic sociology is quite flexible. For instance, as 
Fligstein states (2001: 30), “[m]arkets are social arenas that exist for the production and sales of 
some good or service, and they are characterized by structured exchange. Structured exchange 
implies that actors expect repeated exchanges for their products and that, therefore, they need 
rules and social structures to guide and organize exchanges.” This indicates that insofar as three 
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components – i.e., sellers, buyers, and the rules that guide actor’s behaviors – are present, sellers 
and buyers do not have to be rational, nor do the rules in the market have to be functional. As 
Friedland and Robertson describe (1990:27), “A market is not simply an allocative mechanism. It 
is also a system for generating and measuring value, for producing and ordering preferences that 
in turn become embedded in culture.” Therefore, rather than calculating actor’s behavior within 
stringently defined market settings, exploring the rules that generate value and that sustain 
markets is a more important goal of the economic sociology. Only in this way can we better 
understand the idiosyncrasies of film markets.        
 
 2.2.5 Understanding the Film Market Competition 
In order to understand the logic of competition in the film market, we should refer to 
several market characteristics that economic sociology underscores. As White (1981:518) 
observes, “markets are self-reproducing social structures among specific cliques of firms and 
other actors who evolve roles from observations of each other's behavior.” In this innovative 
definition of the market, we should notice that producers, sellers, firms, and other actors in 
competitive situations monitor each other’s behaviors and then use their observations to decide 
their own behaviors (Han 1994; White 1981). In addition, these observations over each other’s 
behaviors are the basis to generate repeated transactions among market participants, and in turn, 
to sustain the social structure called a market. Indeed, this particular assumption about actors 
provides the most basic theory on which to ground an explanation of competition in the film 
market.   
Competition in the film market is unique in the following two aspects; not all of the 
various types of actors on the sellers’ side of film markets, such as filmmakers, producers, 
advertisers, and marketers, directly compete with each other. The main competition among 
different movies is arranged by distributors whose primary roles are to decide the timing and 
scale of film releases. In the theatrical exhibition market, film release timing and scale are 
extremely important as direct competition occurs only among a particular group of movies 
whose exhibition periods overlap with one another. Distributors monitor each other’s behaviors 
(e.g., distribution schedules). If one distributor wants to avoid competition with a certain film or 
a certain distributor, theoretically, it can do so since an exhibition period of any film cannot cover 
the entire year.    
 22 
 
 More important, distributors must release a given number of movies within a limited time 
period, regardless of whether they would like to avoid other films or distributors. Competition is 
unavoidable; what really matters is when and with whom distributors compete. Distributors use 
certain criteria to select their opponents, and these criteria represent the key to determining the 
characteristics of competition in film markets. Yet, identifying individual distributors’ detailed 
selection criteria is difficult because the types of films that distributors handle vary. Additionally, 
an actor’s behaviors are embedded in a unique context defined by ongoing relationships with 
other actors, according to economic sociology; therefore, we can hardly expect these criteria to 
remain constant over time.    
 Nevertheless, we still have sufficient evidence that overarching rules must exist to guide 
or restrict all distributors’ behaviors because a market cannot function without them. As 
economic sociologists commonly emphasize, a market is sustainable only when its participants 
share common perceptions; in turn, these shared perceptions help produce rules that support 
repetitions of interactions among competitors (Fligstein 2001; Friedland and Robertson 1990; 
White 1981). These rules do not have to be rigid or detailed to qualify as market rules insofar as 
they can help actors to anticipate the behavior of other actors.  
 If avoiding certain opponents is possible, and nevertheless, if the competition itself is 
unavoidable, the most basic rule that guides distributors’ decisions would be simple and 
straightforward, i.e., to avoid other movies that are most likely to attract one’s own potential 
audiences. This precept per se is not difficult to follow. Due to the complex features of films and 
their markets discussed thus far, the true difficulty is identifying which films are more significant 
than others.   
 Indeed, all these unique situations described above are the exact reasons why specialized 
distributors are imperative in establishing rules that sustain film markets. Though no one can 
precisely predict the box-office revenue for a new film and the effect it will have on the box-
office ticket sales of other films, distributors can still distinguish, to some degree, which films 
will substantively threaten their own films. Distributors in the market have access to information 
about the past performance of each distributor and movie, so they form theories as to which films 
will most likely succeed or fail at the box office. By reading patterns of box-office performance, 
they can develop ideas about which of their competitors pose a threat. 
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 If distributors’ individual efforts for identifying invincible or beatable competitors come 
up with a consistent pattern of distributions at an aggregate level, it strongly suggests that 
distribution market participants are sharing common rules that penetrate the entire market. 
Likewise, if some shifts in preexisting distribution and/or competition patterns are found, it 
implies that, for some reasons, the rules of distinguishing optimal competitors or timings, the 
crucial components that define the characteristics of the film market, are modified as well. 
Therefore, when investigating any shifts in the film market, we have many reasons to focus 
primarily on the distribution and competition patterns among distributors.       
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Chapter 3: A Brief History of the Korean Film Industry and Its Recent Changes 
 
Sudden, large-scale fluctuations in the domestic film audience over the past few decades 
have provoked intense debates over diverse issues within the Korean film industry. Most 
debates, especially those related to recent growth, have placed too much stress on the positive 
(or, occasionally, the negative1) sides of the shifts without any clear evidence. Consequently, they 
fail to provide the necessary ground on which to answer various questions about the industry’s 
past and future.       
In this chapter, I will briefly describe the history of the Korean film industry, focusing on 
recent shifts at the domestic film box office and highlighting the following three points. First, the 
history of the Korean film industry is the history of the relationship between Korean and 
American films. In this sense, we cannot discuss recent shifts in the Korean film market without 
recognizing the influence of American films. Second, the competition between Korean and 
American films is a relatively new condition that most studies have not fully considered. Third, 
recent increases in the Korean film audiences are not informative in helping us discern the 
current status of the film industry; therefore, the observed changes require differentiated 
approaches. 
 
3.1 The Birth of the Korean Film Industry and Its Relationship with American Films 
The history of the Korean film industry begins with an American entrepreneur in Seoul 
who showed a filmstrip to the public that advertised tobacco in 1898. Since then and throughout 
the Japanese colonial period (1910–1945), motion pictures became a part of ordinary Korean 
citizens’ lives as popular entertainment. Most films during this period, however, were produced 
privately or with the support of individual capitalists. The market was so small that only 
residents in a few large cities had the chance to watch movies (Lee and Choe 1998; Lent 1990). 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the production of Korean feature films became an 
industrialized system. Inspired by the rapid growth in film audiences, government officials began 
to recognize film as an independent industry. They realized that high-quality films could help 
them to establish a positive international image and bring in foreign currency (Lent 1990). As a 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Kang 2004a and 2004b. 
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result, the first Motion Picture Law was established in 1962. According to this law, no individual 
could produce, screen, or import a film without the government’s permission and supervision. 
Although the law was revised four times in the 1960s and the 1970s, its primary objective—
keeping the film industry under government control—remained unchanged. 
 Apparently, these legal restrictions on business activities can be viewed as social and 
political control devices implemented by an authoritarian regime (Jin 2006; Park 2002). 
However, given the relationship between Korean and American films at that time, they may also 
be read as policies to protect Korean films from an inundation of American films in the domestic 
market. In the 1960s and the 1970s, American films were so popular that most film businessmen 
in the Korean market wanted to directly import as many American films as possible rather than 
investing in domestic film production. Once Korean importers and exhibitors imported American 
films at a certain price, they could keep any profit generated after the importation in their pocket. 
From the perspective of the Korean government, which intended to strategically develop the 
Korean film industry, the domination of the market by foreign films was seen as a serious threat 
to the domestic film production system. Therefore, the government allowed only about twenty 
companies to import foreign films; in return, these importers had to produce an assigned number 
of domestic films each year (Doherty 1984; Paquet 2005).  
This protectionist policy was effective to some degree, and the film industry expanded 
rapidly throughout the 1960s. For instance, in 1969 more than 230 domestic films were 
produced, and the total audience numbers were approximately 173 million, a figure that has not 
yet been exceeded (Kim 2003b).2 Accordingly, many scholars call the 1960s the “Renaissance” 
or “Golden Age” of Korean films because the period saw both solid industrialization and 
remarkable expansion (Yu 2000; Kim 2003b). 
However, the great success of the 1960s was only possible due to the non-competitive 
relationship between Korean and Hollywood films. Along with import restrictions and the 
mandatory production of domestic films by film importers, the Korean government started to 
practice the screen quota system (i.e., mandatory domestic film exhibition days imposed on each 
screen) in 1966. Because of comprehensive protectionist policies, American films were not in a 
                                                 
2 Between 1969 and 1970, the number of Korean film productions reached its peak (233 in 1969 and 234 
in 1970), and there were more than twice as many screened domestic films as imported films. However, the market 
share of the imported films was always greater than that of domestic films (i.e., between 57 and 81 percent during 
the 1960s and 1970s) (see Kim 2003b). 
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position to compete with Korean domestic films until the restrictions were lifted in the 1980s. 
However, major Hollywood studios did not react seriously to protectionist policies in such a 
small market as Korea because they were focusing more on the U.S. domestic market and larger 
overseas markets (Epstein 2005a; Guback 1969). 
        
3.2 Hollywood’s Exploration and Advance into the Korean Market 
After the Second World War, major Hollywood filmmakers started to take seriously the 
importance of foreign markets. They lost considerable proportions of domestic film audiences to 
television, and, as a consequence, had to find alternative financial sources to make up the deficit 
(Epstein 2005b). In comparison to their common pre-war practices, major Hollywood 
filmmakers started to more aggressively explore new overseas markets; their targets were not 
limited to Europe and also included Asia and Latin America. Eventually, they succeeded in 
taking a dominant position in almost every foreign market they entered. As a result of this new 
exploration, the market share of the six major Hollywood distributors in Europe and Japan 
gradually grew from 30% to more than 80% by 1990 (Epstein 2005b). In addition, American 
films in most countries could be released without any modification of the original content, which 
had initially targeted American audiences (Epstein 2005b; Gans 1962). Consequently, many 
countries reinforced protectionism and censorship against American films as the dominance of 
American films undermined the preexisting local market order (Fernández-Blanco and Prieto-
Rodríguez 2003; Guback 1969; Jäckel 2000; Schnitman 1984). 
 In Korea, the effect that television had on film audiences became evident in the mid-
1970s, reducing the total number of moviegoers to one-third of the 1969 record high. To make 
matters worse, an invasion of American films followed. In 1985, under pressure from the Motion 
Picture Exporters Association of America (MPEAA), which represents eight major Hollywood 
studios, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee began discussions with the Korean government 
regarding restrictions on the importation of American films and the screen quota in exhibition 
markets (Lent 1990; Paquet 2005). Later that year, the Korean government finally signed a 
bilateral agreement that allowed the direct distribution of American films in domestic markets 
and promised a step-by-step reduction in the screen quota.  
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 The most important effect of this agreement is found in the changing relationship 
between Korean and Hollywood films. Before direct distribution, revenues from American films 
could be reinvested in the production of Korean films because of the symbiotic nature of the 
relationship between importers and filmmakers.3 After direct distribution by American 
companies was allowed, however, major Hollywood filmmakers could earn $25 to 40 million per 
year from film rentals in the Korean market (Lent 1990). A considerable amount of money that 
could possibly have been used for the production of new Korean films left the Korean market. 
Consequently, the original non-competitive relationship between Korean and Hollywood films 
transformed into a competitive one that the Korean film industry had never experienced before.  
 The aftermath of this market opening turned out to be more alarming than had been 
anticipated. The market share of domestic films dropped as low as 15.9 percent in 1993, and the 
total number of movie audiences was only 42 million in 1996. Many industry experts and market 
participants began to worry about the complete collapse of the domestic filmmaking system, and 
conflicts between the government and industry leaders often emerged as a critical social issue. In 
short, the Korean film industry experienced its most serious and unprecedented crisis in the mid-
1990s.  
 
3.3 The Second Renaissance of the Film Industry and Its Problems 
Unlike the dire state of the film industry during the first half of the 1990s, its atmosphere 
in the late 1990s is much more optimistic. This sudden turnaround is often attributed to several 
factors, such as the new film promotion law, participation in the film industry by conglomerate 
companies, the foundation of the Korean film academy, and so forth. However, the substantive 
effects of these factors on the film industry are still under debate. By contrast, the most obvious 
factor that stimulated the industry was an increase in the number of domestic film consumers. 
Beginning with the box-office hit of a Korean blockbuster, Shiri (1999), the commercial 
success of large- and medium-size domestic films tripled audience numbers in a relatively short 
period. As Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 show, the number of domestic film viewers in Seoul was 8.5 
                                                 
3 In practice, the proportion of foreign film exhibition revenue reinvested in the new domestic film 
production was not that great because, in many occasions, film importers contracted small and indigent filmmakers. 
That is, in order to meet the mandatory domestic film production requirements, large importers tended to hire small 
filmmakers to produce cheap domestic films. Consequently, about 60 percent of domestic films between the mid-




million in 1999. However, this number continually increased until 2006 and finally exceeded 30 
million. Also, as shown in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2, the market share of domestic films finally 
exceeded that of American films (i.e., 49.4 compared to 43.5 percent) in 2003 and rose as high as 
60.4 percent in 2006.  
 Stimulated by audience growth, the number of industry participants also increased 
dramatically. As presented in Table 3.2, the number of filmmakers increased from 367 to 1,718 
between 1999 and 2006, and the number of screens tripled during the same period. Thanks to 
their improved global reputation, Korean domestic films often won awards at international film 
festivals, and their exportation to neighboring countries considerably increased (Lent 2008). As a 
result, many scholars and the mass media began to call this comprehensive growth the second 
renaissance of the film industry (Min et al. 2003; Kim 2007; Rist 2003; Yu 2000).  
 The primary difference between the film industry’s first and second renaissances was that 
the second came immediately after a significant industrial crisis. Unlike the relatively steadfast 
growth of the 1960s, industrial expansion in the 2000s was abrupt and dramatic, so it is 
understandable that the mass media and industry players focused more on positive shifts. 
However, one cannot ignore past industry trends. Many were reluctant to pay attention to the 
situation before significant growth began, or they preferred to redefine the uncomfortable past in 
a positive way.4   
 Two beliefs form the core of their optimism. First, the increase in film audiences 
demonstrates that the industrial system is working properly from production to consumption, and 
such a situation deserves to be called an industrial success. In other words, increases or decreases 
in audience numbers during a particular period are often used as a single barometer to evaluate 
the development of the entire industry. As Kim argued (2004b), however, the success of the 
entire Korean film industry might be nothing more than the exaggeration of an individual film’s 
or director’s successes.  
 Second, and more critical, many people tend to believe that the increased audience 
numbers are a natural outcome of improved film quality. By believing that the improved quality 
of Korean films led to the growth of domestic film audiences, mass media as well as industry 
experts legitimate their negligence in investigating the causal factors of these shifts. However, 
                                                 
4 For example, the period between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s was usually called an industrial crisis 
until the mid-2000. Now, it is re-defined as an industrial transformation period (Park 2007). 
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many scholars have addressed the possibility that the increase in domestic film audiences was 
triggered by a factor other than film contents or quality. For example, arguments pertaining to the 
discount benefits of domestic film ticket prices, which are a part of promotions by large credit 
card or telecommunication companies, were quite compelling, though they failed to offer more 
convincing evidence (Kang 2004b).      
 Researchers also have criticized the Korean film industry for adopting Hollywood’s 
blockbusterization strategy5 in order to escape from the industrial recession6 (Jin 2005 and 2006; 
Kim 2006a; Russell and Wehrfritz 2004; Yu 2000). Due to its intrinsic properties, a blockbuster 
film requires substantial production capital and a large marketing budget. Although a few 
blockbuster films can become box-office hits, most of them eventually fail to meet the 
expectations of their producers and investors, generating considerable financial losses (Shone 
2004). In Korea, for example, the two top-selling domestic films in 2004—Taegukgi and 
Silmido—were made, distributed, and screened according to a Hollywood-style blockbuster 
strategy, and they yielded 23.8 percent of total annual audiences (i.e., 6.1 million out of 25.5 
million in Seoul). Although approximately 90 percent of domestic films experience financial 
losses each year, these two films are still used as evidence of the domestic film industry’s revival.   
 Unfortunately, changes in the audience numbers during a given period contain extremely 
limited and superficial information; therefore, a blind belief in improved film quality and its 
connection with increased ticket sales is not supportable. Nevertheless, many people in the film 
industry tacitly agree that increased audience numbers are the single most conclusive evidence 
that the quality of domestic films has improved. If audience growth provides undeniable 
evidence for positive interpretations of recent shifts, then why did so many positive predictions 
about the film industry suddenly yield to negative ones when faced with the industrial downturn 
in 2007? The discussion thus far implies that we should look for more fundamental and 
systematic changes, rather than ups and downs in aggregate audience numbers, in order to 
comprehensively understand past shifts and to accurately diagnose the current status of the 
industry.  
 
                                                 
5 In the United States, blockbuster-style films emerged as the industry attempted to find survival strategies 
during Hollywood’s recession in the 1960s (Shone 2004). 
6 Actually, many researchers do not criticize blockbusterization per se but instead the loss of national or 
cultural identity in domestic films caused by the process of blockbusterization. For more details, see Jin (2005). 
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3.4 Lingering Concern about the Stability of the Korean Film Market 
Researchers studying the recent Korean film market must remember two facts. Although 
the Korean film industry has existed for more than half a century, only about twenty years have 
passed since domestic Korean films began competing with foreign films in the domestic market. 
The industry still may not have enough experience or accumulated knowledge as to how to 
survive in the market by dealing with the diverse strategies of foreign distributors.  
Second, the sudden increase in domestic film audiences during the last few years does not 
necessarily mean that Hollywood films have failed in Korea. Market shares of Hollywood films 
were relatively low in the middle of the 2000s mostly because domestic film audiences suddenly 
increased. However, Table 3.1 shows that the number of American film viewers stabilized 
between 17.7 and 19.7 million even while Korean film audiences were increasing at an amazing 
rate, from 18.2 to 25.5 million between 2002 and 2004.  
Given that Hollywood films still dominate the hierarchy in almost every global market, 
these two facts have even greater implications. Whenever major Hollywood distributors need to 
exploit the overseas market more aggressively, they have the potential to carry out their own 
decisions based on their economic and technological advantages or political lobbying power. 
Most Korean filmmakers are well aware of and seriously concerned about this power. This 
apprehension among Korean film industry leaders seems to be plausible considering that (1) 
Hollywood’s reliance on the overseas market has been increasing in the 2000s (Holson 2006; 
Trumpbour 2008) and (2) the Korean government cut the number of mandatory domestic film 
exhibition days (i.e., the screen quota) into half in 20067 as a result of the U.S. government’s 
political and economic pressure. Due to the vulnerable nature of the Korean film industry, 
debates on the crisis of the domestic film industry have persisted.  
The knowledge that domestic films have surpassed American films in ticket sales during 
the last few years cannot account for modifications in the ongoing relationship between Korean 
and American films. Likewise, domestic film audience numbers in the past do not provide any 
indication as to the industry’s future performance. Therefore, we need to uncover more 
systematic and empirical reasons for increases in domestic film audiences to accurately 
                                                 
7 For more details, see Iglauer (2006). 
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3.5 Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1 Audience Numbers and Their Proportions by Film Nationality (in Seoul; 1999 – 2007) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
American 13,261,561 15,095,296 16,233,078 19,726,300 19,200,876 19,366,071 18,229,916 17,662,029 24,193,887 
 (55.4) (55.0) (46.4) (48.8) (43.5) (41.2) (38.8) (34.9) (49.0)
Korean 8,483,945 8,799,953 16,131,887 18,246,590 21,800,075 25,513,346 25,832,185 30,521,843 22,356,207 
 (35.4) (32.0) (46.1) (45.2) (49.4) (54.2) (55.0) (60.4) (45.3)
Others 2,212,952 3,568,066 2,618,252 2,429,329 3,134,084 2,158,376 2,915,307 2,366,519 2,787,322 
 (9.2) (13.0) (7.5) (6.0) (7.1) (4.6) (6.2) (4.7) (5.7)
Total 23,958,458 27,463,315 34,983,217 40,402,219 44,135,035 47,037,793 46,977,408 50,550,391 49,337,416 
 






Table 3.2 Registered Industry Participants and Screen Numbers 
Year Production Importation Distribution Exhibition No. of Screens
1999 367 215 155 409 588
2000 715 347 259 466 720
2001 918 390 268 511 818
2002 1,081 428 290 557 977
2003 1,218 469 302 611 1,132
2004 1,375 509 315 654 1,451
2005 1,561 544 327 674 1,648
2006 1,718 566 348 716 1,880
 


























American Korean Others Total
 35 
 



















Chapter 4: Changes on the Audience Side – Preferences 
 
In the previous chapter, I ascertained that the increase in domestic film audiences was the 
key change in the Korean film industry during the last several years. At the same time, however, 
the appraisal of such a change has not been fully implemented due in large part to a general 
belief in the film industry, i.e., the increase in audience numbers is without doubt a good signal 
to the film industry, and for the same reason, it is the single most important criterion that proves 
industrial developments. In addition, such a belief is backed by another flimsy assumption that 
increases in ticket sales originated from improved film quality. 
The main goal of this chapter is to challenge such beliefs. However, it should be noted 
that this challenge is not necessarily for arguing that growing audiences can be detrimental to the 
industry or that the quality of Korean films has not improved. Rather, this chapter claims that 
because audience increases can derive from many different sources other than the quality of 
films, we do not have to mechanically construe those quantitative growths as the success of films 
or the film industry. For that matter, they may not be automatically good for the film industry. In 
other words, the audience increase in and of itself does not explain the duration or magnitude of 
its effect on the film industry.   
I have repeatedly mentioned that the connection between the improved quality of Korean 
films and increases in domestic film audiences has not yet been proven. However, if audiences’ 
preferences for Korean films substantively improved along with increases in ticket sales, perhaps 
additional investigation about the causes of box-office augmentation is not necessary. As the 
quality of a certain product improves, it tends to result in a better reputation; in turn, the 
improved reputation is likely to increase the preference level for that particular product. Only 
when the preference for the domestic films among Korean moviegoers has significantly 
improved, an insistence on improved quality can be feasible and we need to further investigate 
its relationship with the increased ticket sales. Hence, this chapter explores recent changes in 
audience preferences in terms of three different criteria—diversity, degree of overlap, and 
stability. Based on evaluations of these criteria, I will discuss whether the recent increase in 





4.1 Three Analytical Points – Diversity, Degree of Overlap, and Stability 
 The fewer restrictions a film has in reaching its audience, the more chances it has to earn 
high box-office revenues (Dale 1939; Guback 1969; Lee 2006 and 2008). Thus, filmmakers want 
their films to have fewer restrictions and more possibilities to access universal audiences 
(DiMaggio 1977; Stafford 2007). Here, “restrictions” can be interpreted in at least two different 
ways. In the international film market, restrictions represent any factors that make audiences 
avoid imported foreign films, e.g., language barrier, historical and political background, and 
cultural discount (Marvasti and Canterbery 2005; Guback 1969; Lee 2006 and 2008). In the 
domestic market, the restrictions are usually related to audiences’ socio-demographic variables 
such as age, gender, and social class (Barnett and Allen 2000; Knapp and Sherman 1986; 
Stafford 2007). When producing films, filmmakers have to focus on particular subgroups of the 
population because they cannot target the entire population as possible consumers. For instance, 
animated films, in general, draw the majority of their customers from families with small 
children whereas melodramas traditionally target female audiences in relatively old age groups 
(Hilscher et al. 2008; Redondo and Holbrook 2010).  
 As for the Korean film market, researchers have long believed that the socio-
demographic characteristics of the Korean film audience are not as diverse as those of 
Hollywood film audiences (Choe 1990; Seok 1993). Korean domestic films have long drawn 
their audiences from more specific and restricted segments of population; though, the Korean 
market is not alone in that regard. According to Schnitman (1984), targeting a more specific 
fraction of the audience is a common survival strategy of domestic film producers, especially in 
the markets dominated by Hollywood major studios. Thus, the first issue we must discuss is 
whether or not the audience of Korean films became more diversified in the 2000s.  
    Closely related to the diversity issue, the second focus of this study will be the extent to 
which Korean film audiences overlap with Hollywood film audiences. Due to American film’s 
dominant power in Korean market, domestic filmmakers should target segments of the 
population to which Hollywood filmmakers are less likely to pay attention. As a consequence, 
Korean films could avoid intense competition with Hollywood films and survive. But for the 
same reason, the socio-demographic characteristics of the Korean film audience have become 
considerably different from those of American film audiences. Therefore, we need to investigate 
whether the socio-demographic differences between Korean and American film audiences have 
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diminished with the increase in Korean film audiences. This in fact amounts to asking whether 
Korean and American films now have come to a phase where they compete with each other to 
win the same or similar audience groups. 
 Finally, I will consolidate findings from the previous two focal points to discuss whether 
or not Korean film audience groups have stabilized. As Fligstein argued (2001), the most 
important survival strategy for market participants is not to exterminate their principal 
competitors but to stabilize their interactions. In the context of the Korean film market, the key to 
evaluate the implications of recent changes will be whether or not Korean domestic films could 
secure a sizable and reliable audience vis-à-vis American films.  
However, less than a decade may not provide sufficient time to assess stability issues. 
More important, the data set does not provide specific variables that directly measure the 
stability of audience segments and distributions. Therefore, I will discuss the stability issue 
solely based on the findings of the two preceding analyses, namely, changes in diversity and the 
degree of overlap over time. 
 
4.2 Data and Variables for Analyses 
Film Audience Survey administered by Korean Film Council (KOFIC) is the main data 
set in this chapter. In Korea, the number of data sets dealing with the film audience is extremely 
small, except for those collected for individual research projects or business purposes. In the case 
of longitudinal data including repeated surveys, virtually no publicly available data existed until 
KOFIC launched the Film Audience Survey project in 1999. Many audience survey data sets, 
especially those that have been individually collected, have reliability problems. The Film 
Audience Survey, however, provides the best publicly available data set in that it was run and 
supervised by a trustworthy governmental organization.  
However, I should note that the data set has two problems that make it difficult to apply a 
variety of quantitative methods. The first problem involves weak comparability between surveys. 
Since 1999, KOFIC has given the survey annually; between 1999 and 2007,1 however, the 
research companies responsible for collecting data changed four times. Each time the companies 
changed, the format and questions of the survey changed. As a result, only four socio-
                                                 
1 The data set for 2002 is not available.  
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demographic variables maintained the same format throughout the survey years: age (“14~18,” 
“19~23,” “24~29,” “30~34,” “35~39,” and “40~49”), sex (“Male” and “Female”), education 
(“Middle School or Lower,” “High School,” “College,” and “Grad School”), and job (“Blue 
Collar,” “White Collar,” and “Housewife, Student, & Unemployed”).  
Second, most variables, including conventional interval-ratio variables, such as age or 
education years, were measured at ordinal level. This kind of situation often forces researchers to 
make a difficult decision regarding whether the ordinal variables should be treated as interval- 
ratio variables, which assume an equal distance between categories, or as nominal ones, which 
ignore the initial rank or hierarchy of categories (Norušis 2003). In this analysis, age and 
education variables must be used as categorical variables because the number of categories in 
each variable is quite small; we cannot expect enough variation of cases as an interval-ratio 
variable. For a similar reason, these variables are unlikely to meet the normality assumption at 
population level, which is often required for various interval-ratio level techniques.2 In short, the 
data set used in this chapter has some limitations that restrict applicable statistical methods. 
 
4.3 Classification of Film Audiences 
Two variables that address the respondent’s first and second preference for film 
nationality will be used as a single criterion in sorting the audience groups. For each of these 
variables, the survey gave respondents six or more country choices as possible response 
categories. Except for Korean and Hollywood (i.e., American) films, however, the categories for 
other countries were inconsistent between different survey years and not even mutually exclusive. 
Thus, I have re-grouped responses to these variables into three types for analytical parsimony: (1) 
American, (2) Korean, and (3) others.  
 Based on these three response categories, the combination of these two variables (i.e., a 
respondent’s most-liked and second most-liked film nationality) can theoretically produce nine 
types of audience preference groups (3 × 3 = 9). However, respondents were not allowed to 
choose the same country for both questions, which eliminates two cases (e.g., “Korean – Korean” 
                                                 
2 After sorting out respondents into seven subgroups (Refer to the next section for the classification 
method), I check the normality of “age” and “education” variables for four subgroups, which are the major target of 
this round of analysis, in each year’s data set. The results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test show that 
65.6% of age and education variables for these subgroups have a population distribution that is significantly 
different from a normal distribution (P < .05).  
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and “American – American”) from the possible combinations. Finally, as shown in Table 4.1, 
seven types of audience preference groups are generated, which identify individual’s favorite and 
second favorite film nationality.3 
 This study, however, will analyze only four groups whose favorite movie nationality is 
either Korean or American for the following reason. In each year between 1999 and 2006, 
Korean and American films together accounted for more than 90% of total annual ticket sales in 
the Korean market4 (except for 2000). Likewise, Table 4.2 shows that these four types of 
preference groups together account for 76.2% (in 1999) to 96.4% (in 2006) of all respondents in 
these data sets. In some years, like 2006 and 2007, respondents belonging to three marginal 
groups whose favorite film nationality is neither American nor Korean are too few to be taken 
into account (e.g., Persons whose most- and second most-liked film nationalities are both “others” 
account for  0.5% of respondents in 2007). The inclusion of those preference groups may impede 
the efficiency of analysis, unnecessarily complicating interpretation. 
In Table 4.1, individuals whose favorite films are American and second-favorite are 
Korean are called “general American film fans” because they are a dominant type of American 
film audiences in the Korean market; this type of audience was most common in 1999 (37.2%) 
and 2000 (36.0%). Since then, however, the group steadily declined before it resurged in 2007. 
The second preference group, consisting of respondents who like American films the most and 
other types of film the second most, is described as “anti-Korean film fans.” They do not 
necessarily have an aversion to Korean films, but people in this group are least likely to watch 
Korean film when choosing among these four preference groups because Korean films are not 
even their second favorite. In a similar manner, people in the third group that like Korean film 
most and American films next are called “general Korean film fans.” People in this group have 
been the most typical type of film consumers in the Korean market since 2001. Along with those 
in general American film fans, general Korean film fans account for between 55.1% (in 1999) 
and 80.5% (in 2006) of film audiences. Last, the fourth group is named “anti-American film fans” 
in the sense that they are least likely to consume American films. The proportion of this group is 
quite small, except for 2004 when its proportion was as high as 16.8%.      
                                                 
3 Note that the combination of “others” and “others” is possible because the category “others” originally 
consists of several different countries (e.g., European films for favorite and Hong Kong films for second favorite).   




4.4 Analysis of Audience Preference Groups 
 4.4.1 Diversity 
In the analysis rooted in perspectives from population ecology, measuring the diversity of 
audience segments commonly involves using standard deviations of demographic variables as a 
niche width measure (see Mark 1998; McPherson 1983; Popielarz and McPherson 1995). 
Applying such a method to this study is technically impossible because, as mentioned earlier, 
every available socio-demographic variable in the data set is categorical. 
Instead, the simple comparison of cell proportions can be used to capture the diversity of 
audience groups. When simultaneously combining the categories of these four socio-
demographic variables (i.e., age, sex, education and job), we end up with 144 (= 6 × 2 × 4 × 3) 
types of audience categories.5 After counting the number of audiences in each cell (i.e., the 
audience categories), we can dichotomize these 144 cells into 1 and 0, depending on whether at 
least one audience belongs to a given cell. If we then calculate the proportion of “occupied cells” 
(i.e., coded as “1”) out of 144 cells, we can compare the degrees of diversity for each audience 
group. In this measure, a greater proportion indicates a greater diversity of audience groups.  
The most easily noticed pattern from Table 4.3 is that the diversity of two Korean film 
audience groups (i.e., general Korean film fans and anti-American film fans) considerably 
improved as the overall size of these groups increased. In 1999, general Korean film fans had a 
slightly larger (sample) group size than anti-Korean film fans (130 as opposed to 134), but in 
terms of the number of occupied cells, it was smaller than anti-Korean films fans (47 as opposed 
to 49).6 As the group size increased over the years, general Korean film fans became the most 
diverse audience group.7  
Although this method provides an easy way to see an overall picture of audience diversity, 
its weakness is that it does not consider the different distribution of frequencies. Because of the 
                                                 
5 A few cells among those 144 are unrealistic. For instance, it is highly suspicious that any single 
respondent can fall into the cell like “age 1” (14 to 18 years old) and “education 4” (Grad school). Nevertheless, I 
kept those cells because their inclusion does not influence the cross-comparisons among the four audience 
subgroups. 
6 The difference between these two numbers is not statistically significant. 
7 Also, we should note that the correlation coefficient between the number of occupied cells in Table 4.3 
and their respective group size is .933 (N = 32). With the diversity measure based on simple proportion, it is difficult 
to figure out whether improved diversity among Korean film audience groups is directly caused by increased group 
size because this measure does not consider detailed distribution of audiences across socio-demographic categories.     
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dichotomization procedure, which is inevitable in this measure, it does not fully translate the 
different frequency of audiences in each cell into the proportion values. Consequently, this 
measure does not meet the criteria of “dual-concept diversity”8 (McDonald and Dimmick 2003). 
Among the dual-concept diversity measures, the most common and primary is the 
Simpson’s D, which is the sum of the squared proportion of categories and its subtraction from 
one9 (Simpson 1949). According to Lieberson’s interpretation, the Simpson’s D is “the 
probability of obtaining unlike characteristics when two persons are randomly paired” (1969: 
850). In other words, this index provides “the probability that two individuals selected at random 
from the population would be in different categories” (Agresti and Agresti 1978: 206). By 
applying this traditional diversity measure, we can find the comprehensive features of diversity 
that take the variable’s different frequency distributions (or concentrations) into consideration. 
Furthermore, we can discuss the magnitude of diversity at the population level because Simpson 
(1949) provided the exact variance of the measure.10 
However, applying Simpson’s D to multiple numbers of variables can complicate the 
analysis. Because there are too many fragmented tests, they are unlikely to present congruent 
results, which means that we need to reduce the number of tests by measuring the aggregate level 
of the diversity measure—i.e., the multivariate index of diversity or the multivariate Simpson’s 
D (Agresti and Agresti 1978; Lieberson 1969).11 
Unlike the univariate Simpson’s D, the multivariate Simpson’s D considers the number 
of different characteristics. For example, if five variables are used for this measure, then the 
maximum number of different characteristics for each pair is five. A pair of individuals who 
belong to different categories for three variables cannot be equally treated as a pair of individuals 
                                                 
8 See Appendix A for details of “dual- concept diversity.” 
9 As a matter of fact, the Simpson’s D is an unstandardized form of the Index of Qualitative Variation 
(IQV), one of the most common variation measures for categorical variables. Because the maximum value of 
Simpson’s D can vary depending on the number of categories, it could be difficult to directly compare two diversity 
indices if the possible category numbers are different between two variables. Thus, IQV divides the Simpson’s D by 
its maximum value, (k – 1)k, in order to set the maximum value to “1.”     
10 See Appendix B for its formula. 
11 Note that the advantage of (univariate) Simpson’s D over the IQV is its ease of interpretation—the 
probability that two randomly selected cases from the population would be in different categories. However, the 
multivariate Simpson’s D is not that easy to interpret. The best and easiest definition of multivariate Simpson’s D 
comes from Lieberson (1969: 853)—the “average proportion of disagreement between pairs on the characteristics 
under study.” Regardless of the way of interpreting the multivariate Simpson’s D, we can still directly compare one 
value of Simpson’s D with another as long as the number of categories in each variable is identical.   
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who differ from each other for only one variable, so the multivariate Simpson’s D weighs the 
degree of differences between these two pairs of individuals. 
Values of multivariate Simpson’s D listed in Table 4.4 give us a clear picture regarding 
the change of diversity in each audience group over the last several years. As previous studies 
about the Korean film market have argued, Table 4.4 shows that Korean film audiences had a 
lower degree of diversity in terms of their socio-demographic characteristics. In 2004, the 
multivariate Simpson’s D of general Korean film fans, for the first time, exceeded that of general 
American film fans: it was one year after Korean film box-office ticket sales exceeded those of 
American films. Since then, however, the differences between these two groups’ diversity index 
were not that great. As Table 4.5 demonstrates, the differences in the multivariate Simpson’s D 
between general American film fans and general Korean film fans were statistically significant 
until 2003. As soon as Korean fans’ multivariate Simpson’s D exceeded that of American film 
fans in 2004, the statistical significance disappeared. Hence, we can say that no substantive 
difference exists between Korean and American film audiences in terms of each audience’s 
socio-demographic diversity.  
 From comparisons of the diversity index among audience subgroups, I have found 
straightforward evidence for the following arguments. In the past, Korean films drew their 
audiences from smaller or more specific niches of the population than American films did. As 
the size of Korean film audiences grew remarkably in the 2000s, such differences blurred. 
Sample statistics suggest that the diversity indices for Korean film fans have significantly 
increased and that they surpassed the diversity indices of American film fans in 2004 and 2005. 
However, these results cannot be statistically supported. Therefore, it is fair to say that since the 
mid-2000s all four audience subgroups are drawing their audiences from almost equally diverse 
socio-demographic niches.  
  
 4.4.2 Degree of Overlap 
The second measure focuses on the degree of overlap between Korean and American film 
audiences. As demonstrated in the previous section, recent shifts in the Korean film market have 
brought considerable changes to the degree of diversity for each audience group. However, the 
diversity change of one audience group seldom occurs without affecting the diversity of other 
groups. If the type of variables that we use for the diversity measure is constant and the number 
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of categories (or ranges) for each variable is fixed, the number of audience categories classified 
in the whole population cannot increase any more. However, as one type of films develops, it 
tends to require wider niches (i.e., more diverse audiences), and sometimes it will unavoidably 
conflict with other types of film as the types of audience on which it can draw are limited. Thus, 
when identifying changes in audience diversity, we should investigate whether or not 
corresponding changes also occurred in the niche overlap between pairs of audience groups. 
In this section, the key question is whether or not the niche overlap between Korean and 
American film audiences has increased (or decreased). If socio-demographic variables are 
measured at an interval-ratio level, the common way to measure niche overlap is to use the 
overlap of ranges defined by each variable’s standard deviation (see Mark 1998; McPherson 
1983; Popielarz and McPherson 1995). However, we do not have a typical way to measure the 
degree of overlap for nominal- or ordinal-level variables. We may expect some assistance from 
traditional measures for the similarity of binary variables, such as simple matching coefficient or 
Jaccard’s coefficients (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984; Real and Vargas 1996). However, this 
analysis cannot use these methods because they are not a type of dual-concept overlap measure 
(McDonald and Dimmick 2003). 
Under these circumstances, an alternative measure that more systematically deals with 
the overlap issue is Lieberson’s D ( bD ). In the previous section, the way I compared the values 
of Simpson’s D from two different subgroups was to calculate the individual Simpson’s D’s first 
and then see if the two individual Simpson’s D values significantly differed. However, Lieberson 
defines “the diversity between two populations as being the probability, when one member is 
randomly selected from each population, that the two members are classified differently on the 
variable of interest” (Agresti and Agresti 1978: 218). In other words, the diversity between two 
independent groups can be measured by subtracting ∑ ݌௜ݍ௜௞௜ୀଵ  from 1 when { }ip  and { }iq are the 
sets of category proportions for the two groups and ∑ ݌௜ݍ௜௞௜ୀଵ  is the probability that the two 
randomly selected individuals from each group will be in the same category.  
 By calculating ∑ ݌௜ݍ௜௞௜ୀଵ  and its variance, we can estimate the extent to which socio-
demographic similarity (or overlap) exists between two randomly selected persons from each 
subgroup and its population-level probability. Like Simpson’s D in the previous section, we can 
extend this measure to the multivariate level (see formulas in Appendix B); thus, it is possible to 
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evaluate the similarity (i.e., the degree of overlap) of socio-demographic characteristics between 
a pair of audience groups more comprehensively.        
Table 4.7 presents the index of overlap transformed from multivariate Lieberson’s D12 
and its 95% confidence interval. From this table, we can see that the indices of overlap between 
pairs of audience groups usually move together in the same direction. Figure 4.1 shows this 
pattern well; with the exception of 2003, the overlap indices for each pair of audience groups 
decreased until 2004, but between 2004 and 2006, they suddenly soared. As mentioned above, 
this result could occur due to the tendency that a change in one group easily affects the other 
group’s diversity. Because the overlap indices for each pair of groups move together, the 
differences in overlap index between two pairs of audience groups are unlikely to be significant. 
Figure 4.2 compares 95% confidence intervals for overlap indices between pairs of audience 
groups. According to this figure, the overlap index between general American film fans and anti-
Korean film fans in 2003 was significantly lower than that of general Korean film fans and anti-
American film fans. This finding indicates that the similarity between two types of audience 
subgroups who like American films the most (i.e., “general American film fans” and “anti-
Korean film fans”) was lower than the similarity between two types of audience subgroups who 
like Korean films the most in 2003. Except for this one instance, I found no other statistically 
significant differences between the two overlap indices within the same years.  
 Finally, we should pay attention to the fact that the overlap index between general 
American film fans and general Korean film fans has considerably improved since 2004. The 
comparison of confidence intervals presented in Figure 4.2 cannot confirm that the overlap index 
between these two groups is significantly greater than any other overlap indices in a single year. 
However, we can still see that the sample statistic values of the overlap index for these two 
groups have been highest since 2005, and their magnitudes of increase over the last few years are 
statistically significant.13 From these results, we can estimate that since the mid-2000s, not only 
have general Korean film fans diversified, but also their socio-demographic profiles are 
becoming more similar to those of general American film fans. That is, Korean and American 
films are now drawing their audiences from more similar niches than before.   
 
                                                 
12 The same four socio-demographic variables are used for this measure—age, education, sex, and job. 
13 Some evidence for this claim can be found in Figure 4.3, and I will describe it more in the next section. 
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 4.4.3 Stability 
In the previous two sections, I found that (1) Korean domestic films have considerably 
improved their diversity in terms of audience profiles during the last few years; (2) although not 
statistically strong enough, many signals have appeared indicating that the degree of overlap in 
the audience niche between Korean and American films has noticeably increased. Given these 
two findings, the next topic to address is whether this increased diversity and/or the degree of 
overlap is constant over time.  
By virtue of the intrinsic properties of film market, a sudden increase or decrease in 
audience numbers is not unusual. This implicates that a rapid change in the diversity or the 
degree of overlap in audience profile can occur without any significant or fundamental shifts in 
audience preferences. Therefore, if we want to make it confirmed that the causes of recent film 
market changes are related to changes in diversity or degree of overlap index, first, we must see 
the stability of these indices.  
 As for the diversity of audience subgroups, the most straightforward pattern found in 
Table 4.6 is that general Korean film fans has very unstable diversity indices. In terms of 
multivariate Simpson’s D, only this subgroup repeats ups and downs significantly while the rest 
of the subgroups are relatively stable. Considering the uncertainty and instability of film market 
environments, increases and declines in one kind of index could be seen as natural. But the 
problem with this type of diversity index is that only this particular subgroup, i.e., general 
Korean film fans, has recently produced statistically significant changes.  
In the overlap index, I found a similar pattern. Except for one case described in the 
previous section, these overlap indices failed to present a statistically significant difference 
between any two pairs of audience groups within one year. However, Table 4.7 and Figure 4.3 
show that four statistically significant changes appeared when I compared the overlap indices 
between two consecutive years: between 2003 and 2004, [general American films fans & general 
Korean film fans] (P < .1), [general American film fans & anti-American film fans] (P < .1),14 
and [general Korean film fans & anti-American film fans] (P < .05); and between 2004 and 2005, 
                                                 
14 Between 2003 and 2004, overlap index changes for [general American films fans & general Korean film 
fans] and [general American film fans & anti-American film fans] are statistically significant at α-level 0.1, and 
these significances do not appear in Table 4.7 or Figure 4.3. 
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[general American films fans & general Korean film fans] (P < .05). This result suggests that the 
degree of overlap with general Korean film fans is relatively unstable.    
 The findings from these two types of indices are very consistent, indicating that the 
audience profile and distribution of general Korean film fans are very unstable. Korean domestic 
films have been drawing greater audiences recently, but the audience characteristics on which 
they rely have not been consistent. In order to examine this point, we should ask whether the 
multinomial distributions of combined socio-demographic variables for audience subgroups are 
equal to each other and consistent over time. Using the chi-square test, we can see whether the 
frequency distributions across 144 cells of socio-demographic categories15 are significantly 
different from each other (within a year) and relative stable over time (between years).  
   Before running the traditional chi-square test, I note that when we use the same 
classification scheme as above, the frequency tables in the current data set have many low-
frequency cells (i.e., just 1 or 2) and empty cells (which means “a sparse table”). In this situation, 
we may consider Fisher’s exact test or the Monte Carlo method. This round of analysis uses the 
estimated P-values from Monte Carlo method rather than asymptotically estimated P-values as 
the criteria to determine the equality of multinomial distributions.   
It is difficult to extract any meaningful patterns from Table 4.8, which presents the 
differences in multinomial distribution between two preference groups in the same year. During 
the first four years, the overall significance patterns look similar to diversity measures, but for 
last four years, the differences between [general American film fans & anti-Korean film fans] 
and [general Korean film fans & anti-American film fans] are more discernible than the 
differences between [general American film fans & general Korean film fans] and [anti-Korean 
film fans  & general Korean film fans]. To the contrary, test results from Table 4.9, which shows 
the distribution changes of individual preference groups over time, are straightforward. Only the 
multinomial distribution of general Korean film fans has produced significant changes in the past 
several years. Based on these test results, we can more firmly conclude that the socio-
demographic profiles of general Korean film fans, who account for the vast majority of Korean 
film consumers, are unstable.  
 
                                                 




4.5 Discussion  
The results from the three analyses so far provide conflicting answers to this chapter’s 
main questions—whether or not an audience’s preferences toward Korean domestic films have 
significantly increased, and if so, whether or not the growth in the Korean film box office has 
resulted from these increased preferences. On the one hand, the overall evaluation of Korean 
films among Korean audiences had substantially improved over the last decade, and no one can 
repudiate this change. The number of audience members whose favorite films are Korean 
remarkably increased,16 and now, Korean and American films are both competing for almost the 
same types of audiences in the Korean market.  
However, these positive signals are not sufficient to argue that the recent Korean film 
box-office growth originated with improved preferences among audiences. Many reasons exist 
for this negative conclusion, but the following two are most noteworthy. Basically, an audience’s 
preferences for a certain product are highly contingent on the actual consumption of that product. 
As more audiences watch Korean films, preferences for domestic films among Korean audiences 
tend to improve, and in turn, the diversity in Korean film audiences is likely to increase, as well. 
We have to consider the possibilities that the increased diversity of Korean film preference 
groups in those data sets directly resulted from increased ticket sales of domestic films, but not 
vice versa.  
More conclusive evidence should be found in the stability issue that we have discussed in 
the previous section. It is well known that the public’s preferences for cultural products tend to 
change easily. Without observing consistent patterns over a considerable time period, we cannot 
be sure whether newly observed preferences stably settle into some consumer groups or whether 
increases or decreases in preference levels are significant enough to change their behaviors. The 
third focus of this chapter well presents that the diversity of Korean film fans is noticeably 
unstable, especially in later data period, whereas that of American film fans does not show 
significant change. This contrast is reconfirmed in the final analysis showing that the 
multinomial distribution of general Korean film fans is unstable. These outcomes intimate that 
for years, Korean film box-office revenues were relying on inconsistent segments of the 
population while those for American films were being sustained by the same, unwavering 
                                                 
16 Refer to Table 4.2. 
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audience groups. If that is the case, the insistence on the causal relationship between the refined 
quality of Korean films and increases in the domestic film ticket sales cannot be supported; if 
audiences are truly fascinated by improved quality or contents of domestic films, they are 
unlikely to change their preferences within a short period. 
In sum, this chapter suggests that in spite of obvious improvements in preference toward 
domestic films, this changing preference or diversity per se cannot be convincing evidence for 
claiming that recent increases in domestic film ticket sales were mostly derived from improved 
preferences. Rather, it substantiates the possibility that the growth of domestic film ticket sales 
came from something other than audiences’ preference issues.  
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4.6 Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1 Classification of Audience Preference Subgroups 
 Most-liked 
2nd Most-liked American Korean Others 
American  General Korean Film Fans Others 1 
Korean General American Film Fans  Others 2 
Others Anti-Korean Film Fans 
Anti-American Film 










Table 4.2 Proportion of Audience Subgroups within a Year (%) 
Preference Group 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
General American Film Fans 37.2 36.0 27.1 27.0 24.8 22.0 20.8 34.2
Anti-Korean Film Fans 17.4 14.3 9.4 9.1 4.7 3.6 5.5 7.4
General Korean Film Fans 17.9 20.8 42.6 39.7 37.1 50.2 59.7 42.5
Anti-American Film Fans 3.7 6.1 9.1 12.3 16.8 9.6 10.4 8.8
(Subtotal) (76.2) (77.2) (88.2) (88.1) (83.4) (85.4) (96.4) (92.9)
   
Others 1 11.8 9.2 4.5 4.0 4.7 3.8 1.3 2.4
Others 2 8.3 8.6 5.6 4.9 8.7 10.0 1.5 4.3

















Film Fans Mean 
Year Freq. Proportion Freq. Proportion Freq. Proportion Freq. Proportion Freq. Proportion
1999 61 (0.424) 49 (0.340) 47 (0.326) 20 (0.139) 44.25 (0.307) 
2000 57 (0.396) 37 (0.257) 43 (0.299) 22 (0.153) 39.75 (0.276) 
2001 65 (0.451) 39 (0.271) 64 (0.444) 35 (0.243) 50.75 (0.352) 
2003 51 (0.354) 32 (0.222) 54 (0.375) 32 (0.222) 42.25 (0.293) 
2004 49 (0.340) 18 (0.125) 57 (0.396) 44 (0.306) 42.00 (0.292) 
2005 39 (0.271) 13 (0.090) 60 (0.417) 24 (0.167) 34.00 (0.236) 
2006 42 (0.292) 20 (0.139) 65 (0.451) 36 (0.250) 40.75 (0.283) 
2007 47 (0.326) 21 (0.146) 51 (0.354) 23 (0.160) 35.50 (0.247) 
Sum 411  229  441  236   















1999 Diversity 0.621 0.612 0.595 0.599
 Variance 0.014 0.016 0.020 0.013
 N 278 130 134 28
      
2000 Diversity 0.630 0.614 0.600 0.607
 Variance 0.014 0.019 0.021 0.018
 N 183 71 106 31
      
2001 Diversity 0.637 0.635 0.608 0.630
 Variance 0.010 0.006 0.019 0.015
 N 186 63 294 63
      
2003 Diversity 0.634 0.638 0.594 0.584
 Variance 0.010 0.008 0.031 0.037
 N 148 49 219 68
  
2004 Diversity 0.628 0.634 0.642 0.636
 Variance 0.014 0.009 0.011 0.012
 N 131 25 196 89
      
2005 Diversity 0.593 0.636 0.615 0.597
 Variance 0.023 0.023 0.018 0.020
 N 92 15 210 40
      
2006 Diversity 0.592 0.612 0.579 0.616
 Variance 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.017
 N 98 26 281 49
      
2007 Diversity 0.601 0.602 0.592 0.621
 Variance 0.019 0.016 0.026 0.011







Table 4.5 Differences in Multivariate Simpson’s D (within a Year) 
      1999  2000 2001 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007
General 
American 





0.009  0.016  0.002  -0.004  -0.007 -0.042  -0.02  -0.001
General 
American 





0.026 * 0.030 * 0.029 *** 0.041 *** -0.015 -0.022  0.013  0.01
General 
American 





























-0.004  -0.007  -0.022  0.01  0.006 0.018  -0.037 
* -0.029
 


















Film Fans  
1999-2000 -0.009  -0.002  -0.005  -0.008  
2000-2001 -0.007  -0.021  -0.008  -0.023  
2001-2003 0.003  -0.003  0.015  0.046  
2003-2004 0.007  0.004  -0.049 *** -0.052  
2004-2005 0.034 * -0.001  0.027 ** 0.039  
2005-2006 0.001  0.023  0.036 *** -0.020  
2006-2007 -0.009  0.010  -0.012  -0.004  
 
Note1: Negative signs indicate that the value of Simpson’s D increased between the two consecutive years 






Table 4.7 Overlap Index from Multivariate Lieberson’s D  
 Gen. Am. Fans Gen. Am. Fans Gen. Am. Fans Anti-Ko. Fans Anti-Ko. Fans Gen. Ko. Fans 
  & & & & & & 
Year  Anti-Ko. Fans Gen. Ko. Fans Anti-Am. Fans Gen. Ko. Fans Anti-Am. Fans Anti-Am. Fans 
1999 Index 0.374 0.387 0.380 0.378 0.374 0.395 
 S.E. 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.014 0.013 
 Upper Limit 0.384 0.394 0.392 0.394 0.401 0.421 
 Lower Limit 0.365 0.379 0.369 0.362 0.347 0.369 
 
2000 Index 0.372 0.378 0.366 0.379 0.364 0.389 
 S.E. 0.010 0.008 0.014 0.010 0.016 0.015 
 Upper Limit 0.391 0.394 0.393 0.399 0.395 0.417 
 Lower Limit 0.352 0.362 0.339 0.359 0.333 0.360 
 
2001 Index 0.362 0.365 0.354 0.363 0.354 0.376 
 S.E. 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.010 
 Upper Limit 0.374 0.376 0.369 0.380 0.373 0.397 
 Lower Limit 0.350 0.353 0.338 0.347 0.335 0.356 
 
2003 Index 0.358 0.375 0.377 0.370 0.375 0.407 
 S.E. 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.013 0.012 
 Upper Limit 0.372 0.389 0.389 0.394 0.401 0.431 
 Lower Limit 0.345 0.362 0.364 0.346 0.348 0.383 
 
2004 Index 0.357 0.358 0.359 0.344 0.353 0.349 
 S.E. 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.007 
 Upper Limit 0.375 0.368 0.367 0.360 0.376 0.361 
 Lower Limit 0.339 0.348 0.351 0.327 0.331 0.336 
 
2005 Index 0.365 0.392 0.384 0.358 0.352 0.379 
 S.E. 0.027 0.008 0.014 0.024 0.031 0.013 
 Upper Limit 0.419 0.408 0.412 0.405 0.413 0.404 
 Lower Limit 0.312 0.377 0.356 0.311 0.292 0.355 
 
2006 Index 0.391 0.408 0.375 0.391 0.374 0.386 
 S.E. 0.020 0.009 0.014 0.019 0.016 0.014 
 Upper Limit 0.431 0.426 0.403 0.428 0.405 0.413 
 Lower Limit 0.351 0.389 0.347 0.353 0.343 0.360 
 
2007 Index 0.386 0.401 0.373 0.387 0.379 0.374 
 S.E. 0.014 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.014 0.014 
 Upper Limit 0.413 0.416 0.397 0.419 0.408 0.402 







Table 4.8 Chi-Square Test for the Comparison of Multinomial Distributions (within a Year) 












 99% CI for MC Sig.
Year Groups Value DF LL UL  Year Groups Value DF LL UL 
1999 G1-G2 77.071 67 0.188 0.139   0.130 0.148  2004 G1-G2 65.344 52 0.101 0.086 * 0.078 0.093
 G1-G3 76.115 67 0.209 0.166   0.156 0.175   G1-G3 73.353 69 0.337 0.300   0.288 0.312
 G1-G4 64.237 63 0.433 0.446   0.433 0.459   G1-G4 60.840 61 0.482 0.514   0.501 0.527
 G2-G3 82.301 60 0.030 0.005 *** 0.003 0.007   G2-G3 93.249 61 0.005 0.011 ** 0.008 0.013
 G2-G4 51.267 51 0.463 0.489   0.476 0.502   G2-G4 58.194 49 0.173 0.122   0.114 0.131
 G3-G4 53.250 50 0.350 0.356   0.344 0.369   G3-G4 73.168 67 0.283 0.240   0.229 0.251
                                 
2000 G1-G2 61.737 59 0.379 0.371   0.359 0.384   2005 G1-G2 64.020 45 0.033 0.023 ** 0.019 0.027
 G1-G3 70.906 67 0.349 0.319   0.307 0.331    G1-G3 61.099 65 0.614 0.667   0.655 0.680
 G1-G4 62.064 60 0.402 0.419   0.406 0.432    G1-G4 53.044 44 0.165 0.108   0.100 0.115
 G2-G3 78.321 56 0.026 0.002 *** 0.001 0.004    G2-G3 88.010 61 0.013 0.054 * 0.048 0.060
 G2-G4 45.597 44 0.405 0.412   0.399 0.425    G2-G4 34.833 31 0.290 0.255   0.243 0.266
 G3-G4 51.477 49 0.377 0.374   0.362 0.387    G3-G4 84.985 64 0.041 0.032 ** 0.027 0.036
                               
2001 G1-G2 71.211 71 0.471 0.491   0.478 0.504   2006 G1-G2 36.950 45 0.798 0.871   0.862 0.880
 G1-G3 107.175 79 0.019 0.004 *** 0.002 0.005    G1-G3 74.984 71 0.350 0.335   0.323 0.347
 G1-G4 68.948 71 0.547 0.580   0.567 0.593    G1-G4 60.404 54 0.256 0.200   0.190 0.210
 G2-G3 88.615 68 0.047 0.047 ** 0.041 0.052    G2-G3 62.962 66 0.583 0.560   0.548 0.573
 G2-G4 60.276 54 0.259 0.165   0.156 0.175    G2-G4 30.185 40 0.870 0.984   0.981 0.987
 G3-G4 82.021 71 0.175 0.182   0.172 0.192    G3-G4 82.740 70 0.142 0.155   0.145 0.164
                        
2003 G1-G2 49.186 55 0.695 0.760   0.749 0.771   2007 G1-G2 54.779 49 0.265 0.264   0.253 0.275
 G1-G3 85.032 67 0.068 0.024 ** 0.020 0.028    G1-G3 56.021 59 0.586 0.634   0.621 0.646
 G1-G4 71.177 58 0.115 0.057 * 0.051 0.063    G1-G4 66.632 50 0.058 0.037 ** 0.032 0.042
 G2-G3 71.170 58 0.115 0.107   0.099 0.115    G2-G3 50.653 51 0.487 0.504   0.491 0.517
 G2-G4 60.065 47 0.096 0.018 ** 0.015 0.022    G2-G4 30.575 33 0.588 0.770   0.759 0.780
 G3-G4 48.449 57 0.783 0.826   0.817 0.836    G3-G4 86.418 55 0.004 0.003 *** 0.001 0.004
 
Note 1: * = P < .1; ** = P < .05; *** = P < .01 
Note 2: “G1” – General American Film Fans; “G2” – Anti-Korean Film Fans; “G3” – General Korean Film Fans; “G4” – Anti-American Film Fans 
 58 
 
Table 4.9 Monte Carlo Results of the Pearson’s Chi-Square Test (between Years) 




 99% CI for Sig. 




1999-2000 75.055 73 0.412 0.404   0.391 0.417 
2000-2001 77.527 76 0.430 0.421   0.408 0.434 
2001-2003 76.552 71 0.305 0.264   0.253 0.275 
2003-2004 61.967 63 0.513 0.546   0.533 0.559 
2004-2005 64.048 61 0.370 0.339   0.326 0.351 
2005-2006 63.410 53 0.155 0.083 * 0.076 0.090 
2006-2007 58.425 57 0.423 0.421   0.408 0.434 
         




1999-2000 57.635 56 0.415 0.420   0.407 0.433 
2000-2001 59.152 55 0.327 0.263   0.252 0.274 
2001-2003 54.129 54 0.469 0.509   0.496 0.522 
2003-2004 44.731 41 0.318 0.265   0.254 0.277 
2004-2005 30.400 26 0.251 0.169   0.159 0.178 
2005-2006 32.020 29 0.319 0.225   0.214 0.236 
2006-2007 29.320 30 0.501 0.613   0.600 0.626 
         




1999-2000 59.881 60 0.480 0.497   0.484 0.510 
2000-2001 64.602 68 0.594 0.630   0.617 0.642 
2001-2003 109.099 76 0.008 0.000 *** 0.000 0.001 
2003-2004 109.924 70 0.002 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 
2004-2005 107.786 73 0.005 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 
2005-2006 115.473 78 0.004 0.000 *** 0.000 0.001 
2006-2007 62.413 70 0.729 0.802   0.792 0.812 
         
         
Anti- 
American 
Film Fans  
1999-2000 26.984 29 0.573 0.701   0.689 0.712 
2000-2001 30.293 41 0.890 0.988   0.985 0.991 
2001-2003 53.263 50 0.350 0.283   0.271 0.294 
2003-2004 63.109 55 0.212 0.107   0.099 0.115 
2004-2005 57.471 53 0.313 0.255   0.243 0.266 
2005-2006 40.908 44 0.605 0.758   0.747 0.769 
2006-2007 49.489 46 0.336 0.273   0.262 0.284 
 










































Figure 4.2 Comparisons of Confidence Intervals for Overlap Indices (within a Year) 
 
 
Note. “G1” – General American Film Fans; “G2” – Anti-Korean Film Fans  
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Chapter 5: Changes on the Industry Side (I) – Distribution Patterns 
 
 Studies on shifted patterns of cultural product consumptions tend to consist of two parts: 
the immediate consumer-side investigation and an examination of the other side of the market 
transaction—i.e., producers and distributors (Gottdiener 1985; Storey 1999). Thanks to British 
Cultural Studies of the 1980s, the active roles that audiences play in receiving, choosing, and 
interpreting cultural goods are frequently highlighted today (Schor 2007; Smith 2001). However, 
the traditional importance of industry players, especially those who dominate the market, has not 
been undermined. As culture industry researchers indicate (Crane 1992 and 1997; Horkheimer 
and Adorno 2002 [1944]; Peterson 1994), monolithic companies in the broadcasting or the film 
industry still retain the potential to manipulate consumers’ preferences in favor of their own 
interests. Hence, we need to investigate any shifts in the cultural industry from both buyers’ and 
sellers’ sides (Gottdiener 1985; Storey 1999).  
Investigating industry players is particularly important to the Korean film industry that 
has been swiftly and comprehensively reconstructed over the past two decades. Since the 
inception of Hollywood’s distribution in the late 1980s, the Korean film industry has had no 
choice but to modify anything unsuitable for the changing industrial environment. Consequently, 
many organizations that had not previously existed in Korea emerged in the marketplace. Highly 
specialized and professionalized distributors are a good example.  
Distributors mainly determine an individual film’s release timing and scale, one of the 
most crucial factors in retrieving box-office revenue. The primary question that this chapter 
addresses is whether individual types of films in the Korean market, classified by filmmaker’s 
and distributor’s countries of origin, have developed discernible release patterns in both timing 
and scale over the past few years. If so, I will further examine the similarities and differences in 
the distribution patterns of different types of films and any significant changes to these patterns 
in more recent years. By answering these questions, we can find some basis for challenging a 
more important question: whether systematic changes in distributors’ activities have affected 
overall audience-side shifts in the last ten years? 
The chapter will answer this question in two different ways. To begin, I will see if each 
type of film, sorted by filmmaker’s and distributor’s nationalities, has a more preferable season 
for theatrical exhibition. Stated differently, the first focus will be whether distribution companies 
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in the Korean market have a typical season of the year during which they are more likely to 
release a certain type of films. If so, then, I will further probe whether each type of films has 
developed any particular periods for high-budget films for which distributors must retrieve a 
large amount of box-office revenue to make ends meet. That is, the second focus will be whether 
or not a certain type of films has formed temporal distinction of release times, not only against 
different types of films, but also within their own type of films depending on film scales or 
production costs. 
In the next section, I will explain why we should place distribution companies and their 
activities in the center of the industry-side analysis, as compared to other players in the film 
industry. Then, the following section will discuss crucial factors for identifying distribution 
patterns. Next, I will present my research design, with a brief description of the data sets to be 
used, and address the research questions introduced above. Finally, based on findings from the 
analyses, I will discuss what noteworthy changes in distribution patterns have occurred to each 
type of films. 
 
5.1 Key Film Industry Players – Distributors 
Today’s film industry consists of highly specialized organizations that cooperate 
organically under a well-defined division of labor. From pre-production design to theatrical 
exhibition, a single film must pass through numerous production and circulation steps, each of 
which is handled by individual organizations. Given that distributors are simply one type of 
player in film markets, why do we have to pay special attention to them? 
In general, distributors in cultural industries perform a gatekeeping role. Not only do 
they connect producers to consumers by conveying products, but they also mediate them by 
deciphering the volatile production environment and the mercurial preferences of consumers 
(Caves 2000). Distributors control the flow of cultural goods by making important decisions 
regarding who and what should be in the market, based on information collected from both sides. 
That is to say, distributors manage the whole industrial system (Hirsch 1972 and 1978; Peterson 
1994; Powell 1978). As technological developments continue to lower the production cost of 
cultural goods, this role has become more essential in recent years. Tapping into appropriate 
segments of consumers and securing distribution lines often turns out to be more critical than 
controlling the quality and quantity of goods (Hirsh 2000). 
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In particular, the distributors’ role in the film business is more salient than in any other 
cultural industry. The main function of film distributors appears to be selling individual films to 
domestic theaters and foreign importers. Considering the uniqueness of film production and 
consumption, however, we can never be sure that their role is restricted to a simple contract 
between filmmakers and exhibitors. From the filmmakers’ view, box-office revenues are the 
most important factor that determines their next movie production project (Guback 1969). 
Several considerations, such as release timing and scale, play a vital role in maximizing box-
office revenues,1 and they are predominantly determined by distributors. In other words, 
distributors are a key decision maker that could decisively influence an individual film’s 
commercial success and, at the aggregate industry level, the rise and fall of the entire industry. It 
is not a coincidence that major Hollywood studios have disproportionately focused on their 
distribution sectors, especially after The Paramount Decision (1948), which prohibited the 
vertical integration of the film business by forcing studios to divest their theater chains (Gomery 
1986; Menand 2005).  
 In the Korean context, we have even clearer reasons why distributors and their activities 
in the market must be the main subject of sellers’ side analysis. First of all, no specialized 
distributors existed in the Korean market until Hollywood distributors introduced their business 
in the late 1980s. Until then, most filmmakers sold their works to major theater owners who 
represented six exclusive local areas. Once films sold, the major movie theater owners who 
purchased them reserved all copyrights for the redistribution or resale of films to smaller movie 
theaters within their areas. Filmmakers needed to make sales contracts with major theater owners 
as early as possible to procure production costs (Kim 2007; Lee and Choe 1998).  
However, this kind of one-time and indirect distribution deal2 caused many harmful 
problems within the Korean film industry. More than anything else, it precluded capital 
accumulation in the production sector. The ticket sales that occurred after a film sale had no 
effect on the filmmaker’s additional revenues. Although some movies occasionally became box-
office hits, filmmakers often had insufficient production funding; therefore, they had no ability 
                                                 
1 See the next section for more details 
2 In general, this type of distribution system has been called “indirect” in that individual films are initially 
sold to six local theater owners and then sold or distributed again by those six theater owners to smaller distributors 
or theaters. By contrast, the new distribution system brought in by Hollywood majors has been called “direct” 
because each individual distributor covers the entire nation without any intermediary brokers.  
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or desire to invest more money to improve the quality of their films. Consequently, the scale of 
production budgets for Korean films stagnated or dwindled, as did their reputations. Eventually 
they could not meet audiences’ expectations and fell out of favor.  
 Obviously, this distribution practice has often been blamed for making the Korean film 
industry powerless in its struggle against market encroachment by Hollywood distributors in the 
1980s. However, recognizing the importance of the distributors was not easy at that time. For 
instance, the Korean government in the 1960s and 1970s was well aware of the potential of the 
film industry and initiated several supportive policies by modifying film laws. Failing to 
understand the critical role of distributors in the film industry, the government provided support 
mostly to production sectors and failed to break down the old industrial system (Park 1988). 
 By contrast, structural renovations in the late 1990s can be characterized by the birth of 
large-scale domestic distributors and their activities (Kim 2002). Of course, both quantitative and 
qualitative shifts in production and exhibition sectors are noteworthy, but I highlight the 
appearance of these new organizations for the following reasons. When the market opened to 
American distributors, domestic industry players were mostly concerned about the absence of 
large-scale companies, which they thought would shield the industry from the burgeoning 
influence of American movies. Although Korean distributors who emerged in the late 1990s 
were not as large as Hollywood studios, they were large enough to compete with any distributors 
in the market. Furthermore, they were well equipped with knowledgeable and skilled specialists 
who knew the Korean film business and its audiences. All of these factors regarding the 
emergence of domestic distributors suggest one clear point; for the first time ever, the Korean 
film industry has assembled the minimum conditions necessary for competing with American 
films. 
 
5.2 Three Factors in Distribution 
The ultimate goal of commercial films is to earn profits by providing audiences with a 
variety of entertainment. Apart from the intrinsic quality and reputation of individual films, 
distributors’ strategic decisions in the market often serve as key determinants of revenue. In 
order to generate greater revenues, distributors scrupulously monitor and make decisions about 
the following three factors.  
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 First, the number of opening-day screens3 is the most important factor in distribution due 
to its explicit association with audience numbers—the more screens, the larger the audiences 
(Chang and Ki 2005; McKenzie 2009; Moretti 2011; Moul and Shugan 2005; Walls 2009). 
While its positive effect on audience numbers is obvious, the number of launching screens tends 
to be affected by other factors even before reaching the distributor’s hands. For instance, summer 
blockbusters in general require a large amount of money for promotion and advertising, as well 
as production. To earn enough revenue, blockbuster filmmakers need to maximize the number of 
opening-day screens, which increases the probability of drawing large box-office revenues in a 
short period. Thus, the number of opening-day screens for each film has a strong correlation with 
its production scale, and sometimes these two variables can be used interchangeably (Walls 
2009).  
However, deciding the number of launching screens is still difficult because not all films 
that receive a large number of screens earn large box-office revenues. Especially for medium-
sized commercial movies, it is difficult to estimate box-office revenues based on the number of 
launching screens. Each distributor has a limited number of available screens, and disastrous 
opening weeks signify not only the filmmaker’s failure, but also the loss of distributor’s 
resources and time (Marich 2005). Therefore, the decision as to the number of opening-day 
screens still poses a serious risk for distributors. 
 Second, the release date is another important factor that distributors determine (Krider 
and Weinberg 1998; Litman 1983; Sochay 1994). Theatrical movies are a seasonal product; 
depending on the time of year, film consumption varies. Thus, individual films that select a good 
season, such as summer vacation or the Christmas holidays, receive an advantageous position 
from which to begin their runs. However, the release of a film during a high-demand season may 
or may not increase its audience numbers, as compared to the positive relationship that opening-
day screen numbers almost always have with box-office revenues. Good seasons are equally 
good for every film, and the competition during these periods is likely to overheat (Moul and 
Shugan 2005).   
                                                 
3 In the US, it is more frequently referred to as ‘the number of opening-weekend screens’ since most films 
are launched on Fridays with a certain number of screens and maintain the same number of screens over the 
weekend. Although this method of film releases is quite common in the Korean market nowadays, that was not the 
case for the majority of domestic films until the early 2000s. That is, there were many non-Friday openings, and 
occasionally, some films were removed from screens even before the opening weekend was over. Therefore, it is 
more appropriate to use the term ‘opening-day screens’ in the Korean context, instead of ‘opening-weekend screens.’ 
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 The last factor that distributors must consider is the other films in the market (Ainslie et 
al. 2005; Krider and Weinberg 1998). Regardless of the season in which the distributor releases 
the film, there are always multiple films running at a single theater. Assuming that the total 
number of audiences during a particular time of the year does not abruptly change, it would be an 
adverse period for distributors to release their films when other films are drawing large numbers 
of viewers. Additionally, when two or more films have similar topics and are playing at about 
same time,4 none of them will have good ticket sales because they share similar audience 
segments. 
 
5.3 Data Description 
 The Korean Film Year Book, published since the mid-1970s by the Korean Motion 
Picture Promotion Corporation (KMPPC), is the best and the most reliable data source in the 
Korean film industry. Since the Korean Film Council (KOFIC) replaced the KMPPC in 1999, the 
subjects addressed in this annual publication have gradually extended to cover more diverse 
areas of film business, such as audience preferences, independent film production and 
consumption, and film festivals. Consequently, this official report is now the source to which 
scholars most frequently refer in the study of Korean film industry.  
 I utilize the Korean Film Year Book from 2000 through 20065 as the main data source for 
the sellers’ side analysis. According to my initial research design, each individual film in the data 
must have a record of the opening date (or week), the distributor’s name, the filmmaker’s 
nationality, and the number of ticket sales. The Korean Film Year Book holds all of this 
information for each single film screened in the Seoul area since 2000.  
While this data source provides most of the necessary information, in several cases 
information is missing or suspicious. For such cases, I used the electronic files of monthly 
                                                 
4 The matchup between Dante’s Peak and Volcano in 1997 would be a good example (see Marich 2005, 
p.166–167). 
5 The year 1999 is often treated as an important watershed in Korean film history. In that year, the KOFIC 
was founded and launched many innovative projects (e.g., Annual Film Audience Survey). One of the first Korean 
blockbusters, Shiri, drew 6.2 million viewers, breaking the record for single film ticket sales. In addition, Korean 
conglomerates, such as Samsung, Daewoo, and Saehan, retreated from the film industry as the nationwide financial 
crisis (so-called, “the IMF era”) drastically shrank the film market. Because of the government’s support for venture 
investment, financial capital companies and other new distributors entered into the film industry and took care of the 
distribution business (Kim 2006a). All of these events suggest that, in principle, the year 1999 should be included in 
the data set for the analysis. However, the year 1999 was not included because the majority of screened films have 
no or dubious distributor data.  
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statistical reports on the film industry6 as a complementary data source. (These files are available 
at the KOFIC website; www.kofic.or.kr.) I also referred to Internet sources, such as Cine21 (a 
Korean weekly movie magazine; www.cine21.com) and IMDb (The International Movie 
Database; www.imdb.com), if necessary, as auxiliary data sources.          
 
5.4 Classification of Film Types  
 The primary goal of this chapter is to find typical distribution patterns for individual 
types of films in the Korean market and their changes over time, but an equally important second 
goal is to find similarities and dissimilarities of these patterns vis-à-vis different types of films. 
To this end, I classify film types according to the filmmaker’s country of origin. Considering 
recent trends in international joint film productions—i.e., two or more companies from different 
countries participating in a single film production—it is not always easy to identify a 
filmmaker’s nationality. The Harry Potter series, in which each film has been co-produced by 
companies from the U.S. and the U.K., would be a good example.   
In such cases, I followed the classification of the Korean Film Year Book without 
exception. This data source is convenient because it identifies only one nationality for each film. 
However, the problem is that it does not clearly explain its classification criteria.7 According to 
the KOFIC’s response to my personal inquiry, the primary classification standard applied to the 
Year Book is the nationality registered at the Korea Media Rating Board (KMRB). However, if 
the identified nationality is not clear, the KOFIC considers a variety of additional information, 
such as the directors’ nationalities, production companies, shares of production costs, and 
language used. As a result, many co-produced films, including many blockbusters (e.g., the 
Harry Potter series, 007 series, and the Lord of the Rings series), were tagged as an American 
                                                 
6 Unlike the Korean Film Year Book, these monthly reports do not cover the entire period between 2000 
and 2006, so I can only use them as an ancillary source.  
7 In some cases, the classification of film origin by the Korean Film Year Book can be disputed. For 
example, the 2001 film [Go] was made by a Korean-Japanese director with Japanese actors. In addition, it was made 
using the Japanese language in Japan. Nevertheless, the KOFIC categorizes it as a Korean film due to the fact that 
the production company was Korean. Films made by joint productions provide another example. According to this 
data source, [Shanghai Noon (2000)] is a Chinese film. However, its sequel, [Shanghai Knights (2003)], also known 
as [Shanghai Noon 2], is considered American. The latter case does not seem disputable because the IMDb (The 
International Movie Database), one of the most authoritative internet databases, also classifies it in the American 
film category. However, the IMDb identifies the nationality of the former film as both American and Hong Kong. In 
spite of these confusing cases, such controversial films are very few compared to the large number of films released 
each year; therefore, they do not seem to cause any serious problem for this analysis. 
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insofar as (1) Hollywood studios participated in the production and (2) the main language used in 
the film was English. 
 The second criterion of film classification is the nationality of the distributors, i.e., 
Korean or American. As highlighted above, American film distributors, not American films, 
drove the Korean film industry into unprecedented chaos in the late 1980s. This event 
demonstrates that pivotal competition factors in the Korean film market are not only “who makes 
the film” or “who is in the film,” but also “who brings the film into the market for whose profits.”  
Beginning with United International Pictures (hereafter, UIP) in 1988, the advance of 
major Hollywood studios in the Korean market ended in the early 1990s.8 Since then, they have 
been distributing a considerable proportion of American films in the Korean market, most of 
which they or their affiliates produce. These studios have occasionally distributed non-American 
films, even Korean domestic films. However, the number of non-American films released by 
Hollywood distributors during the data period is so small that we can ignore them. Therefore, I 
apply the second criterion of film classification (i.e., the nationality of the distributors) only to 
American films. 
 Relying on these two criteria, we can propose four types of films: (1) Korean domestic 
films (almost completely distributed by Korean distributors), (2) American films distributed by 
Hollywood studios, (3) American films distributed by Korean distributors, (4) other9 types of 
films (non-Korean and non-American films distributed by either Korean or American 
distributors).  
 
5.5 Three Levels of Films Based on Opening-Day Screen Numbers10 
Movies provide audiences with various types of information and entertainment, so the 
film types have changed and developed to meet the needs and demands of both filmmakers and 
audiences. Many different types of genres, styles, and technical trends exist in which individual 
films are rooted; however, we group them together as “movies” for convenience. In this analysis, 
we should pay more attention to fundamental differences in the mode of making and distributing 
                                                 
8 UIP (1988), 20th Century Fox (1988), Warner Bros. (1989), Columbia (1990), and Buena Vista (1993)   
9 In order to avoid possible confusion, the fourth type of film category will hereafter be noted as italic 
(e.g., other types of films). 
10 For this section, refer to Figure 5.1, the distribution of opening-day screen numbers for entire films in 
the data.  
 70 
 
movies, depending on the film types sorted by their intrinsic purposes and functions. For 
example, we often divide the film types into commercial and non-commercial films based on the 
original purpose of a film production (Moul and Shugan 2005). The critical difference between 
the two is whether the production of the film was profit-driven or not, as the word commercial 
indicates.11  
Since the invention of film, entertainment functions have been traditionally the most-
pursued property of movies. We do not expect certain genres, such as documentary or avant-
garde films, to draw large numbers of viewers.12 Thus, their production budget and the number 
of opening-day screens tend to be small compared to those of ordinary commercial films. Even 
though some non-commercial films are simultaneously released and screened with commercial 
films, we can hardly assume that they compete with one another for the same type of audiences. 
Rather, we can presuppose that non-commercial films are likely to adopt a different strategy of 
distribution from ordinary commercial films in order to focus on their specific segment of 
moviegoers (Aufderheide 2007). If we analyze the distribution pattern of all movies in the 
market without such a consideration, we could complicate the analysis and fail to arrive at a clear 
view of the current film market. 
For this reason, I will conduct this chapter’s analyses separately, if necessary and 
applicable, based on different scales of opening-day screens. As discussed earlier, two 
variables—the production budget and the number of opening-day screens—can be 
interchangeably used in defining the characteristics of a film and its distribution (Guback 1969; 
Moul and Shugan 2005). While the number of launching screens for individual films is public 
information, production costs are often unavailable and inaccurate. Because of this reality, the 
number of launching screens would be a good, if not better, indicator for classifying non-
commercial films. If some movies have extremely small opening-day screen numbers, it provides 
indirect but very strong evidence that those movies were made on a small budget. These 
                                                 
11 The definition of “commercial” films is not straightforward as its boundaries are blurred with those of 
other types of films. Hereafter, I will use this term following the general definition by Cones (2008): “Commercial – 
When used as an adjective, … it is indicating the power of the project to draw paying customers to view it.” (p. 95) 
[Italic added].    
12 Although recent years have seen many exceptions, such as Michael Moore’s “Fahrenheit 911(2004),” 
the number of non-commercial films that draw a notable commercial success is still very few.    
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filmmakers expected a relatively small numbers of viewers,13 which means that these films do 
not directly compete with other commercial films. Therefore, we need to separate films with 
fundamentally different purposes and distribution strategies from typical commercial films in 
order to capture more accurate distribution and competition patterns of commercial films. 
Singling out competitive commercial films based on opening screen numbers is not a 
straightforward decision for two reasons. First, the total number of screens available in the 
Korean market has soared since the late 1990s, and the possible influence by a particular number 
of opening-day screens has changed accordingly. For instance, 20 launching screens for Korean 
films was above average in 2000 (Y = 15.12), but it became far less than the average in 2006 (Y
= 44.82). Second, typical opening-day screen scales are quite different depending on the 
nationality of the filmmakers and the distributors. The opening screen numbers for films 
distributed by Hollywood studios are generally large because these distributors focus more on 
seasonal blockbusters. By contrast, independent films from third-world countries have very few 
opening-day screens.14 Thus, when identifying films with small numbers of opening-day screens, 
we should consider at least two additional variables, i.e., “year” and “type of film.” 
 In this chapter and the next, the initial analysis will be performed for all movies screened 
in Seoul, regardless of their opening-day screen numbers. (Hereafter, I will call this analysis 
[Level 1].) In order to account for the issues discussed thus far, I grouped individual films based 
on the release year and the type of film (i.e., four types of films sorted in the previous section). 
Then, I calculated the z-score of opening-day screens within each group. The same kind of 
analysis performed at [Level 1] will be repeated after removing the films whose opening-day 
screen numbers are smaller than the z-score, -.67. (Hereafter, I will call this analysis [Level 2]15.)  
Under the normal curve, the area covered by z-score -.67 or smaller is equal to the lower 
quartile. Because the distributions of opening-day screen numbers within each group are not 
                                                 
13 According to the data set used in this chapter, the correlation coefficient between an individual film’s 
opening-day screen number and its audience size in the Korean market between 2000 and 2006 is .722 (P < .01). 
14 In Figure 5.1, the majority of films whose opening-day screen numbers are one or two belongs to other 
types of films. 
15 Unlike Korean or American films whose average opening-day screen numbers have continually increased 
year after year, other types of films have an unusual distribution of launching screen numbers. Especially since 
2004, the proportion of movies with small-scale openings (i.e., one to three screens) in this category has 
significantly increased (50.7% in 2004 and 64.4% in 2006), while very few films have considerably large numbers 
of opening screens. As a result, the overall shape of the distribution for launching screen numbers for this type of 
film became extremely right-skewed, and consequently, no film has a z-score smaller than -.67. Thus, for the period 
from 2004 to 2006, the constitution of other types of films has no difference between [Level 1] and [Level 2]. 
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normally shaped, we should not expect that this procedure will cut off the lower quartiles. 
However, it roughly eliminates the lower quartile of films from each group, decreasing the total 
number of cases (i.e., films) to 1,480 (about 72.0% of the initial case number, 2,055). 
For the [Level 3] analysis, I have adopted the same elimination standard—i.e., z-scores 
based on the release year and the type of film—with a higher cutoff point by removing films 
whose opening-day screen numbers were smaller than the mean value (i.e., z-score = 0) within 
each group. While the [Level 2] analysis intended to exclude non-competitive and/or non-
commercial films, the [Level 3] analysis aimed to reveal the distribution patterns of high-profile 
films.   
Obviously, distributors cannot assign a large number of opening screens to every film 
they release. Therefore, deciding the release time and scale is a critical procedure for distributors 
that requires accumulated knowledge from the arts and sciences (Marich 2005). In this situation, 
the opening-screen scales assigned by distributors are usually proportionate to anticipated 
audience numbers (Elliott and Simmons 2008). If one film has a large number of launching 
screens, the distributor who released the film expects to draw large box-office revenues from it, 
despite exposing itself to greater risks. Thus, separating and focusing on high-stakes competition 
may result in patterns of distribution that differ from those of the two previous levels.  
 
5.6 Analyses 
 Scholars in film-related studies have a tendency to focus disproportionately on the 
demand or consumption side while leaving matters on the supply side barely explored. For 
instance, arguments about a movie’s seasonality, one of the most popular topics in this area, 
originate from two premises (Einav 2007; Krider and Weinberg 1998; Marich 2005). Each year 
has particular periods in which people are more likely to go to movie theaters, which means that 
audience numbers are unevenly distributed. Additionally, audience numbers are likely to repeat 
similar patterns of fluctuations across years. Here, we need to notice that arguments about the 
consumption patterns of movies (i.e., the movie’s seasonality) are completely based on the 
demand side. Due to the interdependence between demand and supply, many people surmise that 
high demands provoke high supplies, or vice versa. Consequently, systematic studies focusing on 
the pattern of film supply or distribution are rare. 
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In reality, however, the number of audiences in a certain period is not always 
proportional to the number of films released in the market (see Ko and Kim 2005). I see two 
explanations for this discrepancy. First, if a certain film dominates ticket sales, the size of 
prospective audiences for other films will suddenly drop due to the winner-take-all property of 
the film market (Frank and Cook 1995). By nature, such a situation discourages the release of 
other films, regardless of film types. Second, we can imagine the opposite situations in which 
many different types of films are jumbled together in the market at the same time. We see this 
kind of situation more frequently during the typical low-demand season of the film market. 
Because distributors are generally reluctant to release large-scale films in this period, no single 
dominant film is likely to overwhelm the entire market. Despite the large number of films 
running at theaters, the total potential number of moviegoers in the entire film market during 
such a period is relatively small because it is a low-demand season. These explanations indicate 
that the mechanism of film supply (i.e., film releases) can substantially differ from that of the 
demand (i.e., audience sizes).  
Focusing on the supply side only, I will first see whether or not each type of film sorted 
by filmmaker’s and distributor’s countries of origin has shown any noticeable patterns of 
distribution during the last seven years. However, the term pattern may be too broad in meaning. 
As in the two premises of film seasonality introduced above, we should adopt two criteria in 
determining whether a pattern exists or not; first, are there preferred release periods for different 
types of films, and if so, have such preferred release periods stayed constant over the years? 
Table 5.1 shows the monthly number of films releases between 2000 and 2006. This 
table provides baseline information, including an overarching view of the market’s distribution 
patterns. The actual number of films released each month is in bold, and their percentages out of 
the annual total are italicized. As the last column shows, the annual totals of released films have 
changed noticeably over the years. Therefore, we should refer to the percentages, instead of the 
raw monthly number of released films, when comparing months across years. 
In order to better capture distribution patterns, months with more than an average 
percentage (i.e., more than 100/12 = 8.33%) of released films are shaded in gray. Although the 
combination of white and gray cells may look like a Rorschach test, a few patterns are 
discernible and deserve a brief discussion. For example, releases of Korean films seem to be 
more concentrated during the second half of the year (12 gray cells in the first half versus 24 
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gray cells in the second half), and this pattern has become more evident since 2002. In fact, the 
concentration of domestic film releases during the second half of the year can be taken for 
granted. As the overwhelming influence of Hollywood blockbusters diminishes in July or early 
August, domestic distributors can place their films relatively easily in the market until another 
blockbuster season starts during Christmas and the New Year’s Day break. In addition, the 
traditional Korean holiday season, Chuseok, is in September or October; therefore, the demands 
for the new films are likely to increase. 
As for American films distributed by both Hollywood studios and Korean distributors, 
more were released during the first half of the year, but the differences between the numbers of 
films released in the first and the second half do not seem as great as those of Korean films. Also, 
I found it interesting that during the months commonly known as Hollywood’s blockbuster 
season, i.e., May to August and December to January, Hollywood distributors actually release 
very few films. As discussed previously, this is probably the situation in which one or a few 
influential (blockbuster) films detain the entrance of other films released not only by Korean 
distributors but also by other Hollywood distributors. 
 Table 5.1 provides a good point at which to begin developing a rough sense of 
distribution patterns for each type of film, especially because pertinent previous studies are rare. 
However, it does not provide any concrete grounds for arguing whether patterns of distribution 
formed during that period. The lack of rigidity is due mostly to the lack of explicit criteria in 
making two determinations: (1) how large the difference in released film proportions needs to be 
in order to be considered significantly different and (2) how long such a difference needs to last 
in order to be called a pattern. In the next section, I will use a statistical method to resolve these 
problems.   
   
 5.6.1 Friedman Test  
 I employ the Friedman test16 to see whether some months have significantly higher mean 
ranks in terms of film release frequencies, assuming that months are the categories (k = 12) and 
distribution years are the sets of observations (n = 7). The months in each year are ranked 1 (for 
                                                 
16 For details of the Friedman Test, see Appendix C.  
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the lowest release frequency) to 12 (for the highest release frequency). If two or more months 
have the same number of released films, I use the average rank of these months.  
 Table 5.2 shows the results of the Friedman test for each type of films at three different 
levels. When every single film, regardless of its opening-day screen numbers, is included, the 
arrangement of ranks in the leftmost table is consistent with the pattern that I discussed in Table 
5.1; Korean films are more likely to be released during the second half of the year, while 
American films distributed by Hollywood majors are released mainly during the first half of the 
year (see the highlighted months for each type of film17). However, even at the very liberal 
significance level (i.e., α = 0.1), neither of them has a statistically meaningful high-supply season. 
Instead, American films distributed by Korean companies and other types of films have 
relatively clear distinctions between high- and low-distribution months. A similar pattern is 
visible even after we remove the films that have very small opening-day screen numbers (see the 
table in the middle). As we narrow down the range of targeted films to include only those with 
higher than average opening-day screen numbers, the original significance found in American 
films distributed by Korean companies and other types of films disappears. Instead, Korean 
domestic films gain very strong evidence against the null hypothesis.  
 I summarize the distribution patterns found in Table 5.2 as follows. Regardless of the 
number of launching screens, Korean films had their favorite distribution months in the second 
half (i.e., from August to November) for the last seven years. Although this pattern fails to obtain 
statistical evidence at the first two levels of opening-day screen numbers, it can be statistically 
supported by the highest opening-day screen level in the test. In terms of American films 
distributed by Hollywood studios, I cannot find any months that have a significantly higher mean 
rank than those of other months. Also, the top-ranked months differ from each other depending 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that if and only if some categories have a significantly large sum of ranks, we can 
reject the null hypothesis of the Friedman test. In other words, only when the differences in sum of ranks between 
categories that have the highest and the lowest mean rank are sufficiently large, the overall test result can be 
significant. Therefore, rejecting the null in the Friedman test indicates that at least one highly ranked category (i.e., 
top-ranked) has a significantly higher sum of ranks than at least one low-ranked category. We can see which 
categories have a significantly higher rank by performing various post hoc tests. One of the simplest methods is to 
compare the difference between two categories’ sums of ranks and the score computed on the basis of standard 
normal distribution, i.e. ( 1) / 6z nk k  ; for more details, see Gibbons and Chakraborti (2003) and Sheldon et al. 
1996). According to these post hoc test results, the significant Friedman test results in Table 5.2 usually come from 
the sum of rank differences between one or two top-ranked months and one or two bottom-ranked months. 
Therefore, the two highest ranked months are highlighted for comparison across different types of films.  
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on the level of opening-day screens (i.e., [Level 1] through [Level 3]). Last, American films 
distributed by Korean companies and other types of films have significantly higher ranks of 
months, but these months are scattered in both the first and the second half; contrary to Korean 
films, they lose statistical support at [Level 3]. 
 In order to further investigate the patterns in Table 5.2, I divided the time periods into 
two. The first year in the history of Korean film that Korean domestic films exceeded American 
films in terms of audience numbers was 2003; thus, I divided the seven-year period into the first 
three (2000 to 2002) and the last four years (2003 to 2006). For each time period, I repeated the 
Friedman test against the four types of films. The result is summarized in Table 5.3. Korean 
films have meaningful differences between high- and low-distribution months for the last four 
years (i.e., between 2003 and 2006), and this pattern is identical across all three levels of opening 
screen numbers. Obviously, this finding indicates that Korean films have established their 
preferable distribution periods in more recent years. By contrast, American films distributed by 
Hollywood majors do not have such a difference between high- and low-distribution months. For 
the last four years at [Level 1], American films distributed by Hollywood distributors obtain a 
very weak significance from the Monte Carlo estimation, but otherwise, I did not find any 
interpretable patterns regarding top-ranked months. Third, American films released by Korean 
distributors have a reverse pattern against Korean films. At all three levels of analysis, they have 
fairly consistent high-distribution months in the first half of the year between 2000 and 2002; 
statistical significance supports this pattern quite well. However, both the consistency and the 
statistical significance disappear for the last four years. Other types of films have quite consistent 
high-ranked months for both periods. However, while the first three years have the highest-
ranked months in the first half of the year (i.e., March and April, except for [Level 3]), the last 
four years divide the two top-ranked months into April and September. Also, only at [Level 1] 
and [Level 2] analysis between 2003 and 2007, the differences between high- and low-
distribution months were statistically significant.    
 
 5.6.2 One-Way ANOVA  
 The analyses in the previous section solely relied on the frequency of film releases in 
searching for distribution patterns; therefore, they did not show anything about the characteristics 
of films released in each month. While the analyses carried out by the Friedman test effectively 
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grasp quantitative shifts of film numbers in the market, we have yet to learn what kind of films 
have prevailed in which seasons. Therefore, we still need to investigate more qualitative aspects 
of distribution patterns and their changes over time.  
In this section, I will see how the average opening-day screen numbers in each month 
have changed during the recent seven-year period by means of a one-way ANOVA test. As I 
described earlier, the scale of opening-day screen numbers is one of the most prominent and 
straightforward indicators that suggests various characteristics of films. Although we are 
dependent on a quantitative feature of film releases, this test can illuminate more qualitative 
aspects of individual films. 
 Using a one-way ANOVA test, I will compare the average opening-day screen numbers 
in each month (k = 12) over the last 7 years (n = 7) in order to see whether each type of film has 
a particular period(s) in which distributors are more likely to release large-scale films. If I can 
find such a period(s), as with the Friedman tests in the previous section, I will divide the seven-
year period into the first three and the last four years to find more recent changes.  
However, we should consider the recent, rapid augmentation of the number of available 
movie screens in the Korean market before running the analysis. Each screen number used in this 
analysis needs to be converted into a standardized score based on its release year and film type 
(i.e., four types of films classified by the filmmaker’s and the distributor’s countries of origin). 
Then, I will compare ANOVA test results from the z-scores with those from original opening 
screen numbers.  
The first ANOVA test results in Table 5.4 make one explicit suggestion: films 
distributed by Hollywood majors clearly distinguish between large- and small-scale film seasons. 
Although Korean films and Korean-distributed American films have a somehow significant 
difference of average opening screen numbers between large- and small-scale film seasons in 
standardized scores, such a distinction is even more salient for American-distributed American 
films in both standardized and unstandardized monthly opening scales. According to Tukey’s 
HSD (Honest[ly] Significant Difference), the average opening scales of American films released 
by Hollywood distributors during May, June, July and December are significantly greater than 
those of most other months. Korean films and Korean-distributed American films, however, have 
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only one month with a larger average opening scale (i.e., September for Korean films and 
December for Korean-distributed American films).18   
 To a certain degree, these findings are not surprising in that American films have a 
typical blockbuster season from May to August and from December to January. Thus, a greater 
average opening scale for these periods is not unusual. It also seems natural that Korean films 
have a higher average opening screen count in September and October because, as described 
previously, these months are strategically more advantageous due to the absence of Hollywood 
blockbusters and the overlap with the traditional Korean holiday season. 
If I run the same ANOVA test for first three years (i.e., 2000 to 2002), the results differ 
from my earlier findings. While American films distributed by both Hollywood majors and 
Korean companies do not show considerable difference from the initial ANOVA test, the 
significance for standardized Korean films’ opening scale has disappeared. Instead, other types 
of films reaches statistical significance, and the Tukey’s HSD shows that August has a 
significantly large average opening scale.  
 However, the ANOVA test results for the last four years seem quite different from those 
for the period between 2000 and 2002. While American films distributed by Hollywood studios 
show a consistently large opening scale during the traditional blockbuster seasons, the remaining 
types of films show results that conflict with those of the first three years. As Korean films gain 
statistical significance for both standardized and unstandardized average opening scales, the 
remaining two types of films—American films distributed by Korean companies and other types 
of films—lose statistical significance.  
                                                 
18 Because the small sample size (n = 7) is applied to this analysis, it is necessary to check the robustness of 
ANOVA test. As researchers know, the F-test is not robust when the homoskedasticity assumption is broken. For 
such a case, some alternatives like Brown-Forsythe test or Welch test have been recommended. However, according 
to Glass and Hopkins (1996), if the test design is balanced, the ANOVA tests are robust with respect to the 
homoskedasticity assumption and therefore no preliminary test is needed to confirm the equal variances. In terms of 
type I error, Hartung et al. (2002) show that the classical F-test is superior to any modified F-tests, even in the case 
of small samples. When the null hypothesis is rejected, the probability of type I error is not significantly smaller or 
greater than the given α-level. However, measuring type II error for small samples is quite complicated and even 
controversial. According to Cohen (1977), when α = .1, n = 7, k = 13, and the effect size (f) = .50, the estimated 
power is .93, which is sufficient for any type of significance test. If effect size (f) is assumed .25, the estimated 
power drops to as low as .37, all other things being equal. In the worst case, the estimated power is only between .19 
and .33 if this small sample problem is combined with any other violation against assumptions, such as normality 
and homoskedasticity (Hartung et al. 2002). Therefore, we should note that even in the cases that a certain ANOVA 
test has a large P-value, this result does not necessarily mean that the largest difference between two average 
monthly opening scales is statistically ignorable or that the difference is zero at the population level.  
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 ANOVA tests so far have demonstrated two congruent characteristics of film distribution 
in the Korean market. First, American films released by five Hollywood distributors have well 
distinguished large- and small-scale movie seasons, and these distinctions have remained 
relatively consistent over the last seven years. By contrast, the remaining three types of films 
have, to some degree, experienced shifts in these distinctions. Originally, Korean films had a 
weak or possibly no distinction between large- and small-scale movie seasons. In more recent 
years, the distinction has become more discernible. American films released by Korean 
companies and other types of films showed changes that ran in the opposite direction. These two 
types of films retained a fairly well defined, large-scale movie season for first three years, but 




Throughout the analyses in the previous sections, I found several discernible shifts 
regarding individual kinds of films’ release timings and opening-day screen numbers. These 
shifts lead me to pose a few key questions, such as “how could these shifts be derived?” and 
“what would be the practical meaning of having typical distribution periods?” Also, “what would 
be the possible impact of these shifts on the entire distribution market?”  
Suppose that a distributor is uncertain of the optimal release point for its movies. Under 
such a circumstance, the best choice it can make is to refer to the experience of other distributors, 
especially those who have handled similar types of films (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Han 
1994). If distribution environments in a particular time period are friendly to a certain type of 
films and every distributor in the market is aware of that relationship, distributors will release 
more films belonging to that particular kind during the given period, attracted by the period’s 
known advantages. At the same time, if a certain type of films dominates a particular period, the 
entrance of other types of films into that period will be more difficult. This mechanism tends to 
reinforce the dominance of a single type of films during a certain period, and in turn, the period 
can function as a foothold for that kind of films when extreme uncertainty makes the distribution 
timing decision more difficult. 
 Then, how can we interpret the phenomenon that a certain type of films has a larger 
launching scale during some periods? It indicates that the distribution of that particular type of 
 80 
 
films has been internally modified, according to its own rules of temporal separation. As 
repeatedly mentioned, there is a tendency that some properties of an individual film, especially 
the production budget, predetermine distribution timing. For example, summer seasons are 
obviously advantageous for high-budget blockbuster films worldwide because they have the 
largest number of potential moviegoers.  
In the view of blockbuster distributors, releasing their films during typical blockbuster 
seasons is inevitable because these periods have the highest probability that their film will 
become a box-office hit. However, blockbuster seasons are equally good for all other 
blockbusters; thus, they have to share these release periods, which means that they must draw the 
maximum number of audiences within a short period. Otherwise, few opportunities remain for 
them to recoup their production costs. In this sense, securing a large number of opening-day 
screens is not an option for blockbuster distributors but an imperative in maximizing box-office 
revenues. As a result, large-scale movies with a large number of opening-day screens often seem 
to appropriate summer seasons.  
From the perspective of distributors dealing with medium- or small-sized films, yielding 
summer seasons to blockbuster films is not necessarily disadvantageous. Because blockbuster 
seasons are concentrated in limited time periods, these distributors can target blockbuster-free 
periods with less risk of failure. They can also strategically place different types of films into 
blockbuster seasons to attract audiences without a taste for blockbusterized films.  
In this regard, a higher opening-day screen season can reflect the fact that distributors 
who deal with similar types of films share well defined rules and experiences. Temporal 
separations between large- and small-scale movies are only possible when distributors who are 
competing for a similar type of audience share collective experiences and unspoken rules 
developed from their experiences. Furthermore, those rules and separations can only be 
maintained if they reduce the degree of uncertainty attached to distribution timing selections. 
 From the analyses thus far, we can see that in more recent years Korean domestic films 
have succeeded in having both preferable seasons of releases19 and, within these seasons, a 
                                                 
19 In fact, the high frequency of domestic film releases during the second half of the years, especially around 
the Chuseok holiday season, is not a completely new trend. According to Ko and Kim (2005), since the opening of 
the distribution market in 1988, distributors had a tendency to release more Korean domestic films during the second 
half of the years. However, it is more important that until then, new (direct) distribution system had not yet settled 
down in the Korean market and no systematic activities by domestic distributors were observed. 
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particular period for large-scale films. Table 5.3 shows that Korean films did not have a 
preferred release month for the first three-year period. Either they did not have a month that 
consistently ranked high in film release frequencies or that the differences between high- and 
low-ranked months were not significant. In more recent years,20 Korean films finally found 
preferable and possibly advantageous time periods. Also, Table 5.4 shows that the separations 
between large- and small-scale films were not noticeably developed during the first three years, 
but they became more prominent during the last four years.  
We might expect that Korean films would open more between August and November 
when their most serious rivals, Hollywood blockbusters, are least likely to be released. Similarly, 
it would be understandable if films with large opening-day scales prevail in September or 
October as these periods overlap with the traditional Korean holiday season. Indeed, the point 
that the analysis results in this chapter consistently emphasize is that in spite of these obvious 
market conditions, Korean film distributors could not create such patterns in the early 2000s, and 
more importantly, these patterns only became possible in more recent years. 
As for American films distributed by Hollywood majors, I observed no significant 
distinction between the most and the least preferable release seasons for the last seven years, and 
the same holds true for a comparison of the first three and the last four years. Does this 
information mean that this type of film does not have a definable pattern? The answer should be 
“no,” and the reason for this answer is visible in close examination of the second analysis. As 
Table 5.4 demonstrates, Hollywood films have the most explicit distinction between large- and 
small-scale movies. This distinction implies that blockbuster films have priority in the 
distribution lineup for Hollywood films and that distributors arrange overall distributions on the 
basis of these blockbusters. 
To further our understanding of Hollywood movies’ distribution patterns in the Korean 
market, two facts are worth noting. Only five21 Hollywood distributors are conducting business 
in the Korean market, and not every film produced by major Hollywood studios is released in the 
Korean market. The first point indicates that Hollywood majors, i.e., the members of MPAA 
                                                 
20 The separation scheme of the first 3 and the last 4 years is quite arbitrary, so I cannot claim the exact 
period when the argued changes emerged. Instead, the test results demonstrate that the changes were made in later 
periods rather than in early periods. 
21 The number reduced to four in 2007. Sony Pictures and Buena Vista combined their distribution channels 
under the name “Buena Vista Sony Picture Releasing.” 
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(Motion Picture Association of America),22 understand that undue or overheated competition in 
overseas markets would not increase anyone’s profits. The UIP, a joint venture of Universal 
Studios and Paramount Pictures, provides one supporting example as it once worked for other 
MPAA members, including Disney, MGM, and DreamWorks. The number of overseas 
distribution companies for Hollywood majors has been always smaller than the number of 
Hollywood majors, which implies that these studios have collaborated to avoid unnecessary 
competition and to maximize their benefits in ancillary markets.  
In the similar contexts, Hollywood majors do not (perhaps, cannot) bring every single 
film that they or their affiliates produce into the foreign market for two reasons. First, their 
distribution lineups are already full of blockbusters, and they must care more scrupulously for 
these films. Second, overly aggressive film distribution may backfire given that overseas markets 
almost always have multiple local films that exclusively target local audiences. 
Under these circumstances, it is not unusual that American films distributed by 
Hollywood majors do not have any months in which they rank significantly and consistently 
higher in film release frequency. Distributors carefully arrange the distribution lineups of 
Hollywood majors through direct and indirect cooperation among MPAA members. Therefore, 
they will not release too many films within a short time period,23 or they will shift the release 
timing for other films depending on blockbuster film schedules. We can hardly conclude that 
American films distributed by Hollywood majors do not have any patterns. For the last seven 
years, Hollywood studios have maintained a well-designed pattern of distributions in the Korean 
market. 
With regard to American films distributed by Korean companies, we can see that this 
type of film experienced significant shifts in the last seven years. Test results from Table 5.3 and 
5.4 consistently demonstrate that this type of film used to have more preferable months of the 
year for its releases and a clear distinction between large- and small-scale films between 2000 
and 2002; both trends disappeared in the later four years. In order to understand why these shifts 
occurred, we should remember that during the last seven years Korean films achieved 
unparalleled box-office growth. Simultaneously, they have drawn attention from the mass media 
                                                 
22 It is also notable that the MPAA is the parent organization of the MPA (Motion Picture Association), 
formerly known as the MPEA (Motion Picture Export Association) (Scott 2004, p.34 & p.56). 
23 We may refer to the mean of standard deviations of monthly released film frequencies (i.e., Korean films 
= 2.092, American films by Hollywood majors = 1.797; n = 7). 
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and improved their overall influence on the market. As a result, Korean films have gained more 
priorities than Korean-distributed American films in the market.  
Then, we can explain the disruption of the relatively well-organized distribution pattern 
of Korean-distributed American films with the following assumption. The release schedule of 
Korean-distributed American films became contingent on the release timing of both Korean 
films and Hollywood’s directly distributed films. When Korean companies distribute American 
films, they must observe the release points of both Korean films and Hollywood-distributed 
American films, and then carefully decide their release points. Consequently, it became more 
difficult for Korean-distributed American films to find optimal release spots or maintain 
stabilized distribution patterns. This assumption is very likely because the same Korean 
distributors distribute many imported American films as well as Korean domestic films.24  
 Last, other types of films show a statistical significance in the difference between high- 
and low-release months between 2003 and 2006. Does this information mean that other types of 
films have recently found their own preferable season(s) of the year, just like Korean films? The 
answer to this question may be positive, but it needs some clarification. Tables 5.1 through 5.3 
show that other types of films were more frequently released in spring (i.e., March and April) 
and fall (i.e., September and October), and this tendency became stronger during the last four 
years (see Table 5.3). The spring release concentration is completely understandable because as 
the least popular type of movies at the Korean box-office, other types of films need to search for 
the least competitive time slots. Consequently, March and April would be rational choices. Then, 
how can we explain the increased likelihood that these types of films will open in September and 
October, months in which Korean films prefer to be launched? Does it mean these films prefer to 
compete with Korean films? This time, the answers are negative because these periods are 
popular among large-scale Korean movies. A large proportion of other types of films has only 
one or two launching screens, and this proportion has steadily increased in recent years (47.6% 
in 2000 and 57.6% in 2006); therefore, we can hardly expect that other types of films released in 
September or October will compete with large-scale Korean films. 
Regarding other types of films’ recent distribution pattern shifts, another important point 
we must consider is that they have lost a significant proportion of audiences in the last seven-
                                                 
24 Some distributors specialize in only one type of film (i.e., either Korean domestic films or imported 
Hollywood films), but the number of such distributors is relatively small.  
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year period (3.56 million in 2000 to 2.37 million in 2006 in Seoul). In other words, they have 
already lost multiple audience segments on which they used to rely. It would be natural for them 
to decrease the number of opening-day screens to minimize possible losses and to search for 
safer release points to avoid competition with other films. 
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5.8 Tables and Figures 
Table 5.1 Monthly Film Release Frequencies (by Four Types of Films)  
Korean Films        
Year JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Total
2000 6 10.3 3 5.2 7 12.1 4 6.9 3 5.2 6 10.3 5 8.6 4 6.9 4 6.9 7 12.1 4 6.9 5 8.6 58 
2001 4 7.7 5 9.6 4 7.7 2 3.8 6 11.5 3 5.8 2 3.8 6 11.5 3 5.8 5 9.6 8 15.4 4 7.7 52 
2002 8 8.0 3 3.0 6 6.0 8 8.0 12 12.0 9 9.0 6 6.0 9 9.0 9 9.0 9 9.0 12 12.0 9 9.0 100
2003 3 4.6 4 6.2 2 3.1 8 12.3 5 7.7 5 7.7 4 6.2 8 12.3 6 9.2 7 10.8 9 13.8 4 6.2 65 
2004 5 6.8 6 8.1 7 9.5 6 8.1 4 5.4 6 8.1 9 12.2 8 10.8 7 9.5 5 6.8 5 6.8 6 8.1 74 
2005 6 7.1 5 6.0 4 4.8 6 7.1 8 9.5 5 6.0 6 7.1 8 9.5 14 16.7 4 4.8 10 11.9 8 9.5 84 
2006 7 6.5 9 8.3 9 8.3 8 7.4 7 6.5 8 7.4 7 6.5 15 13.9 12 11.1 4 3.7 14 13.0 8 7.4 108
             
             
American Films Distributed by American Distributors      
Year JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Total
2000 7 9.6 6 8.2 6 8.2 5 6.8 7 9.6 6 8.2 7 9.6 6 8.2 8 11.0 5 6.8 5 6.8 5 6.8 73 
2001 3 4.9 4 6.6 7 11.5 3 4.9 7 11.5 4 6.6 6 9.8 7 11.5 6 9.8 4 6.6 6 9.8 4 6.6 61 
2002 3 3.9 5 6.6 9 11.8 8 10.5 8 10.5 6 7.9 6 7.9 8 10.5 4 5.3 6 7.9 10 13.2 3 3.9 76 
2003 3 4.2 7 9.9 7 9.9 6 8.5 7 9.9 6 8.5 3 4.2 4 5.6 6 8.5 12 16.9 6 8.5 4 5.6 71 
2004 5 6.7 11 14.7 7 9.3 11 14.7 3 4.0 6 8.0 3 4.0 4 5.3 9 12.0 3 4.0 7 9.3 6 8.0 75 
2005 5 7.7 8 12.3 4 6.2 6 9.2 6 9.2 3 4.6 7 10.8 5 7.7 5 7.7 4 6.2 7 10.8 5 7.7 65 
2006 4 5.9 6 8.8 7 10.3 9 13.2 5 7.4 5 7.4 6 8.8 4 5.9 6 8.8 4 5.9 5 7.4 7 10.3 68 
             
             
American Films Distributed by Korean Distributors      
Year JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Total
2000 3 3.2 9 9.7 8 8.6 12 12.9 8 8.6 7 7.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 10 10.8 8 8.6 10 10.8 5 5.4 93 
2001 3 3.8 10 12.5 9 11.3 9 11.3 4 5.0 9 11.3 4 5.0 7 8.8 8 10.0 5 6.3 8 10.0 4 5.0 80 
2002 6 10.5 6 10.5 5 8.8 4 7.0 5 8.8 6 10.5 3 5.3 5 8.8 3 5.3 6 10.5 5 8.8 3 5.3 57 
2003 7 17.1 2 4.9 3 7.3 2 4.9 1 2.4 1 2.4 3 7.3 3 7.3 4 9.8 5 12.2 7 17.1 3 7.3 41 
2004 1 2.3 5 11.4 5 11.4 5 11.4 2 4.5 3 6.8 2 4.5 4 9.1 3 6.8 3 6.8 6 13.6 5 11.4 44 
2005 5 10.2 3 6.1 5 10.2 3 6.1 3 6.1 6 12.2 4 8.2 3 6.1 4 8.2 5 10.2 3 6.1 5 10.2 49 
2006 5 9.8 4 7.8 5 9.8 9 17.6 3 5.9 3 5.9 2 3.9 2 3.9 4 7.8 3 5.9 8 15.7 3 5.9 51 
             
             
Other Types of Film      
Year JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Total
2000 6 5.8 6 5.8 8 7.7 14 13.5 7 6.7 5 4.8 6 5.8 5 4.8 10 9.6 15 14.4 11 10.6 11 10.6 104
2001 5 5.7 10 11.5 14 16.1 11 12.6 3 3.4 9 10.3 5 5.7 4 4.6 6 6.9 5 5.7 11 12.6 4 4.6 87 
2002 7 12.3 2 3.5 9 15.8 7 12.3 4 7.0 5 8.8 2 3.5 8 14.0 3 5.3 2 3.5 3 5.3 5 8.8 57 
2003 3 4.8 4 6.3 2 3.2 8 12.7 7 11.1 4 6.3 1 1.6 5 7.9 2 3.2 13 20.6 6 9.5 8 12.7 63 
2004 3 4.0 6 8.0 1 1.3 11 14.7 4 5.3 7 9.3 3 4.0 7 9.3 9 12.0 9 12.0 7 9.3 8 10.7 75 
2005 7 6.8 3 2.9 10 9.7 17 16.5 7 6.8 7 6.8 10 9.7 8 7.8 10 9.7 8 7.8 9 8.7 7 6.8 103





Table 5.2 Friedman Tests and Kendall’s W – Different Levels of Opening-Day Screen Scales 
 
         All Films [Level 1]    GT Z-score -.67 [Level 2]      GT Z-score 0 [Level 3] 
Month Korean ABA ABK Others Korean ABA ABK Others Korean ABA ABK Others
JAN 4.857 3.857 6.286 4.429 5.929 4.214 5.500  4.071 3.929 4.929 6.000 5.143 
FEB 4.786 8.071 7.857 3.929 4.714 6.714 6.500  4.286 5.071 5.714 4.643 4.571 
MAR 5.786 8.571 8.357 7.071 4.786 7.429 7.500  7.071 5.214 6.286 7.500 8.071 
APR 5.643 7.357 7.714 10.714 7.286 7.857 8.429  10.429 8.286 5.643 7.786 7.286 
MAY 6.143 7.929 4.000 5.786 6.071 6.429 3.786  6.357 4.786 6.214 3.857 6.071 
JUN 6.214 5.143 6.857 5.857 4.786 5.071 8.214  6.429 5.643 6.143 8.500 6.286 
JUL 5.214 6.571 3.571 4.500 4.857 7.286 4.714  4.071 5.714 8.571 5.071 4.500 
AUG 9.357 5.929 5.000 5.786 7.786 5.929 6.429  6.286 6.071 7.500 7.214 7.571 
SEP 7.929 7.571 6.857 7.786 8.786 6.214 4.071  7.429 9.643 6.714 5.143 7.857 
OCT 6.071 4.500 7.357 7.214 7.286 5.214 8.500  7.286 6.786 4.857 6.571 8.000 
NOV 9.286 7.571 8.857 8.143 8.214 8.929 8.214  7.071 9.571 6.857 7.857 7.643 
DEC 6.714 4.929 5.286 6.786 7.500 6.714 6.143  7.214 7.286 8.571 7.857 5.000 
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Kendall's W 0.197 0.202 0.236 0.282 0.184 0.139 0.242 0.254 0.295 0.125 0.194 0.170
chi-square 15.149 15.571 18.190 21.730 14.145 10.713 18.623 19.555 22.720 9.596 14.924 13.060
df 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Asympt. Sig 0.176 0.158 0.077 0.027 0.225 0.468 0.068 0.052 0.019 0.567 0.186 0.289
Monte Carlo 
Sig. 0.166 0.148 0.064 0.018 0.218 0.481 0.056 0.041 0.012 0.590 0.178 0.292
Upper 
Bound 0.157 0.139 0.058 0.014 0.208 0.469 0.050 0.036 0.009 0.577 0.168 0.280
Lower 
Bound 0.176 0.157 0.070 0.021 0.229 0.494 0.062 0.047 0.015 0.603 0.188 0.304
 
Note: ABA – American films released by American distributors; ABK – American films released by Korean distributors 
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Table 5.3 Friedman Tests and Kendall’s W – Comparisons of the First 3 and the Last 4 Years 
[Level 1] Korean ABA ABK Others 
Month First 3 Last 4 First 3 Last 4 First 3 Last 4 First 3 Last 4 
JAN 6.667 3.500 4.333 3.500 4.167 7.875 6.167 3.125
FEB 3.667 5.625 5.000 10.375 10.500 5.875 5.000 3.125
MAR 6.667 5.125 9.500 7.875 7.833 8.750 10.333 4.625
APR 3.500 7.250 4.333 9.625 8.667 7.000 10.333 11.000
MAY 7.833 4.875 10.000 6.375 5.500 2.875 4.333 6.875
JUN 7.000 5.625 5.667 4.750 8.333 5.750 5.667 6.000
JUL 3.833 6.250 8.000 5.500 2.667 4.250 3.667 5.125
AUG 7.667 10.625 8.833 3.750 5.667 4.500 5.000 6.375
SEP 5.333 9.875 7.667 7.500 6.667 7.000 6.500 8.750
OCT 9.333 3.625 4.333 4.625 7.500 7.250 6.333 7.875
NOV 9.333 9.250 7.500 7.625 8.167 9.375 8.167 8.125
DEC 7.167 6.375 2.833 6.500 2.333 7.500 6.500 7.000
N 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Kendall's W 0.335 0.434 0.460 0.388 0.504 0.302 0.359 0.421
Chi-Square 11.068 19.111 15.176 17.068 16.641 13.278 11.852 18.544
df 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Asymt. Sig. 0.438 0.059 0.175 0.106 0.119 0.276 0.375 0.070
M.C. Sig. 0.463  0.033  0.142 0.086 0.088 0.278  0.391  0.044 
Upper 0.450  0.028  0.133 0.078 0.080 0.266  0.378  0.039 
Lower 0.476  0.038  0.151 0.093 0.095 0.289  0.403  0.049 
[Level 2] Korean ABA ABK Others 
Month First 3 Last 4 First 3 Last 4 First 3 Last 4 First 3 Last 4 
JAN 7.833 4.500 6.000 2.875 3.667 6.875 5.500 3.000
FEB 4.500 4.875 6.500 6.875 6.333 6.625 5.333 3.500
MAR 6.000 3.875 6.667 8.000 7.167 7.750 10.667 4.375
APR 5.000 9.000 5.667 9.500 11.167 6.375 9.833 10.875
MAY 9.000 3.875 7.500 5.625 4.333 3.375 6.333 6.375
JUN 3.167 6.000 3.667 6.125 11.000 6.125 6.500 6.375
JUL 5.833 4.125 10.167 5.125 2.667 6.250 2.500 5.250
AUG 4.500 10.250 8.167 4.250 6.333 6.500 6.167 6.375
SEP 7.167 10.000 6.500 6.000 4.167 4.000 5.333 9.000
OCT 9.833 5.375 4.500 5.750 9.000 8.125 6.500 7.875
NOV 7.333 8.875 7.667 9.875 7.500 8.750 6.000 7.875
DEC 7.833 7.250 5.000 8.000 4.667 7.250 7.333 7.125
N 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Kendall's W 0.344 0.490 0.249 0.353 0.647 0.197 0.358 0.416
Chi-Square 11.343 21.543 8.230 15.526 21.365 8.658 11.812 18.303
df 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Asymt. Sig. 0.415 0.028 0.693 0.160 0.030 0.653 0.378 0.075
M.C. Sig. 0.444  0.010  0.758 0.140 0.006 0.690  0.394  0.050 
Upper 0.431  0.007  0.747 0.131 0.004 0.678  0.381  0.045 
Lower 0.456  0.012  0.769 0.148 0.008 0.701  0.406  0.056 
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Table 5.3 (Cont.) 
[Level 3] Korean ABA ABK Others 
Month First 3 Last 4 First 3 Last 4 First 3 Last 4 First 3 Last 4 
JAN 6.000 2.375 5.667 4.375 3.833 7.625 4.500 5.625
FEB 3.833 6.000 7.500 4.375 4.000 5.125 5.667 3.750
MAR 6.667 4.125 5.833 6.625 8.000 7.125 9.000 7.375
APR 8.333 8.250 4.667 6.375 11.333 5.125 6.333 8.000
MAY 5.667 4.125 5.167 7.000 2.667 4.750 5.500 6.500
JUN 4.333 6.625 3.667 8.000 10.000 7.375 6.000 6.500
JUL 5.667 5.750 10.833 6.875 3.833 6.000 4.000 4.875
AUG 4.333 7.375 8.000 7.125 7.167 7.250 9.167 6.375
SEP 9.333 9.875 7.833 5.875 4.667 5.500 6.833 8.625
OCT 7.000 6.625 4.167 5.375 8.333 5.250 8.000 8.000
NOV 9.333 9.750 6.500 7.125 7.500 8.125 7.667 7.625
DEC 7.500 7.125 8.167 8.875 6.667 8.750 5.333 4.750
N 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Kendall's W 0.312 0.419 0.352 0.148 0.611 0.157 0.255 0.188
Chi-Square 10.307 18.438 11.627 6.520 20.153 6.899 8.410 8.278
df 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Asymt. Sig. 0.503 0.072 0.392 0.837 0.043 0.807 0.676 0.688
M.C. Sig. 0.551  0.044  0.421 0.872 0.015 0.846  0.740 0.726 
Upper 0.538  0.039  0.408 0.864 0.012 0.836  0.729 0.714 
Lower 0.563  0.049  0.434 0.881 0.018 0.855  0.752 0.737 
 
Note: ABA – American films released by Hollywood distributors 





Table 5.4 Average Monthly Opening Screen Numbers and One-Way ANOVA Test Results (df1 = 11, df2 = 72, 24, 36) 
All 7 Years JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC F Sig. 
KOR 32.25  28.72  31.64 34.66 28.18 32.55 33.48 25.00  39.13 41.79 30.32 37.20 .719 .717
KOR (Z-score) 0.03  -0.10  0.02 0.15 -0.13 0.05 0.06 -0.34  0.40 0.36 0.00 0.22 1.952 .046
ABA 23.47  20.06  21.29 22.49 34.62 34.17 38.93 27.58  20.63 24.71 25.41 40.56 2.555 .009
ABA (Z-score) -0.04  -0.26  -0.31 -0.17 0.27 0.25 0.67 0.01  -0.23 -0.13 -0.05 0.75 5.343 .000
ABK 19.56  17.63  18.98 17.51 14.22 22.15 25.26 17.39  14.21 15.05 16.50 29.16 1.013 .444
ABK (Z-score) 0.06  -0.08  0.04 0.03 -0.25 0.26 0.31 -0.10  -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 0.63 1.897 .054
OTH 10.94  6.88  12.57 6.26 7.85 7.35 10.90 11.28  10.41 10.84 8.57 6.77 1.067 .400
OTH (Z-score) 0.15  -0.12  0.32 -0.24 -0.04 -0.13 0.20 0.31  0.14 0.22 -0.03 -0.17 1.608 .115
 
First 3 Years JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC F Sig. 
KOR 18.14  16.89  22.47 20.50 17.08 16.85 22.02 12.25  33.21 19.35 21.64 22.31 1.125 .385
KOR (Z-score) -0.06  -0.11  0.11 0.13 -0.05 -0.19 0.13 -0.43  0.81 0.01 0.20 0.17 1.555 .177
ABA 23.95  20.60  15.82 19.56 19.05 18.86 30.38 20.81  17.44 17.79 16.11 35.52 1.922 .088
ABA (Z-score) 0.24  -0.01  -0.36 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 0.73 -0.08  -0.18 -0.26 -0.29 1.06 5.549 .000
ABK 14.00  8.37  10.88 16.19 6.73 14.40 13.11 9.91  8.72 12.16 7.34 24.29 1.341 .263
ABK (Z-score) 0.19  -0.26  0.00 0.38 -0.38 0.33 0.08 -0.12  -0.17 0.06 -0.27 0.91 2.332 .040
OTH 4.73  6.45  6.76 4.51 8.57 6.27 6.61 12.28  6.88 9.87 5.87 4.86 2.146 .057
OTH (Z-score) -0.26  0.00  0.00 -0.31 0.19 -0.11 -0.03 0.66  -0.01 0.35 -0.13 -0.24 2.295 .043
 
Last 4 Years JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC F Sig. 
KOR 42.83  37.59  38.52 45.27 36.51 44.32 42.08 34.57  43.57 58.62 36.83 48.38 1.966 .063
KOR (Z-score) 0.09  -0.09  -0.04 0.16 -0.19 0.22 0.01 -0.27  0.08 0.62 -0.14 0.26 1.869 .078
ABA 23.11  19.65  25.39 24.69 46.29 45.66 45.34 32.66  23.02 29.90 32.39 44.34 2.945 .007
ABA (Z-score) -0.25  -0.45  -0.28 -0.22 0.54 0.53 0.63 0.07  -0.27 -0.04 0.13 0.51 3.501 .002
ABK 23.74  24.58  25.05 18.50 19.83 27.96 34.38 23.00  18.33 17.22 23.37 32.82 .772 .665
ABK (Z-score) -0.03  0.06  0.07 -0.24 -0.15 0.21 0.48 -0.08  -0.29 -0.35 -0.01 0.42 .847 .597
OTH 15.61  7.21  16.93 7.57 7.31 8.17 14.12 10.53  13.06 11.57 10.59 8.20 1.186 .331
OTH (Z-score) 0.46  -0.21  0.56 -0.19 -0.21 -0.14 0.37 0.04  0.25 0.13 0.04 -0.12 1.638 .129
 
Note: KOR – Korean films; ABA – American-distributed American films; ABK – Korean-distributed American films; OTH – Other types of films
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Chapter 6: Changes on the Industry Side (II) – Competition Patterns 
 
 Findings from the previous chapter suggest that Korean films during the last seven years 
have successfully secured their preferable release seasons against other types of films. Within 
those seasons, they have also developed a particular period for large-scale films. While American 
films distributed by Hollywood majors did not show any noticeable shifts in their release 
patterns, dynamics in Korean film distributions ultimately drove Korean-distributed American 
films and other types of films into precarious situations, forcing them to search for safer release 
points and opening scales.  
 Although these findings are certainly important clues in identifying what the Korean film 
industry has achieved during the last decade, they do not tell us anything about relationships 
between Korean films’ recent box-office success and the changes in their distribution patterns. 
We just conjecture that the increased box office has played some roles in making the distribution 
pattern change possible and the changed distribution pattern has served as a necessary condition 
in maintaining box-office revenues, but we are still ambiguous as to how exactly one affects the 
other by what mechanism. Instead, what can be clarified is that, unlike the audiences’ preference 
toward Korean films, which has been significantly modified but still unstable, the shifts in 
Korean film distributions were both significant and consistent. Therefore, we can claim that the 
industry side shifts during the last decade has been more salient than the audience side in 
characterizing recent changes of the Korean film industry. 
 In this chapter, I am going to tackle the more conclusive and direct factors of distributions 
that may cause the increases in box-office revenues: the extent to which one type of film 
competes with another. In the previous chapter, I briefly discussed three factors that define the 
feature of distributions. Among those, the first two factors—i.e., “opening-day screen numbers” 
and “release timings”—were used for empirical analyses, but the last one, “other films in the 
market,” still remains unexplored. Under the current film industry system, no single film can 
preempt all the screens in the market, and the competition with other films is unavoidable. 
Depending on the type of films, however, the degree of competition and the type of competitors 
can be different. For example, competing films for blockbusters, if defined as those running at 
theaters during the same period, are relatively few, and the medium-sized movies are rarely 
launched during blockbuster seasons. 
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 Given that Korean and American films (distributed by either American or Korean 
companies) together account for about ninety percent of total ticket sales in the Korean market 
over the past ten or more years, it is fair to speculate that the competition between these two 
could be the key that determines the direction and the degree of shifts in the Korean film industry 
(Lee and Han 2006). Thus, the main question of this chapter is “For the last seven years, has the 
competition strength between Korean and American films increased (or decreased)?” Focusing 
on the competition between these two types of films does not mean that competition with other 
types of films is not important. This is just for emphasizing that since the vast majority of 
audiences have consumed Korean and/or American films, we need to pay more attention to their 
manners of competition. 
 Two steps of analyses are employed. In the previous chapter, analyses were performed 
based on monthly distributions at an aggregate level; films were grouped and compared by 
filmmaker’s and distributor’s countries of origin1. In the first step, which will be used as 
groundwork for the second, I will adopt the same comparative framework except that the unit of 
analysis period is a week. Using zero-order correlation coefficients, first, I will see if each pair of 
two different types of films has a positive or a negative relationship in their weekly film release 
frequencies and weekly total opening-day screen numbers. Also, strength of relationships will be 
compared across individual years.  
The second analysis is also based on weekly distributions. The distinction of four film 
types will be maintained for a while in order to make comparisons with previous (correlation 
coefficient) analyses. However, the following two features make the second analysis 
differentiated from the first. While the analyses before this have taken into consideration only 
one of two distribution components at a time—i.e., either release frequencies or opening-day 
screen numbers, the final analysis for competition patterns will consider both simultaneously. 
Second, the competition strength and its change will be measured and investigated based on the 
unit of individual distributors, not on their aggregated groups. In addition, the distinction of film 
type that has been initially maintained for comparisons will be collapsed for solely focusing on 
each distributor’s release and competition pattern without regard to the film types they are 
dealing with.  
                                                 
1 See Section 5.4 in the previous chapter for details of film type classifications. 
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Indeed, a great many distributors, including Hollywood major studios, are striving to 
secure and maximize their revenues in the Korean market. No matter what films they mainly 
distribute in the market, all those distributors are nothing more nor less than independent profit-
seekers. Therefore, the competition patterns among individual distributors can be quite different 
from those measured by four aggregated groups (i.e., four film types). We need to remind the 
fact that the existence of Hollywood distributors in the Korean market, rather than their products 
(i.e., American movies), has been a more direct source of affliction to the Korean film industry. 
By switching the unit of analysis to individual distributors, we can expect to see how Korean 
distributors treated Hollywood distributors and how those treatments were different from when 
competing with other Korean distributors. 
  
6.1 Measuring Competition between Different Types of Films 
 The key difference between the analyses in this and the last chapter is that the current 
objective is to explore the patterns of competition, not individual distributions. That is, we have 
to consider at least two distribution patterns simultaneously and figure out how they affect each 
other. Although the theatrical exhibition market is always crowded with lots of newly released 
films all year around, only some of those are in play during the same period. Thus we cannot say 
that all newly released films compete with each other. This implies that we should have clear 
criteria that determine whether or not two films are in competitive situation and how strong the 
competition between them is. However, this is not an easy task for the following reasons.  
  First, not all films playing at theaters in the same period are squarely competing with 
each other. It is undeniable that, to some degree, films give influences on each other insofar as 
they are on screen during the same periods. However, depending on their genre, story, scale, 
etc., the strengths of competition between each pair of films are fundamentally different. 
Second, the length of the period that each film stays on the launching screen is considerably 
different. For instance, the exhibition period of megahit blockbusters, unless significant 
challengers emerge, can be extended for several months. By contrast, if a film turns out to be a 
disastrous flop right after the opening weekend, it can be removed immediately2. Last, although 
                                                 
2 This is quite a typical case in the Korean film market where exhibitors (i.e., movie theaters) reserve 
priorities in deciding the screening periods. This kind of situation may or may not be the case in other film markets 
in the world. 
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a film can play for several weeks on average, its influences on other films are not consistent 
across its exhibition period because the number of running screens and its ticket sales decline at 
various speeds. If all these issues are combined, computing one film’s influence on the other is, 
if not impossible, extremely difficult. Also, no matter what or how many factors are considered, 
the validity of such a measure is likely to be dubious after all. 
 In this chapter, the only criterion used for determining the competitive status of two films 
is whether or not they are released in the same week3. In the light of the complexity in measuring 
one film’s influence on another, this is a looser standard than the required. However, if we can 
hardly accomplish the desired level of validity in such a way that puts everything into 
consideration, then one possible alternative is to take the opposite direction—i.e., pursuing 
simplicity. By focusing on the most important factor in deciding release timings, although we 
may fail to extract a complete or comprehensive picture of competition in the theatrical 
exhibition market, we can increase the probability of obtaining the core part of competition 
mechanism and their changes over time.  
 Previous studies on the Korean film market often consider one week before and after the 
opening week as the range of competing period for every film (Kim 2003a; Lee and Han 2006). 
If a certain film is launched in week 2, they assume that the film competes with not only those 
released in the same week, but also those screened in week 1 and 3. However, according to the 
complexity in measuring the competition strength between individual films, this method does not 
seem to be good enough to clean up the validity concerns. Rather, we should acknowledge that 
by applying an unverified range of competitive period to every film, it can make matters unduly 
complicated without the guarantee of improved validity.  
Indeed, the importance of the opening week in distribution market cannot be 
exaggerated. The following three explain why this simple standard based on the opening week is 
fit to the current analysis. First, even for the blockbusters, the extreme reliance on the opening 
weekend is no less than any other small-scale films. The overdependence on the first week can 
be interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, most films, even blockbusters, draw the 
greatest proportion of ticket sales from the opening week. On the other hand, from the second 
week, the ticket sales for most films declines precipitously and so do their influences on other 
                                                 
3 Here, a week indicates the period from Friday to next Thursday. This is because most films, especially 
those with a large number of opening-day screens, are likely to be launched on Fridays for weekend audiences.  
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films4. Therefore, although movies can remain top-ranked in the box office for several weeks, 
their influences on other films from the second week tend to be much weaker than those of the 
opening week.  
Second, in general, large distributors publicize, officially or unofficially, their lineups at 
least several months before actual opening dates. Distributors are, to a certain degree, able to 
schedule their lineups with reference to other distributor’s lineups. If afraid of those films that 
will be simultaneously opened with their own films, distributors cannot release films on the 
scheduled date. Stated inversely, only when they believe their competitors are not a considerable 
threat to their films, they can release films.   
Lastly, the distributors, who are planning to release their film(s) soon, can garner 
information about the movies in play. If a film has been drawing great proportion of weekly 
audiences for last several weeks and still sells well in the market, many characteristics about that 
film, especially its main consumer groups, tend to be publicly known. If it seems that the box-
office revenue of their films can be potentially and significantly cut down by the dominant film, 
distributors can postpone the release of their films a little bit.5 Even in the case of re-scheduling 
release dates, the only available information is who will enter into the market at the same time.  
In sum, the same week opening matchup is the key evidence signifying that two films 
are in the highest level of competition. Despite the well-known importance of opening week 
selection, if two distributors decide to release their films at the same time, it straightforwardly 
indicates that for some reasons each distributor anticipate greater odds for their own film in 
drawing a large proportion of weekly audiences. 
 
6.2 Correlation Coefficients for Weekly Film Releases and Their Total Screens 
 Monthly film release frequencies during the past seven years can be regrouped into 365 
weekly frequencies. Using the zero-order correlation coefficient, we can estimate the extent to 
which one type of films has a linear relationship with another type in their weekly release 
frequencies. A positive correlation indicates that as weekly release numbers of one type of films 
increase, those for the other type of film increase accordingly. When such a correlation is 
                                                 
4 Also, this is why many large distributors can release their films for several consecutive weeks without 
much struggle between their own films. 
5 In reality, examples of the opening day rescheduling are not difficult to find. See Paquet (2007) and Jung 
(2005). Also, refer to “[D-War], (a.k.a., [Dragon War]) Avoid to Survive” (<Cine 21> August 13, 2007). 
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statistically significant,6 then it is fair to assume that the competition between them is tougher 
than the competition between those who have either weak positive or negative correlations.  
 In fact, the size of correlation coefficients per se does not measure the degree of 
competition between two types of films. In addition, the relationship between two sets of weekly 
film release numbers may or may not be linear. Nevertheless, reasons for using correlation 
coefficients are quite obvious. First, as noted in the previous section, this portion of the analysis 
is a preliminary work for figuring out where we should more focus on in the analysis of 
competition patterns. Under the circumstance where information revealed by existing studies is 
scant and limited, it is necessary to briefly capture the large picture that intimates what the actual 
shape of competition would be. By doing so, we can develop more sophisticated focal points for 
follow-up analyses. Therefore, simple and parsimonious measures, like zero-order correlation 
coefficients, are fit for such a purpose.  
Second, a zero-order correlation coefficient is equivalent to the standardized regression 
coefficient in bivariate regression models (Agresti and Finlay 1997). As repeatedly mentioned, 
the annual totals of released film numbers vary depending on year and film type. The annual 
totals of released film numbers for some types of films may significantly increase (or decrease) 
while those for other types stay constant. In such a case, measuring a competition level between 
the two groups would be difficult because raw weekly numbers of released films carry an 
unequal importance, varying by years and film types. For instance, the annual totals of Korean 
film distributions considerably and consistently increased between 2003 and 2006 while Korean-
distributed American films maintained similar distribution numbers during the same period (See 
Table 5.1). The significance of one Korean film in the competition with Korean-distributed 
American films is contingent upon both its release year and the number of weekly released 
Korean-distributed American films.     
Because correlation coefficients are already scaled based on the standard deviation of 
released film numbers for each type of films, we can directly compare the size of one correlation 
coefficient to another without additional standardization procedures. In the current analysis, this 
feature is particularly useful when comparing two individual correlation coefficients from 
different pairs of film types, or the same pair of film types from different years.   
                                                 
6 Since we are dealing with the entire movies in the Korean market during the focused time period, 
inferential significances can be less important. 
 97 
 
 Table 6.1 shows correlation coefficients and their significance of weekly film releases for 
each pair of four types of films. Correlation coefficients for the entire seven-year period are in 
the first row, and those for seven individual years are listed below. Also, the same set of 
correlation coefficients was measured one more time after eliminating the films that has 
considerably small opening-day screen numbers7.  
 When every single film during the last seven years is considered (i.e., [Level 1]), the first 
thing that grabs our attention is that all correlation coefficient values in the first row are negative 
although their strength and significance of relationships are not that great. If the issue of 
inferential significance can be sidelined, this result leads us to make a straightforward 
interpretation. If one type of films is prevailing in a particular week, the tendency that holds off 
the release of other types of films during that week is quite common since weekly frequencies of 
film releases between any two types of films are negatively related.  
However, most outstanding is the relationship between Korean films and American films 
distributed by Korean companies since they have the greatest absolute value of coefficient plus 
statistical significance8. It has a correlation value, -.162 and its P-value is smaller than .01. 
Almost identical results are found after excluding the films with very small opening-day screen 
numbers (i.e., [Level 2]). 
 Another point of interest is the relationship between Korean films and American-
distributed American films. As noted above, when the entire seven years are considered, the 
likelihoods of weekly release frequencies between two different types of films are generally 
negative. But the signs of correlation coefficients for individual years frequently change except 
for those between Korean films and Korean-released American films. This evidences that, by 
nature, the release frequency of one type of film corresponding to that of other types is likely to 
change easily and abruptly depending on market situations. However, in the case of Korean films 
and American-distributed American films, they changed the sign of correlation coefficient only 
once, from positive to negative, in 2003. Since then, they have maintained a negative correlation 
in weekly film release frequencies. Likewise, [Level 2] analysis, though there are minor 
discrepancies, shows a similar tendency as in [Level 1] analysis.  
                                                 
7 Refer to the description of [Level 1] and [Level 2] analysis in Section 5.5. 
8 In general, absolute correlation coefficient value 0.162 cannot be said a strong relationship. However, 
compared to other correlation values in the table, it is still a considerably large value.  
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Table 6.2 presents the same format of correlation coefficient set as before. However, 
instead of weekly film release frequencies, correlation coefficients are measured by weekly total 
opening-day screen numbers. In this table, two major tendencies regarding the size and the 
direction of correlation coefficients look almost identical with those in Table 6.1; first, most 
coefficients are negative, and second, the relationship between Korean films and Korean-
distributed American films has the most significant and constant negative values. This indicates 
that when a certain type of films occupy a large number of available launching screens, other 
types of films are likely to take smaller number of opening-day screens. 
Securing opening-day screens, to a certain degree, is ruled by a zero-sum principle. The 
more screens are reserved for one or two particular big-hits, the fewer screens are allocated for 
the rest on their opening day. This general principle, however, does not always stand since not all 
screens are used as launching screens in one week. It is possible that weekly launching screen 
totals for two or more types of films can increase concurrently, and positive correlations in Table 
6.2 confirm that such cases actually exist.  
 What we need to focus on more carefully is, again, the relationship between Korean films 
and American-distributed American films. Unlike the [Level 1] analysis in Table 6.1, the size of 
correlation values between these two types of films shows a little fluctuation in Table 6.2. 
However, compared to the early period (i.e., 2000 to 2004) that has either weak positive or 
negative values, the latest two years (i.e., 2005 and 2006) have strong negative correlations, 
which are quite significant in a statistical sense.  
Putting together findings from Table 6.1 and 6.2, we can recapitulate two prominent 
features of the competition patterns in recent theatrical distribution market. First, in both weekly 
film release frequencies and weekly total opening-screen numbers, the competition pattern 
between Korean films and Korean-distributed American films has been most consistent and 
outstanding. As more Korean films are released or they occupy a larger number of opening-day 
screens, Korean-distributed American films have the greatest likelihood to hold off their films 
and/or retain to release the large-scale films. Second, the most noticeable recent change is found 
in the relationship between Korean domestic films and American films distributed by Hollywood 
majors. Until the early 2000s, both weekly release frequencies and the sum of weekly launching 
screen numbers between them had a positive or a weak negative relationship. In recent years 
(e.g., 2005 or 2006), those changed to significantly negative relationships. 
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Regarding the question why the competition level between Korean films and Korean-
distributed American films is the weakest, we have a few simple and plausible explanations. As a 
matter of fact, we may take it granted because these two types of films are commonly distributed 
by the same Korean companies. While several specialized distributors in the Korean market 
import and screen only one type of films (e.g., independent films from the third world countries), 
the majority of Korean distributors deal with both Korean domestic films and imported American 
films at the same time. As a result, these two types of films tend to be packed in a single lineup 
for the same distributor, and thus, intrinsic probabilities that they are released in the same week 
can be smaller than those for any different pairs of film types. In addition, as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, if there are particular periods (or months) in which Korean films are intensively 
released, the temporal separation between these two types of films is more likely, and in turns, 
the probability of the same week opening could be even smaller.    
However, making further interpretations over the second feature of competition patterns 
described above is apt to be premature due to the following reasons. First, the correlation 
coefficient analyses thus far consider two distribution components separately—i.e., release 
frequencies and opening-day screen numbers. Consequently, with respect to the observed 
phenomenon that Korean films and American-distributed American films have a negative 
relationship in the weekly total opening-day screen numbers, we do not exactly know how such a 
result is derived; it can be caused by the tendency that when one type of films preempts a large 
number of opening-day screens, the other type of films (1) decrease its film release frequencies 
or (2) holds off only large-scale films that require a large opening-day screens or (3) both.  
Second, tough competition is only possible when at least two competitors aggressively 
response to one another. If one of competitors decides not to join in the contest, competition 
itself cannot be made or its degrees can be very low. The same things hold true for the 
competition measure by way of correlation coefficients. If one of competitors avoids the 
competition and adjusts the distribution pattern, correlation values are easily changed and even 
the directions of the relationship can be switched. However, the more crucial problem in such 
cases is that we do not know which competitor avoids the competition. It may be one of 
competitors, but possibly, both sides want to avoid each other. Whatever would be the case, the 
bottom line is that the correlation coefficient in and of itself does not provide the critical piece of 




6.3 Patterns of Competition among Individual Distributors 
 From the foregoing analysis, we have learned that the crux of transformation in recent 
distribution market is not in the relationship between Korean and the entire American films, but 
the competition pattern changes between Korean films and American-distributed American films. 
This suggests that as far as recent changes in the distribution pattern are concerned, distributor’s 
nationality matters more than filmmaker’s nationality. 
 In this section, the goal of analyses is to elucidate individual distributor’s competition 
patterns and their changes over time. In so doing, individual film distribution records, which 
have been originally sorted by four-film types, will be further classified by individual 
distributors. In addition, because correlation coefficients have critical restrictions in measuring 
competition strength, I will develop and utilize an alternative measure.     
The first task for this round of analysis is to single out significant distributors whose 
activities during the past seven years were influential to the entire market. When individual 
distributors are the unit of analysis, putting every distributor that has existed for a certain time 
period into the data could be redundant at best and deteriorative at worst. The majority of 
distributors in the market are ephemeral and the majority of films are distributed by a few large 
companies (See Figure 6.1). Under these circumstances, considering every single distributor 
together including those who released only one or two films for the entire period can make it 
more difficult to observe the dynamics of core interactions among significant players. Thus, we 
must discuss who should be in or out of data at first. 
For the analyses in this section, I selected 23 distributors based on three straightforward 
criteria9. Although these 23 account only 11.8% of all distributors (i.e., 23 out of 194) who have 
ever played in the Korean market for the given data period, they released 1,332 films (64.8% of 
total) and drew more than 280 million audiences (96.4% of total).  
 
6.4 Measuring Competition between Distributors  
 Two important criteria in measuring the competition strength among individual 
distributors need to be discussed. One is how frequently two distributors released their films 
                                                 
9 See Appendix D for the detailed selection criteria and the profiles of 23distributors (Table D.1). 
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during a same week. Although most distributors in the Korean market deal with many films in a 
year, they do not release films every week. Thus, the number of times that two distributors 
release their films during a same week across the year can vary depending on the strategy 
adopted by each distributor. Under the assumption that the same week film releases 
straightforwardly signify the competition for weekly audiences, the value of competition 
measure should be greater if two distributors more frequently release their films during the same 
week. 
 Another important criterion is the number of opening-day screens that each distributor 
assigned to individual films. The sum of opening-day screens that each distributor reserves for a 
year is tantamount to the amount of annual resource they can spend. Since it is impossible or 
impractical to assign a great many screens for every single movie, finding an appropriate 
opening-day screen number is a critical job for distributors. In this sense, if two films released by 
two different distributors have a large number of opening-day screens, respectively, the 
competition made by those two films must be seen more significant or stronger than the 
competition made by two films that have very small opening-day screens. However, if actual 
number of opening-day screens is applied to the measurement, medium- or small-sized 
distributors inherently do not have a chance to make a significant or strong competition since 
their annual total opening-day screen numbers are very small compared to those of large 
distributors. Therefore, the competition strength measure must have a greater value if two films 
released in the same week account for a greater proportion of annual total opening-day screens 
for each distributor.10  
 These two criteria together imply that the more similar is the distribution pattern between 
two distributors, the stronger or tougher the competition between them. Although there are 
various types of coefficients that have been used for measuring the strength of association or 
similarity, finding an appropriate measure that fully satisfies these two criteria was not easy. 
Hence, I developed my own unique measure that rigidly follows these suggested criteria and 
named it competition scores11. Henceforth, both the strength of competition and competition 
patterns among individual distributors will be discussed based on the competition scores.   
                                                 
10 Depending on the type of screen numbers (i.e. either actual numbers of opening screens or their 
proportions out of individual distributors’ annual total screen numbers), the strengths of competition measures are 
quite different. This issue will be discussed again later in this chapter.     




6.5 Competition Score Changes for Individual Distributors Sorted by Four Film Types 
In this section, to make direct comparisons with previous findings from correlation 
coefficient analyses, which were performed based on four types of film classifications, different 
film types released by the same distributor will be distinguished. For instance, one of the largest 
domestic distributors, Cinema Service distributed three types of films (i.e., Korean, American, 
and other types) in 2000. Therefore, the distribution records for Cinema Service will be divided 
into three groups, and each group of films will be treated as if they were distributed by individual 
and independent distributors, namely, Cinema Service (1), (3) and (4)12. As a result, distribution 
records for 14 companies in 2000 are subdivided into 31 groups (See Table E.1 in Appendix E).  
The first row of Table 6.3 presents the annual average competition score (i.e., the sum of 
all competition scores within a year divided by the number of all possible pairs of competition). 
According to these, the strength of average competition in the entire distribution market has 
somewhat fluctuated, showing no easy-interpretable pattern. Theoretically, we may anticipate 
that as more films are released to the market within a limited period, say, a year, the competition 
among distributors who release those films would be tougher because the number of time slots is 
restricted (i.e., 52 or 53 weeks per year) and the probabilities of the same week openings 
increase. To some degree, this anticipation looks feasible in the Korean market since the average 
competition score for the entire market and the total number of films released by distributors has 
a correlation coefficient .833 (i.e., a correlation coefficient between the first and the second row 
in Table 6.3).  
As for individual level average competition scores, it appears that the same thing 
generally holds true in that most gray-marked distributors in Table 6.3 (i.e., distributors whose 
average competition score is greater than the market average) have a large number of distribution 
frequencies. However, a closer look into this association reveals that although a positive 
relationship exists between one distributor’s average competition score and the number of films 
released by that distributor, the latter does not completely determine the former. For instance, 
Warner Brothers distributed only 10 films in 2000, but its average competition score is more than 
twice greater than Buena Vista who released 19 films (.1425 vs. .0665). Since plenty of similar 
                                                 
12 Each number stands for one type of films; (1) – Korean films, (2) – American-distributed American 
films, (3) – Korean-distributed American films, (4) – other types of films. 
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cases are found across the data set, we can claim that an individual distributor’s average 
competition strength is not solely determined by the number of films each distributor releases.  
Instead, what we have to pay more attention to in Table 6.3 is how these individual level 
average competition scores have changed. First, the most noticeable characteristic in this table is 
found in American films distributed by Hollywood studios. Over the past seven years, American 
films released by five American distributors in the Korean market have made constant and 
significant level of competition against all other distributors; each year during the period, four or 
five Hollywood distributors maintained above-average competition scores in their American film 
distributions. Although they occasionally distributed Korean films or other types of films, the 
number of such films is small, and the competition levels derived by those films are mostly 
negligible.  
Second, other than Cinema Service and CJ Entertainment, no distributor made a constant 
and significant competition via Korean domestic films. Though a few mid-sized late-comers, 
such as Chungeorahm, Show Box, and Show East, were steadfastly dealing with Korean films, 
their overall competition scores frequently went above and below the market average. Also, the 
number of distributors who handled Korean films in each year and, among those, the number of 
distributors who made an above-average competition score frequently and noticeably changed.  
Lastly, individual average competition scores for American films distributed by Korean 
companies and other types of films are even more difficult to extract any readable pattern. It is 
obvious that two Korean distributors – Cinema Service and CJ Entertainment – have vigorously 
distributed imported American films, but their strength of competition against other distributors 
seems quite unstable. Situations are almost identical for other types of films. Each year, although 
there were lots of distributors who dealt with other types of films, individual distributor’s 
competition levels derived by those films were not so great that no distributor (except for CJ 
Entertainment) made average competition scores greater than the market average for two 
consecutive years.  
 
6.6 Competition Score Changes among Top-5 Distributors in Each Type of Films 
In the previous section, we found that only a few influential distributors who dealt with 
Korean films or American-distributed American films have maintained a strong competition 
score. Stated inversely, most distributors failed to maintain strong and consistent competition 
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over the past seven years, especially in distributing Korean-distributed American films and other 
types of films. Though this is obviously an important piece of information, we could not discern 
any manifest patterns from it as to individual distributors’ average competition scores against all 
other distributors in the market.  
In this section, we will narrows down the target of interest by considering more 
significant players only. That is, after picking up top-five distributors with regard to the annual 
total opening-day screen numbers in each type of films, the competition scores among those 
high-ranked distributors will be investigated. Figure 6.2 presents average competition scores and 
their changes between and within top-five distributors in three types of films13. Three dotted or 
dashed lines indicate average competition score changes within each type of films (i.e., 
competition among top-five distributors who distribute the same type of film), and three solid 
lines indicates the same measure between two different types of films.   
Once again, average competition scores have fluctuated noticeably. However, it has 
nothing unusual because depending on which distributors are included in top-five distributors, 
and how many films are distributed by them, the values of average competition scores within and 
between these 3 groups can be substantially different. More important is the relative sizes of 
average competition scores in each year, and by focusing on them, we can find following a few 
interesting points. 
First of all, relative sizes of average competition scores within top-five distributors for 
American-distributed American films and Korean-distributed American films have been well 
preserved. Average competition scores within these two groups of distributors have an identical 
shape of fluctuations over the past seven years, maintaining almost an equal distance between 
them. In addition, average competition scores between these two groups are usually located 
between those two within group average scores although they slightly exceeded the within 
average competition score for American-distributed American films in 2001 and 2005. 
However, the most important shifts are found in Korean film distributions. For easier 
comparisons, another line graph below Figure 6.2 extracts only 3 kinds of average competition 
scores from its original: “within Korean films,” “within American-distributed American films,” 
and “between Korean films and American-distributed American films.” To begin with, it is 
                                                 
13 Due to the lack of significance, other types of films have been omitted in this analysis. 
 105 
 
notable that average competition scores within top-five distributors for Korean films were 
initially lowest among these three kinds of competition scores. However, in 2003, it, for the first 
time, exceeded the average competition score within Hollywood distributors. Although it went 
again below the average competition score among Hollywood majors in 2004, it bounced back in 
2005, and finally, soared up in 2006.14 
Regarding the changes in the average competition strength among those who deal with 
Korean films, we may suspect that the increased average competition score are natural outcomes 
corresponding to the increased number of Korean films screened by top-five distributors. To 
some degree, that would be true since the number of Korean films in the market steadily 
increased. But as Figure 6.3 shows, it was 2006 when the number of Korean films released by 
top-five distributors became greater than the number of American-distributed American films. In 
2003 when the average competition score within top-five Korean film distributors was greater 
than that of Hollywood film distributors, the number of Korean films released by those 5 
distributors was slightly greater than a half of Hollywood films in the market.  
All the findings thus far suggest one clear point; the competition strength among the 
distributors who deal with Korean films was unusually high. While Hollywood distributor’s 
average within competition scores for American films fluctuated in proportion to the number of 
films they screened, average competition scores among the major distributors who handle 
Korean films disproportionately increased since 2003 for the actual increase in the number of 
Korean films.    
 
6.7 Competition Score Changes between Korean and Hollywood Distributors 
 The analysis on individual film releases in the previous section has been performed based 
on two classification criteria; (1) four film types distinguished by filmmaker’s and distributor’s 
countries of origin (2) Individual distributors. However, the results indicate that American films 
distributed by Korean companies and other types of films did not make any interpretable patterns 
in the market and the overall competition strengths for both types of films were quite low. Since 
the vast majority of other types of films are released by Korean distributors, it can be said that 
                                                 
14 When we measure the average competition strength by means of Identity Coefficient (Refer to Appendix 
E for its description) with raw weekly opening screen numbers, almost the same competition patterns as presented in 
this paragraph are observed except that average competition strengths ‘between’ groups are considerably lower than 
those measured by competition scores.  
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except for Korean films, the other two types of films (i.e., American films and other types of 
films), if considered separately, did not make readable competition patterns or give substantial 
influences on Korean distributors.  
 In this section, I eliminate the first classification standard and each released film is 
identified by the distributor who released it. Without regard to film types, I will analyze 
competition scores and their changing patterns based on the unit of individual distributors. 
However, distributor’s nationality will keep distinguished to make comparisons between Korean 
and American distributors.  
 Table 6.4 shows 23 individual distributors’ average competition scores for all other 
distributors in the market. First of all, what we must take a notice from this table is the changes 
in the number of Korean distributors and Hollywood distributors whose average competition 
score is greater than the market average. Until 2001, all five Hollywood distributors in the 
Korean market had a competition score greater than the annual market average, but in the latest 
two years, only two of them marked an above-average competition score. By contrast, going ups 
and downs quite often, though, the number of Korean distributors who have an above-average 
competition score has increased compared to the first two years (i.e., 2000 and 2001). Again, this 
can be interpreted that, more Korean distributors run their business actively and aggressively in 
more recent years.   
 The insistence on increased competition scores for Korean distributors is well supported 
by Figure 6.4, which shows top-five15 Korean and the five American distributors’ average 
competition scores against all other distributors in the market. According to this figure, the 
average competition scores for the top-five Korean and the five American distributors were very 
similar until 2003. During that period, although the number of Korean distributors whose 
average competition scores were greater than the market average was very small, the vigorous 
activities by two most outstanding distributors—i.e., CJ Entertainment and Cinema Service—
offset the absence of mid-sized Korean distributors. However, since 2003, as the number of 
large-scale Korean distributors in the market increased, the average competition scores for top-
five Korean distributors also increased consistently. During the same periods, because the 
                                                 
15 This time, top-five distributors are selected based on total audience numbers that individual distributors 
obtained in each year. Given the high correlation between each distributor’s total number of occupied opening 
screens and their obtained audience numbers, applying audience numbers for identifying top-five distributors does 
not result in significantly different outcomes compared to applying occupied screen numbers.  
 107 
 
average competition scores for American distributors either stagnated or a little bit decreased, the 
average competition score gaps between the top-five Korean and the five American distributors 
became larger in the latest three years (i.e., 2004 to 2006).  
 Furthermore, by focusing on the relationship between those top-five Korean distributors 
and five Hollywood distributors, we can find more interesting results. Figure 6.5 shows three 
types of average competition scores and their changes over time; (1) within top-five Korean 
distributors (2) within five Hollywood distributors (3) between top-five Korean distributors and 
five Hollywood distributors. Initially, the between-group average had the highest value, followed 
by “within American distributors” and “within Korean distributors.” The competition between 
Korean and Hollywood distributors was strongest and the competition within Korean distributors 
was weakest. This order had been preserved until 2001, but since then the most interesting 
among the recent competition pattern changes happened. While the average between-group 
competition scores and average within-group competition scores for five Hollywood distributors 
had flattened or a little bit decreased, the competition score within top-5 Korean distributors had 
continually and significant increased. It surpassed the average competition score within 
American distributors in 2002, and became the highest in 2005. In 2006, it became more than 
three times as great as the average competition score within five Hollywood distributors.16  
 
6.8 Discussion 
 Based on the findings so far, I now attempt to answer the main question of this chapter; 
whether the degree of competition between Korean and American films increased for the last 
seven year. To conclude, the degree of competition between Korean and American films has not 
increased. When distribution frequencies and opening-day screen numbers are separately 
considered, correlation coefficient values and their changes indicate that the competition strength 
between them has rather weakened although this tendency fails to obtain a statistical support. 
This finding is already interesting enough. As shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 6.3, the 
number of Korean domestic films in the market has gradually increased since 2000 (except for 
an aberrant increase in 2002). In Table 6.3, it is demonstrated that as the number of films in the 
                                                 
16 Basically, these shifts are the same kinds as those described in Figure 6.2. However, when competition 




market increases, the competition level among distributors who release those films is likely to 
increase accordingly. If the increase in the number of Korean films in the market did not result in 
tougher competition with their most significant contenders (i.e., American films), then what has 
absorbed the impact of the Korean film’s quantitative expansion?  
 Relying on Figure 6.2, it is not easy to directly argue whether the absolute level of 
competition between Korean and Hollywood films has increased or not. In the latest two years, 
average competition levels between these two types of films apparently lowered, but they were 
still about the same as in 2000. Since there is no absolute criterion in terms of strong and weak 
competition levels, the evaluation over the competition strength is supposed to be relative. That 
is, compared to the increased number of Korean films in the market and corresponding increase 
in the competition level among Korean films, the competition strength between Korean and 
American films did not make substantive increase, especially in the latest two years. This can be 
further interpreted that the greatest Korean film’s market shares in recent years (especially in 
2005 and 2006) have been accomplished in the absence of tough competition with American 
films, and the augmented number of Korean films mostly helped to increase the competition 
level among Korean films themselves.  
 When the type of films was not considered, changes in competition strength shown in 
Figure 6.4 and 6.5 look even clearer and more strongly suggest the same conclusion as before. 
During the last seven years, the competition strength within Korean distributors noticeably 
increased whereas the same measures within five Hollywood distributors and between Korean 
and American distributors have stagnated or lowered. The increased film numbers in the market 
helped to produce tougher competition among Korean distributors, but not between Korean and 
Hollywood distributors. 
 The findings in this chapter are extremely important in that they can provide conclusive 
clues in arguing the following two issues. First, until the early 1990s, scholars in this area often 
insisted that the market opening to Hollywood distributors would result in the collapse of the 
Korean film industry because, for various reasons, they believed that Korean films could not be a 
competitor of American films. In the 2000s, although such an insistence was proved to be wrong, 
scholars have yet to evaluate the meaning of Korean films’ survival in view of their previous 
arguments, i.e., does the survival of the Korean film industry imply that Korean films defeated 
American films in the Korean market? 
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 As shown in this and the last chapters, the patterns of American film distribution and 
competition in the Korean market in the 2000s did not noticeably change; audiences’ preference 
toward American films is still concrete and stable, and the distribution patterns of Hollywood 
films are consistent across the 2000s. In the meantime, Hollywood distributors completely 
controlled the competition level among themselves, and most important, their profits from the 
Korean market have increased (See Figure 6.6). In other words, Hollywood films—like any other 
overseas market in the world17—are proliferating in the Korean market regardless of Korean 
films’ recent success at the box office. Findings in this and the last chapters shed light on how 
that was possible. That is, the temporal separation of distribution seasons and reduced 
competition levels between Korean films and American-distributed American films played 
crucial roles in augmenting domestic film consumers.  
 Finally, findings from these two chapters together provide conclusive clues in clarifying 
and evaluating what Korean film industry has actually achieved in the 2000s. For instance, if 
someone notices that the overall competition strength between Korean films and American-
distributed American films has reduced, he or she may argue that thanks to Korean film’s 
improved quality and reputation, Hollywood distributors are trying to avoid direct competition 
with Korean domestic films (See Lee and Han, 2006). We cannot completely reject such a claim 
since the level of competition is determined by both sides of competitors’ activities. In light of 
the findings from the previous chapter, however, we can hardly insist that the reduced 
competition level between those two types of films has originated from Hollywood distributor’s 
defensive distribution strategy since the distributors who experienced significant shifts in their 
distribution patterns were not American, but Korean.   
                                                 
17 Refer to the following two articles: AFP (Agence France-Presse). 2009. “Hollywood films selling 
overseas better than ever.” January 3 (http://www.france24.com/en/20090103-hollywood-films-overseas-profits-
record-cinema-abroad); Hopkins, Nic. 2005. “Foreign box offices contribute most to Hollywood’s coffers.” The 
Times, March 16 (http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/media/article428540.ece).  
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6.9 Tables and Figures 
Table 6.1 Correlation Coefficients – Weekly Opening Film Frequencies   
  [Level 1] – All Films [Level 2] – Z-score GT .-67 
 KOR-ABA KOR-ABK KOR-OTH ABA-ABK ABA-OTH ABK-OTH KOR-ABA KOR-ABK KOR-OTH ABA-ABK ABA-OTH ABK-OTH
All Correlation  -0.022 -0.162 -0.055 -0.021 -0.025 0.016 -0.048 -0.214 -0.013 -0.054 -0.031 -0.041 
Years Sig.  0.680 0.002 0.291 0.694 0.632 0.764 0.363 0.000 0.800 0.301 0.551 0.431 
n  365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365
 
2000 Correlation  0.078 -0.175 -0.094 -0.156 -0.049 0.017 0.078 -0.064 -0.111 -0.290 0.005 0.090 
Sig.  0.581 0.214 0.507 0.269 0.732 0.907 0.582 0.652 0.435 0.037 0.974 0.527 
n  52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
2001 Correlation  0.025 -0.091 0.000 0.096 -0.090 -0.004 0.199 -0.154 -0.029 -0.111 -0.126 0.010 
Sig.  0.857 0.515 1.000 0.493 0.521 0.977 0.153 0.271 0.835 0.430 0.368 0.941 
n  53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
2002 Correlation  0.007 -0.074 0.010 -0.209 -0.080 0.050 -0.069 -0.135 -0.068 0.108 -0.059 -0.026 
Sig.  0.963 0.604 0.943 0.137 0.574 0.723 0.625 0.339 0.631 0.444 0.679 0.853 
n  52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
2003 Correlation  -0.086 -0.277 -0.028 -0.016 0.125 0.085 -0.079 -0.468 -0.179 -0.007 0.045 0.107 
Sig.  0.546 0.047 0.845 0.909 0.379 0.551 0.576 0.000 0.205 0.959 0.753 0.449 
n  52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
2004 Correlation  -0.019 -0.196 0.011 -0.098 -0.040 -0.011 0.016 -0.218 0.057 -0.124 -0.241 0.041 
Sig.  0.893 0.164 0.940 0.488 0.780 0.936 0.910 0.120 0.687 0.383 0.085 0.774 
n  52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
2005 Correlation  -0.144 -0.024 -0.377 0.152 -0.028 -0.162 -0.258 -0.107 -0.345 0.131 0.060 -0.160 
Sig.  0.308 0.864 0.006 0.283 0.843 0.252 0.065 0.449 0.012 0.356 0.673 0.256 
n  52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
2006 Correlation  -0.042 -0.018 0.152 0.252 0.089 -0.045 -0.183 -0.185 0.115 0.057 0.133 -0.110 
Sig.  0.768 0.898 0.284 0.072 0.529 0.751 0.195 0.189 0.415 0.687 0.348 0.438 
n  52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
 
Note: KOR – Korean films; ABA – American films released by Hollywood distributors; ABK – American films released by Korean distributors; OTH – Other films
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Table 6.2 Correlation Coefficients – Weekly Total of Opening Screen Numbers 
KOR-ABA KOR-ABK KOR-OTH ABA-ABK ABA-OTH ABK-OTH 
All  Correlation -0.089 -0.190 -0.137 -0.092 -0.114  -0.159 
Years Sig. 0.090 0.000 0.009 0.078 0.029  0.002 
N 365 365 365 365 365 365
2000 Correlation 0.007 -0.011 -0.164 -0.252 -0.097  -0.207 
Sig. 0.962 0.936 0.245 0.071 0.494  0.142 
n 52 52 52 52 52 52
2001 Correlation -0.100 -0.238 -0.150 -0.199 -0.017  -0.243 
Sig. 0.477 0.086 0.283 0.153 0.906  0.080 
n 53 53 53 53 53 53
2002 Correlation -0.055 -0.260 -0.094 0.003 -0.142  -0.156 
Sig. 0.697 0.063 0.509 0.985 0.315  0.271 
n 52 52 52 52 52 52
2003 Correlation 0.002 -0.324 -0.151 -0.270 0.046  -0.002 
Sig. 0.990 0.019 0.286 0.053 0.744  0.987 
n 52 52 52 52 52 52
2004 Correlation -0.006 -0.168 -0.162 -0.134 -0.264  -0.135 
Sig. 0.968 0.234 0.252 0.343 0.059  0.340 
n 52 52 52 52 52 52
2005 Correlation -0.237 -0.134 -0.262 0.191 -0.181  -0.248 
Sig. 0.091 0.343 0.061 0.174 0.198  0.076 
n 52 52 52 52 52 52
2006 Correlation -0.266 -0.265 0.073 -0.049 -0.072  -0.161 
Sig. 0.056 0.058 0.607 0.728 0.613  0.254 
  n 52 52 52 52 52 52
 
Note: KOR – Korean films; ABA – American films released by Hollywood distributors;  
          ABK – American films released by Korean distributors; OTH – Other types of films 
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Table 6.3 Distributor’s Average Competition Score against All Other Distributors (I) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Ave. competition score .0534 .0416 .0727 .0515 .0589 .0581 .0632 
The total # of films (1) 163 172 216 190 193 192 207 
The total # of films (2) 328 280 290 240 268 301 345 
 
Note: [The total number of films (1)] indicates the annual total of released films by 23 selected distributors while  
          [The total number of films (2)] means the annual total of released films by all distributors in the Korean  
          market. 
 
Film Type (1): Korean films  
A LINE(1)    0.0569 0.0140      
AFDF(1)   0.0356        
Aura Entertainment(1)     0.0538      
Buena Vista(1) 0.0588 0.0326 0.0380  0.0259      
Cheong-Uh-Ram(1)    0.0678 0.0639 0.0873  0.0593  0.0474 
Cine World(1) 0.0729 0.0369  0.0221      
Cinema Service(1) 0.0944 0.0917 0.1202 0.1174 0.1015  0.0879  0.0998 
CJ Entertainment(1) 0.0665 0.0346 0.1164 0.1216 0.1378  0.0971  0.1668 
Dong Ah Export(1) 0.0192 0.0285        
Fox(1)    0.0324       
HanMac Yeonghwa(1) 0.0169 0.0351        
Korea Pictures(1)   0.0180 0.0968 0.0251 0.0515  0.0632    
Lotte Entertainment(1)      0.0335  0.0741  0.1111 
Mirovision(1)   0.0256 0.2067     0.0402 
MK Pictures(1)       0.0325  0.0653 
Shindo Film(1) 0.0471         
Show Box(1)    0.0460 0.0599 0.0553  0.1007  0.1362 
Show East(1)     0.0760 0.0353  0.0913  0.0265 
Sinavro(1)   0.0237 0.0583 0.0463      
Columbia (1)   0.0385   0.0482      
Tube Entertainment(1) 0.0716 0.0298  0.0613 0.0590  0.0468    
Warner Brothers(1)   0.0292        
Film Type (2): American films distributed by American companies 
Buena Vista(2) 0.0665 0.0607 0.1125 0.1058 0.0885  0.1147  0.0538 
Fox(2) 0.1080 0.0848 0.1145 0.1072 0.1293  0.0904  0.0953 
Columbia (2) 0.1006 0.0809 0.1089 0.1076 0.0809  0.0924  0.0662 
UIP(2) 0.0861 0.0873 0.1201 0.1044 0.0999  0.0963  0.0687 
Warner Brothers(2) 0.1425 0.0740 0.1323 0.0463 0.0579  0.0421  0.1224 
 





Table 6.3 (Cont.) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Film Type (3): American films distributed by Korean companies 
A LINE(3)    0.0942 0.0320      
AFDF(3)   0.0262        
Aura Entertainment(3)     0.0292 0.0664      
Cine World(3) 0.0193  0.0322 0.0858 0.0775 0.0664      
Cinema Service(3) 0.1001  0.0407 0.0667 0.0427 0.0629  0.0529  0.0543 
CJ Entertainment(3) 0.0935  0.0667 0.0627 0.0772 0.0711  0.0768  0.0631 
Dong Ah Export(3)   0.0162        
HanMac Yeonghwa(3) 0.0327  0.0474        
Korea Pictures(3)   0.0792 0.0509 0.0311 0.0401  0.0372    
Lotte Entertainment(3)      0.0372  0.0228  0.0858 
Mirovision(3)    0.0182     0.0458 
Shindo Film(3) 0.0857  0.0483        
Show Box(3)     0.0249 0.0576  0.0790  0.0382 
Show East(3)       0.0445  0.0236 
Sinavro(3) 0.0256  0.0559 0.0275       
Tube Entertainment(3) 0.0219  0.0139  0.0131 0.0559  0.0782    
Film Type (4): Other types of films 
A LINE(4)     0.0133      
AFDF(4) 0.0169  0.0336        
Aura Entertainment(4)     0.0355 0.0482      
Buena Vista(4) 0.0335  0.0369 0.0392 0.0745  0.0142  0.0571 
Cine World(4) 0.0071  0.0121 0.0669 0.0266      
Cinema Service(4) 0.0388  0.0744 0.0287 0.0544 0.0228    0.0448 
CJ Entertainment(4) 0.0598  0.0296 0.0449 0.0267 0.0291  0.0703  0.0783 
Dong Ah Export(4) 0.0539  0.0228 0.0782 0.0214 0.0252    0.0361 
Fox(4)   0.0268 0.0735 0.0132 0.0322  0.0164    
HanMac Yeonghwa(4) 0.0334  0.0072        
Korea Pictures(4)    0.0640 0.0512  0.0140    
Lotte Entertainment(4)       0.0203  0.0200 
Mirovision(4)   0.0359 0.0640 0.0372 0.0664    0.0424 
MK Pictures(4)         0.0822 
Shindo Film(4) 0.0260    0.0284      
Show Box(4)      0.0365  0.0468  0.0456 
Show East(4)     0.0145 0.0574  0.0207  0.0296 
Sinavro(4) 0.0059  0.0145 0.0322 0.0287      
Columbia.(4) 0.0303  0.0306 0.0114 0.0758 0.0354  0.0332  0.0313 
Tube Entertainment(4) 0.0209  0.0472 0.0628  0.0404  0.0475    
UIP(4)   0.0578    0.0453  0.0191 
Warner Brothers(4)     0.0476  0.0495    
 




Table 6.4 Distributor’s Average Competition Score against All Other Distributors (II) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Ave.  0.1221  0.1060 0.1542 0.1072 0.1207 0.1405  0.1367 
Fox 0.1514  0.1189 0.1812 0.1530 0.1965 0.1549  0.1493 
Buena Vista 0.1439  0.1352 0.1814 0.1890 0.1370 0.1372  0.0930 
Warner Bro. 0.1934  0.1310 0.1727 0.0792 0.0683 0.0804  0.1698 
Sony Pic. 0.1624  0.1525 0.1444 0.1590 0.1261 0.1387  0.0966 
UIP 0.1343  0.1168 0.2028 0.1360 0.1106 0.1553  0.1004 
CJ Ent. 0.1950  0.1245 0.2000 0.1894 0.2227 0.2562  0.2581 
Cinema Serv. 0.1864  0.1821 0.1945 0.1886 0.1810 0.1408  0.1935 
Dong Ah Export 0.0814  0.0574 0.1421 0.0377 0.0308   0.0456 
Sinavro 0.0281  0.0929 0.1104 0.0934      
Shin Do Film 0.1387  0.0739  0.0447      
Cine World 0.1026  0.0599 0.1823 0.0812 0.1307     
Tube Ent. 0.1033  0.0970 0.0510 0.0852 0.1301 0.1309    
Han Maek 0.0561  0.0987        
AFDF 0.0323  0.0925        
Miro Vision   0.0507 0.2052 0.0683 0.1307   0.1036 
Korea Pic.   0.1115 0.1648 0.0985 0.0862 0.1318    
Show Box     0.0660 0.0902 0.1180 0.1902  0.2002 
Chung Uh Ram     0.1035 0.0985 0.1193 0.0938  0.0427 
Show East      0.1162 0.0431 0.1597  0.0863 
A-Line     0.1656 0.0315      
Aura Ent.       0.0967 0.1361     
Lotte       0.0841 0.1342  0.2199 
MK Pic.        0.0622  0.1552 
 
Note: The values in gray-marked cells are greater than each year’s average competition score of the entire market 
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Figure 6.2 Average Competition Scores for Top-Five Distributors 
 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Within ABA 0.1627  0.0869 0.1611 0.1208 0.1408 0.0974  0.0972 
Within KOR 0.0958  0.0587 0.1344 0.1391 0.0975 0.1113  0.2677 
Within ABK 0.0862  0.0305 0.0641 0.0300 0.0704 0.0119  0.0330 
Between KOR & ABA 0.1454  0.0943 0.1754 0.1813 0.1834 0.1341  0.1416 
Between ABA & ABK 0.1042  0.0940 0.1473 0.0915 0.1158 0.1216  0.0927 
Between KOR & ABK 0.0961  0.0643 0.0640 0.0651 0.1011 0.1112  0.0765 
 
Average Competition Scores for Top-Five Distributors (KOR and ABA Only) 
 
 
Note: KOR – Korean films; ABA – American films released by Hollywood distributors;  






















Figure 6.3 Annual Total Released Film Numbers by Top-5 Distributors in Each Type 
 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
KOR 29 37 50 45 55 54 82
ABA 73 60 76 72 74 64 68
ABK 23 31 32 25 29 29 20
               
Note: KOR – Korean films; ABA – American films released by Hollywood distributors;  















Figure 6.4 Top-5 Distributor’s Average Competition Score Changes against All Distributors  
 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Americans 0.157  0.131 0.177 0.143 0.128 0.133  0.122 












Figure 6.5 Average Competition Scores for Top-Five Distributors (Koreans vs. Americans) 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Within Americans 0.181 0.123 0.160 0.147 0.157  0.110  0.109 
Between Koreans & Americans 0.187 0.174 0.212 0.201 0.212  0.186  0.187 















Figure 6.6 Five Hollywood Distributors’ Film Release Frequencies and Obtained Audiences 
 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Audience 9,932,404  10,704,585 12,804,599 11,852,060 11,755,590 13,225,750  14,525,094 
Number of Films 74  60 74 68 72 63  68 
 
Source: KOFIC Yearbook 2007*
                                                 


























Chapter 7: Connecting Audience and Industry Sides Together 
  
Findings throughout the three analysis chapters thus far can be summarized as follows. 
First, analyses on the buyers’ side of the Korean film market have disproved the presumption that 
escalated preferences for Korean films spawned the sudden increase in the domestic film ticket 
sales. Indeed, researchers agree that the overall level of preferences for Korean films has 
improved since the turn of the twenty-first century. Given the instability observed in the 
composition of Korean film preference groups, we can hardly claim that these improved 
preferences have led directly to a meaningful improvement in consumer evaluation of Korean 
films and, in turn, their consumption at the box office.  
On the other side of market transactions, investigations have demonstrated that sellers 
found ways to survive the barrage of Hollywood films. Korean distributors, which have been key 
industry players since the late 1990s, successfully secured their favored distribution seasons 
against Hollywood distributors. Despite the growing number of domestic films in the market, 
they curbed the extent to which they competed with Hollywood distributors by maneuvering the 
release timings of new Korean films and their opening-day screen numbers. 
 Two questions naturally arise at this point. First, if the augmentations in domestic film 
audiences cannot be fully ascribed to heightened preferences for Korean films, how could such 
augmentations occur? I have ascertained that elaborate activities by distributors gave rise to 
meaningful shifts in the distribution and competition patterns of Korean films. Then, why and for 
what purpose did distributors create these shifts? Although approached from opposite directions, 
these two questions are, if combined, asking the same thing; did orderly changes from the sellers’ 
side have something to do with the upsurge of the Korean films from the buyers’ side? Stated 
more directly, do the systematic behaviors of Korean distributors, as discussed in previous two 
chapters, deserve much credit for the resurgence in domestic film box-office ticket sales? 
In searching for answers to these questions, this chapter provides important analyses. In 
the previous two chapters, I performed analyses addressing the sellers’ side at aggregate levels as 
each film was grouped based on four film types or individual distributors. In this chapter, the unit 
of analysis becomes individual films, the ultimate unit in the film industry, though the influence 
of competition factors—the same week film releases and opening-day screen numbers—is still 
measured at an aggregate level by filmmaker’s and distributor’s countries of origin. 
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While I carried out previous analyses within two individual domains of the film 
market—i.e., the buyers’ or the sellers’ side, the goal of the current chapter is to consolidate 
findings from previous examinations. By focusing on audience numbers drawn by each film, I 
scrutinize the effects that sellers’ elaborate activities had on the buyers’ side. This strategy will 
allow me to confirm and extend the arguments made by previous analyses so that we will better 
understand the heart of shifts in the Korean film industry based on a more comprehensive 
picture. 
 
7.1 Focal Points of Puzzle Assembly 
Identifying the factors required to draw large numbers of audiences has been a traditional 
but still popular topic in film-related studies. Given that the ultimate goal of commercial 
filmmaking is to earn profits, many inquiries focus on this goal, especially in marketing research 
or economics (Chang and Ki 2005; Elliott and Simmons 2008). The question addressed in this 
chapter does not widely differ from this kind of inquiry in that I examine the cause for increases 
in ticket sales for individual films. 
However, unlike ordinary marketing research, which tends to explore many different 
factors at once (See Chang and Ki 2005; Elliott and Simmons 2008; Litman 1983; Sochay 1994), 
this chapter’s analyses rely solely on the competition factors discussed in previous chapters. 
Regarding competition among film distributors, I have argued that the number of simultaneously 
released films and their opening-day screen numbers are crucial. By probing the effect these two 
factors have on the outcomes of individual films, we will see whether or not the decisions that 
distributors have made regarding the release of their films yielded good results. Based on the 
outcomes of the analyses so far, I will determine what important role Korean distributors played 
in galvanizing the Korean film industry in the last decade. 
 The analyses will be divided into two major parts, one for general relations and the other 
for specific contexts. The first analysis focuses on how distributors’ special care affects the 
number of ticket sales for each film. Apart from a film’s original features and the qualities 
infused by its filmmakers, the final audience sizes for commercial films are subject to a variety 
of external factors. Among these, we should take into account the number of competitors in the 
market and the screen numbers they occupy for openings (Kim 2003a; Krider and Weinberg 
1998). Neither a lot of new movies waiting for screenings nor the large number of screens that 
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will be occupied by them is a good signal for distributors who are seeking release points for their 
own films; all the films in the markets have to share the limited number of weekly audiences 
unless the size of weekly audiences abruptly increases. Hence, new films, in general, prefer ideal 
release points where fewer films are newly released on smaller numbers of screens. As in the 
case of blockbusters, if some film is expected to draw a large number of viewers and therefore 
intimidates other films’ market entrances, making such a distribution-friendly circumstance 
would be relatively easy.  Otherwise, distributors need to search for advantageous time spots or 
create them. In this sense, we can tag the films distributed at a particular time point when few 
other films are released on small numbers of screens as “cared for” by distributors. Using OLS 
regression models, the first analysis explores how the number of other films released in the same 
week1 and their screen numbers affect individual films’ audience numbers.  
 Exclusively focusing on only Korean domestic films, the second analysis deals with a 
more specific question: among the competition factors examined in the first analysis, what 
helped certain domestic films to become bestsellers in the Korean market? There are two reasons 
why we have to address this question. First, factors that help to increase Korean film audiences 
may not be identical to those that make Korean films sell better than other films. The first 
analysis explores competition factors that might influence a Korean film’s audience numbers, but 
we do not know yet whether or not these factors were equally valid when Korean films 
outperformed other types of films released in the same week. Second, the fact that Korean film 
audiences substantially increased is not the only reason for the Korean film industry’s success in 
the 2000s. More important, total Korean film audiences exceeded American film audiences, and 
consequently, Korea became one of very few countries in which domestic films surpassed 
imported Hollywood films in their annual box-office ticket sales. Employing binary logistic 
regression models, the second analysis examines the conditions under which Korean films 
performed better than other films released in the same weeks.  
 
                                                 
1 The limitation of the regression models in this chapter is that they do not consider the influence of other 
films already in play. Indeed, this problem cannot be overlooked as the films released before a particular week 
always preoccupy a considerable proportion of active screens, and the marketability of these films may be even 
greater than those released in the same week. However, given the importance of opening-week audience numbers 
and the difficulties in measuring the influence of previously released films in both technical and practical aspects, 
the simplified models in this chapter are still effective for developing arguments (see section 6.1 for more details on 
this issue).   
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7.2 Interpreting Results (1) – OLS Regression Models 
 When developing regression models whose explained variable is the total audience 
number for individual films, we should note the following two issues. First, even in the case of 
the simplest model, the opening-day screen numbers for individual films must be included as a 
control variable. As repeatedly emphasized, this variable is the most important single predictor 
with the greatest correlation with audience numbers for any kind of film (Chang and Ki 2005; 
Elliott and Simmons 2008; McKenzie 2009; Moretti 2011; Prosser 2002). In the data set applied 
to the current analysis, the opening-day screen numbers have a correlation coefficient .653 with 
audiences for Korean films (n = 540), .825 for American-distributed American films (n = 487), 
and .727 for Korean-distributed American films (n = 406).  
 Given the high correlation between individual films’ opening-day screen numbers and 
their audience numbers, including the screen number variable in the model as a control variable 
may cause an “over-control” problem. As a matter of fact, many researchers have been well 
aware of the close, perhaps too close, relationship among production budget, opening screen 
numbers, and total revenues for individual films. Thus, they usually want to see if those variables 
have technically the same effects on other variables in the model. However, as recent studies 
corroborated (Chang and Ki 2005; Elliott and Simmons 2008), in spite of high correlations 
among these variables, each variable’s relationship with other important predictors of movie 
performance is quite different from one another. Depending on the combination of explanatory 
variables in the model, the effect of opening screen numbers on the total revenue can be 
significantly different (Ainslie et al. 2005). In addition, as Walls demonstrates (2009), the mean 
total revenue is more elastic against the opening screen number than production budget. 
Therefore, controlling for the effect of opening-day screen number is still valid and necessary.  
 Another issue is about audience number outliers. Each year, without exception, several 
high-profile films receive great attention due to their extraordinary performance at the box office; 
the greatest motivation in commercial filmmaking is to create these few extremely successful 
films. Their existence in the film industry is indispensable because, as models of success, they 
encourage more investments in the filmmaking business. However, such films are not always 
welcome in film market analysis because they are outliers. Running regression models without 
any treatment of these audience-size outliers may distort the true explanatory power of some 
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independent variables because outliers are rarely explained by any variables. Therefore, outliers 
must be identified and eliminated beforehand, based on clear standards.  
 Table 7.1 presents the OLS regression models, each of which has the audience numbers 
for three different types of films as a dependent variable. As noted above, an individual film’s 
opening-day screen numbers (i.e., “screen” variable in Table 7.1) become a control variable, and 
a group of films classified as audience number outliers are removed in advance.2 The remaining 
variables represent two groups of independent variables, one for the numbers of other films 
released in the same week and the other for the sum of opening-day screen numbers for those 
other films. Because these two variables are further distinguished by the (four) types of films, 
each model includes eight independent variables. 
 Three general patterns are noticeable. First, an individual film’s own screen numbers are 
still the most significant predictor in estimating total audiences. Despite minor discrepancies in 
the size of the coefficients, they have a strong positive effect on the total number of audiences, 
regardless of film type. Second, the numbers of films released within the same week do not have 
any meaningful influence on audience sizes when the sum of opening-day screens for other films 
and individual films’ own screen numbers are controlled. Third, the effects of screen numbers 
occupied by other films vary depending on the type of film. For instance, screen numbers for 
American-distributed American films and other type of films significantly affect audience 
numbers for Korean domestic films.3 In the case of screen numbers of American-distributed 
American films (i.e., ABA Scrn_#), every one-screen increase corresponds to, on average, 758 
fewer ticket sales for Korean films, when other variables are controlled. 
The crux of these regression analyses, however, lies in the comparisons of the American-
distributed American film’s model with the other two models. While the sum of screen numbers 
for any kind of film significantly affects audience numbers for American-distributed American 
films, audience numbers for Korean films and Korean-distributed American films are influenced 
                                                 
2 I ran univariate regression models for opening-day screen numbers (= IV) and total audience numbers (= 
DV) for three individual types of films (i.e., Korean films, American-distributed American films, and Korean-
distributed American films). Then, the cases with an absolute value of studentized residual greater than 3 were 
identified as outliers and removed. (See Appendix F for the lists of eliminated films in each type.) Notice that 
because outliers are identified based on individual film’s audience numbers weighed by their opening-day screen 
numbers, all eliminated films are not necessarily a big hit (or a big flop). If audience numbers are too large or small 
compared to the film’s opening-day screen numbers, then they are treated as outliers.  
3 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the films not made by either Korean or American filmmakers are classified 
as other type of films. When indicated in this dissertation, they are distinguished by an italic font style.  
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by only American-distributed American film’s screen numbers.4 We can read this contrast in the 
following ways. When selecting their films’ opening weekends, Korean distributors should be 
attentive to one primary factor: the number of screens occupied by new American-distributed 
American films. This powerful variable may negatively influence Korean film audience 
numbers. Additionally, the sum of Korean or Korean-distributed American films’ screen numbers 
did not have a meaningful effect on each type of films’ audience numbers. Theoretically, Korean 
distributors can pay no or less attention to other Korean distributors’ lineups as long as they are 
vigilant regarding Hollywood distributors’ release schedules. 
 However, we should remember that the result of the regression models we are addressing 
is not to garner pragmatic information for future distribution strategies but to understand the 
general patterns between audience numbers and their competition-related variables in the past. 
The more important goal in this analysis is not to find any factors that positively or negatively 
influence an individual film’s audience numbers but to determine the effects of a distributor’s 
release week selection. When this point is fully considered, the findings from the current analysis 
will be key evidence in answering the questions at hand.  
 Regarding the first question of this chapter, “where does an augmentation of Korean 
domestic film audience come from,” the current analysis provides at least one partial answer. 
Given the significant negative relation between a Korean film’s audience numbers and the screen 
numbers allocated to new Hollywood films, domestic films placed at advantageous points—i.e., 
weeks that have fewer screen numbers for new Hollywood films—are more likely to draw larger 
numbers of audiences and in that sense, to help more to augment annual Korean film audiences.5 
Also, I can propose a straightforward answer to the more direct question regarding whether 
distributors’ elaborate behaviors helped to increase Korean film audiences. Because distributors 
determine the opening timing of new films, their watchful decisions have played a critical role in 
expanding annual domestic film audiences.  
                                                 
4 In case of audience numbers for Korean films, the results suggest that the sum of screen numbers for 
both American-distributed American films and other films has a strong negative effect. In addition, the coefficient 
for “Other_Scrn#” is more than twice as great as that of “ABA_Scrn#.” However, given the fact that most of “other 
types” of films has only one or two opening-day screen numbers, substantive effects of other types of film’s screen 
number variable are negligible.  
5 How much those carefully released films helped the scale of Korean film audiences to increase will be 
further discussed later in this chapter.  
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Now, we can better understand that the restricted competition between Korean and 
Hollywood distributors, discussed in Chapter 6, was not a coincidence. We do not know yet 
whether Korean distributors were fully aware that avoiding competition with Hollywood 
distributors, at the expense of overheated competition with other Korean distributors, was 
necessary to maximize their box-office revenue. But, more important is that Korean distributors 
willingly eschewed head-on competition with Hollywood distributors, and by doing so, they 
were able to increase their audiences.   
 
7.3 Interpreting Results (2) – Binary Logistic Regression Models 
The second analysis in this chapter aims at complementing and refining what we have 
discussed thus far in more specific contexts. Although the first analysis elucidated how audience 
numbers for individual films are associated with the numbers and the scales of their competitors, 
this still falls short for a variety of inquiries about the relation between audience numbers and 
distributor’s release decisions. There can be many reasons for this restriction over the findings 
from the first analysis, but the most important is that the first analysis relied on the absolute scale 
of audience numbers.  
In fact, substantive meanings of a particular size of audience are not fixed but change in 
accordance with both the internal and external conditions of the film industry. The simplest 
example of changing conditions is the seasonality of commercial movies, which indicates that 
the numbers of potential moviegoers vary depending on periods within the year (Einav 2007; 
Krider and Weinberg 1998; Moul and Shugan 2005). Consequently, the total audience numbers 
for bestselling films during low-demand seasons can be far smaller than those for mediocre films 
during high-demand seasons. Although the mediocre films in the high-demand season may 
obtain larger audiences than bestselling films in the low-demand seasons, the former cannot be 
necessarily said to have better results than the latter because it is forced to yield a larger segment 
of audience to other film(s). In addition, if films released in high-demand seasons spent more 
money on production and promotion than those in low-demand seasons, judging the outcomes 
based on the absolute scale of audience numbers is meaningless. In the film market, obtaining a 




Keeping this point in mind, we need to remember what happened to the Korean film 
industry in the first seven years of the 2000s. Indeed, what brought attention to the Korean film 
industry and what made people inside it so excited at that time was the fact that Korean film 
ticket sales had recovered from an almost complete collapse. However, another crucial reason for 
this attention and excitement was that the total audience numbers for Korean films eventually 
exceeded those for other types of film in the Korean market, including for American films. Given 
Hollywood films’ dominance in international markets, this shift was unusual enough to draw 
extraordinary attention to the Korean film industry. Considering that the number of annually 
screened Korean films did not substantially differ from that of American films, such a shift 
would have been impossible without many domestic films having top box-office results. Thus, 
we need to scrutinize how competition factors addressed in the first analysis affected Korean 
film’s chances to outperform other types of films.  
Table 7.2 presents two sets of binary logistic regression models whose dependent 
variable is whether or not a Korean film best performed in two areas of interest. In the first set 
(left-hand side), the dependent variable is whether a Korean film obtained the largest audiences 
among the films released in the same week. To identify such cases, I sorted all 541 Korean films 
during the seven-year period by their opening week, i.e., 1st to 365th week. Then, I selected only 
the films that obtained the largest audience numbers among Korean films in each week. Within 
this seven-year period (= 365 weeks), Korean films were not released during 74 weeks. 
Therefore, this procedure came up with 291 (= 365 – 74 weeks) weekly bestselling Korean films. 
Among these 291 films, if they obtained larger total audience numbers than any other film 
released in the same week, they were coded as 1; otherwise, they were coded as 0.6  
In the second set (right-hand side), the criterion of the dependent variable slightly 
changed. Drawing a larger number does not necessarily demonstrate that one film outperformed 
another given the strong tendency that a higher number of opening-day screens attracts more 
audiences (Elliott and Simmons 2008; McKenzie 2009). Therefore, the highest audience 
numbers per screen, instead of plain audience numbers, was adopted as the criterion for the 
second dependent variable. All other control and explanatory variables in both sets are identical 
                                                 
6 Out of 291 Korean films, 150 marked the largest audience numbers among those released in the same 
week, so they are coded as 1. Although these 150 films account for 27.7 percent of domestic films released between 
2000 and 2006, the total audience numbers obtained by them are more than 72 percent (See Table 7.3). We are 
focusing on only a quarter of all Korean films, but their practical importance cannot be underestimated.  
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with those in the first OLS regression analysis. Model 1 and 2 in each set measure how the 
numbers of other films released in the same week and their total opening-day screens affect the 
focused probability of the dependent variable, respectively. They are combined in Model 3.  
These two sets of logistic regression models reveal several interesting points, but the 
following few should attract our attention. When considering only the numbers of simultaneously 
released films, Model 1 in each set shows that the number of other Korean films increases the 
probability that a Korean film outperformed others, while the number of different types of film 
exerts a negative influence on it. The latter part of this finding is easily understandable because 
even the least influential film in the market may reduce one film’s possible audience size, but 
this effect never operates inversely. Then, how can we understand that the number of other 
Korean films helped to increase Korean films’ probability of becoming the best-performing film 
of the week?  
At this point, we need to remember the discussion of previous findings. In Chapter 5, we 
observed that Korean films had developed their favored distribution seasons in more recent 
years. This implies that Korean films succeeded in regulating their typical highly concentrated 
opening seasons against other types of films. If we apply this finding to the current analysis, 
reading the sign of KOR_film# variable is quite simple. Given that Korean films had high-supply 
seasons each year, if released in such periods, at least one Korean film is more likely to draw 
larger audiences than other types of films.7 Therefore, the positive relation between the 
probability of being a high-performing film and the number of other Korean films released in the 
same week simply reconfirms the temporal concentrations of Korean film releases, which 
Chapter 5 discussed.  
Overall relationships between the total screen numbers occupied by four types of films 
and the Korean film’s probability of being the best-performing film, presented in Model 2 of 
each set, are almost identical with those in Model 1. With regard to the direction and the 
statistical significance of regression coefficients, the only difference is that those in Model 2 are 
more consistent and salient than in Model 1. As in the first OLS regression models, screen 
                                                 
7  Due to the sensitivity of the logistic regression to the sample size, Raftery (1995) suggests that a 
coefficient, to be included in the model, should have a z-test statistic whose squared value is greater than the natural 
logarithm of the sample size (i.e., Baysian Information Criterion [BIC] > z2 – ln n). Since the sample size in Table 
7.2 is 291, its natural logarithm equals 5.673. This implies that if P-values in this table are greater than 0.05, (e.g., in 
the first set, Kor_film# of Model 1 and Kor_scrn# of Model 2), their statistical significance can be ignored.   
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numbers occupied by American-distributed American films have the strongest effect on the 
dependent variable.8 In the first set, for instance, at every one screen increase for American-
distributed American films (ABA_scrn#), the odds of drawing the largest audiences for Korean 
films multiply by .950 (i.e., 5% decline), while the same odds increases by a factor of 1.015 (i.e., 
increase by 1.5%) for each unit increase in other Korean films’ screen numbers (KOR_scrn#), 
controlling for other variables. Nevertheless, the basic patterns in Model 2 have no substantive 
difference from Model 1; thus, they can be understood in the same context of Model 1 (i.e., 
Korean films’ high-supply seasons).  
If we merge these two models, however, a bit different trends emerge. When screen 
number variables are considered together, the majority of original relationships between film 
number variables and the dependent variable shows remarkable shifts in the direction of the 
relationships and/or statistical significance. By contrast, screen number variables’ original 
directions of relationships with the dependent variable remain constant in both sets even after 
four types of film number variables are combined. These two jointly suggest that, like the 
previous OLS regression models, screen numbers occupied by other films are stronger 
explanatory variables than the numbers of other films released at the same time.  
In comparison with the previous OLS regression model, we can note two important 
differences in Model 3. First, although these two models have the same explanatory and control 
variables, the sign of regression coefficient for KOR_scrn# variable (i.e., the screen numbers 
occupied by other Korean films) in the logistic regression model is positive, while the same sign 
in the OLS model is negative. Second and more important, the coefficient of the ABA_film# 
variable (i.e., the number of American-distributed American films released in the same week) in 
both sets is a strong positive value with great statistical significance. While we can understand 
the first difference using the explanations presented for Models 1 and 2 above, the second 
difference makes a more ambiguous point. How can we interpret the fact that the number of new 
American films released by Hollywood distributors has a positive effect on a Korean film’s 
probability of being the best-performing film, while at the same time, the screen numbers 
occupied by those American films have a strong negative effect on the same dependent variable? 
                                                 
8 In the case of the second set, the coefficient for OTH_scrn# variable (i.e., opening screen numbers for 
other types of films) has the largest absolute value. However, as discussed above, because typical opening-day 
screen numbers for other types of films are just one or two, so this variable’s substantive effect on the dependent 
variable is not that great.  
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These seemingly incompatible signs provide a clue to answering the main question of 
the second analysis: under what condition (of competition factors) are Korean films more likely 
to be the best-performing films? To resolve this paradoxical point, we need to pursue the 
implications of the effects that film number and screen number have on other film’s audiences, in 
addition to the relationship between them. In cases of American films distributed by Korean 
distributors and other types of films, Model 3 in each set shows that their screen numbers had a 
significant negative effect on a Korean film’s chances to be the best-performing film, while their 
film numbers did not. Because an individual film’s opening-day screen numbers are the strongest 
predictor of total audience, successful distributors are necessarily watchful regarding the number 
of screens taken by any type of film. Therefore, a negative coefficient for any screen number 
variable can have a statistical significance insofar as Korean distributors paid attention to the 
screen numbers of that particular type of films. However, if film numbers for a certain type of 
films do not have a significance, it indicates that the constitution of that particular type of films 
was outside the consideration of Korean distributors and, consequently, not important to a 
Korean film’s box-office outcomes. Whenever and whatever distributors released Korean-
distributed American films or other types of films to the market, their existences were not 
counted in a Korean film’s probability of being the best-performing film, other than the number 
of screens they preempted. 
Returning back to the issue of the opposite signs of two American-distributed American 
film variables, we now need to remember the key distribution characteristic for this particular 
type of films discussed in Chapter 5. They have very clear seasonal distinctions between large- 
and small-scale films, while their distributed film numbers remain relatively constant all around 
year. If the number of American-distributed American films released each week does not vary 
much, its sum of screen numbers significantly increases only when large-scale films are included 
in the opening film list.9 Therefore, the negative signs of ABA_scren# variables imply that 
during the week when large-scale Hollywood film(s) open, the probability of Korean film’s best 
outcome at the box office decreases. If these large-scale Hollywood films are frightening enough 
to make other American films refrain from entering the market (e.g., summer blockbuster films), 
the number of other American-distributed American films is apt to be smaller, while a Korean 
                                                 
9 Note that, by nature, many large-scale films cannot be released in the same week. 
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film’s chance to be the best is even smaller. In short, the opposite signs of two variables for 
American-distributed American films indicate that the Korean film’s probability of becoming a 
best-performing film was maximized during the periods when large-scale American-distributed 
American film(s) were not newly launched, that is to say, Hollywood film’s typical low-demand 
seasons.   
 
7.4 Discussion 
 Analyses in this chapter make it clearer that Korean distributors’ activities over the past 
seven years have been the major driving forces that have increased Korean film audiences. I can 
demonstrate the truth of this statement based on the fact that among many Korean films during 
the data period, those that avoided direct competition with large-scale American-distributed 
American films were likely to obtain more audiences at the box office. In addition, Korean films 
placed in Hollywood films’ typical low-demand season were more likely to reach the top of box-
office ticket sales, and hence they helped to make Korean films’ market dominance possible. 
Because distributors determine appropriate release points and scales for individual films, the role 
of Korean distributors in increasing total audience numbers and surpassing other types of films 
must be a central concern when evaluating recent shifts in the Korean film industry.   
 The arguments presented so far may look too simple because the story that avoiding 
powerful competitors in the market results in better outcomes has nothing unusual. However, it is 
interesting that avoiding the weeks that have a large number of opening-day screens for 
American-distributed American films was not a primary tactic for Korean distributors in the 
earlier period. Table 7.4 shows the numbers of Korean films whose opening-screen number Z-
score in each year were greater than .67.10 To make comparisons, I divided these large-scale 
Korean films into two groups, depending on whether they were released in weeks during which 
American-distributed American films’ sum of screen numbers was greater than the annual 
average. For example, 8 out of 12 Korean films that had measurable screen numbers in 2000 
were launched in the weeks whose opening-day screen numbers for American-distributed 
American films were smaller than the annual average (i.e.,Y = 21.1 screens). Table 7.5 shows 
audience numbers and their proportions out of annual totals that the films in Table 7.4 obtained.  
                                                 




 As these two tables suggest, the percentages of large-scale Korean films distributed in 
disadvantageous weeks, namely, weeks whose sum of screen numbers for American-distributed 
American films are greater than annual average, gradually increased between 2000 and 2002. 
This pattern was more apparent in audience proportions drawn by those films. This outcome is 
somehow natural or predictable given the growing number of Korean domestic films during that 
period. For example, the domestic film numbers abruptly soared in 2002, having been stimulated 
by successes until 2001  (Park and Kim 2006), and in turn, a great proportion of Korean films, 
which failed to find their best release points, entered into direct competition with Hollywood 
films. Nevertheless, domestic film audiences did not proportionally increase to those inflated 
film numbers. Many filmmakers had to accept great losses, and the number of Korean films 
suddenly shrank in 2003.  
However, the distribution patterns of domestic films after this point contrast strikingly 
with those in the earlier period. As the number of domestic films increased again since 2003, the 
proportion of large-scale films that avoid tough competition with American-distributed American 
films increased as well. In 2006, although the number of screened Korean films was greater than 
it was in 2002, the proportion of considerably large-scale domestic films that failed to avoid 
tough competition with American-distributed American films significantly decreased (i.e., from 
57% to 25%). At the same time, the proportion of audience numbers drawn by those 
“scrupulously placed” films expanded to more than 55%, but the proportion gained by the films 
that competed with large-scale Hollywood films dropped as low as 11%.11  
 These changing trends suggest one simple fact; distributors all know that avoiding tough 
competition will be good for their films, but not everyone can avoid such competition. Friendly 
release circumstances in the film market are never given for free or by good luck. Distributing 
films to advantageous time spots could be far more difficult without assiduous efforts by well-
organized subjects, who can analyze and predict the possible outcome of their films based on 
collected information. 
  
                                                 
11 The changing trends regarding the distribution of large-scale Korean films and audiences obtained by 
those films are well presented in Figure 7.1 and 7.2.  
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7.5 Tables and Figures 
Table 7.1 OLS Regression Models for Individual Film Audience Numbers  
 Korean Films  
American-distributed 
American Films  
Korean-distributed 
American Films 
Coeff. (SE) Beta Coeff. (SE) Beta Coeff. (SE) Beta
Constant -27649.762  -25264.358 229.973 
(32122.367)  (18683.223) (13927.593) 
Screen 8877.370 *** .737 9192.076 *** .851 6558.327 *** .797
(371.425)  (263.345) (267.129) 
KOR films# 11582.623  .037 2284.550 .010 3504.681 .027
(12503.394)  (6996.475) (5518.262) 
ABA films# 19720.292  .058 374.758 .002 -1469.947 -.011
(12919.518)  (7167.320) (5660.585) 
ABK films# -2464.188  -.008 382.853 .002 7560.818 .063
(12197.821)  (6903.356) (4635.922) 
Other films# -3207.769  -.013 -4481.937 -.026 -7469.753 ** -.079
(9015.867)  (5467.126) (3617.632) 
Korean Scrn# -443.523  -.062 -300.094 * -.058 -169.561 -.053
(292.365)  (167.320) (140.143) 
ABA Scrn# -758.894 ** -.079 -613.809 ** -.071 -434.599 ** -.101
(365.005)  (263.275) (183.057) 
ABK Scrn# -255.070  -.018 -929.068 *** -.089 -391.103 -.054
(515.236)  (299.208) (262.271) 
Other Scrn# -1545.123 ** -.079 -823.953 * -.060 3.590 .000
(734.445)  (445.205) (334.942) 
R-square .540 .749 .630 
Adj. R-Square .532 .745 .621 
N 528     476   396    
 
Note 1: * = P < .1; ** = P < .05; *** = P < .01 





Table 7.2 Binary Logistic Regression Models  
DV = Korean films drawing the largest audiences (Set 1) DV = Korean films drawing the largest audiences per screen (Set 2)
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coeff. (SE) Exp(B) Coeff. (SE) Exp(B) Coeff. (SE) Exp(B) Coeff. (SE) Exp(B) Coeff. (SE) Exp(B) Coeff. (SE) Exp(B)
screen .056 *** 1.058 .092 *** 1.097 .103 *** 1.108 .038 *** 1.039 .046 *** 1.047 .051 *** 1.052
 (.008) (.013) (.014) (.006) (.007) (.008)
KOR_film# .302 * 1.353 -.478 .620 .555 *** 1.743 .239 1.270
 (.158) (.308) (.152) (.242)
ABA_film# -.370 ** .691 .875 *** 2.399 -.109 .897 .528 ** 1.696
 (.161) (.276) (.149) (.211)
ABK_film# -.135 .874 -.086 .918 -.063 .939 .029 1.029
 (.147) (.218) (.139) (.181)
OTH_film# -.053 .948 .088 1.092 -.122 .885 .034 1.035
 (.112) (.183) (.105) (.146)
KOR_scrn# .015 * 1.015 .036 ** 1.036 .019 *** 1.019 .015 * 1.015
 (.008) (.014) (.006) (.009)
ABA_scrn# -.051 *** .950 -.073 *** .930 -.022 *** .978 -.032 *** .969
 (.008) (.011) (.005) (.007)
ABK_scrn# -.029 *** .971 -.024 ** .976 -.017 ** .983 -.016 * .984
 (.009) (.010) (.007) (.008)
OTH_scrn# -.032 *** .968 -.041 *** .960 -.032 *** .969 -.034 *** .967
 (.012) (.016) (.010) (.012)
Constant -1.706 *** .182 -.971 ** .379 -1.755 *** .173 -1.693 *** .184 -.750 ** .472 -1.549 *** .213
(.497) (.449) (.675) (.469) (.362) (.534)
L2 113.19 198.422 213.080 80.983 118.762 126.162
df 5 5 9 5 5 9 
sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke 0.430 0.659 0.692 0.324 0.447 0.469
N  291     291   291    291     291   291    
 
Note 1: * = P < .1; ** = P < .05; *** = P < .01 / Note 2: ABA – American-distributed American films; ABK – Korean-distributed American films 
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Table 7.3 Weekly Bestselling Korean Films and Their Audience Numbers  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Total Korean Film Numbers 58 52 100 65 74 84 108 541
The Number of Korean Films  
(WBF: Weekly Bestselling Films) 11 14 23 23 24 26 29 150
Percent 18.97 26.92 23.00 35.38  32.43 30.95 26.85 27.73 
Total Korean Audiences 8,975,618 16,284,892 18,883,002 23,443,775  22,767,402 29,731,087 26,553,943 146,639,719 
Korean Audiences by WBF 5,833,303 13,310,511 12,877,506 19,154,601  14,883,080 21,634,990 19,082,318 106,776,309 




Table 7.4 Proportion of Large-Scale Korean Films Distributed in Disadvantageous Weeks  
Year Annual Korean  Film Numbers 
Large-Scale Korean Films 
Total Films Released in LTA Weeks (Proportion) 
Films Released 
in GTA Weeks (Proportion) 
2000 58 12 8 (0.67) 4 (0.33)   
2001 52 12 8 (0.67) 4 (0.33) 
2002 100 28 12 (0.43) 16 (0.57)   
2003 65 16 8 (0.50) 8 (0.50)  
2004 74 16 9 (0.56) 7 (0.44) 
2005 84 24 16 (0.67) 8 (0.33)  
2006 108 24 18 (0.75) 6 (0.25)  
 
Note: LTA – Lower than Average sum of opening-day screen numbers for American-distributed American films  
GTA – Greater than Average sum of opening-day screen numbers for American-distributed American films 
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Table 7.5 Audience Numbers and Their Proportion Changes Drawn by Large-scale Korean Films 
Year Annual Korean Film Audiences 
Total Korean Film 
Audiences from LTA 
Weeks 
Total Korean Film 
Audiences from GTA 
Weeks 
Percent out of 
Annual Total  
(LTA Weeks) 
Percent out of 
Annual Total  
(GTA Weeks) 
2000 8,975,618  4,458,206 969,706  49.67 10.80 
2001 16,284,892  7,293,391 6,211,152  44.79 38.14 
2002 18,883,002  6,436,906 8,567,003  34.09 45.37 
2003 23,443,775  9,872,742 5,570,919  42.11 23.76 
2004 22,767,402  7,584,317 4,137,448  33.31 18.17 
2005 29,731,087  13,519,650 9,019,072  45.47 30.34 
2006 26,553,943  14,838,283 2,987,527  55.88 11.25 
 
Note: LTA – Lower than Average sum of opening-day screen numbers for American-distributed American films  




Figure 7.1 Percentage of Large-Scale Korean Films Released in LTA and GTA Weeks  
 
 
Note: LTA – Lower than Average sum of opening-day screen numbers for American-distributed American films  
















Figure 7.2 Percentages of Audiences by Large-scale Korean Films (LTA vs. GTA Weeks) 
 
 
Note: LTA – Lower than Average sum of opening-day screen numbers for American-distributed American films  












Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
A recent article1 published by a web-based Korean newspaper addressed an interesting 
topic about how domestic film distributors are perceived among Korean film industry players. It 
asks “why actors and directors do not give a vote of thanks to any investment and/or distribution 
companies during their acceptance speeches at movie awards ceremonies.” The article provides 
two answers. First, people in creative sectors of the film production, such as actors, directors or 
production staffs, tend to make a clear distinction between themselves and people in the business 
sectors, and second, those in business sectors are often depicted as greedy, interested only in 
profit while ignoring the preservation of artistic values. From the perspective of actors or 
directors, they have no reason to thank these money-grubbers as long as investors and/or 
distributors are rewarded by box-office revenues.   
In this dissertation, I have argued that Korean distributors played important roles in 
rejuvenating the film industry during the past ten or so years. This argument does not necessarily 
imply that actors or directors are incorrect in their judgment of film distributors. Rather, these 
perceptions are shockingly correct insofar as they do not completely disapprove of all the 
functions performed by distributors. Hence, my arguments are perfectly compatible with such 
views.     
 I have intended to say that individual players, even those in cultural product markets, are 
purely economic beings that pursue maximum profit with all available resources. However, 
players in this particular domain are well aware of the mechanisms that define the idiosyncrasies 
of their markets and the effect of these mechanisms on their behaviors in realizing maximum 
profits. Hence, players have to make decisions that remain within the boundaries delineated by 
the given conditions. Put another way, as economic sociologists argue, these players have to rely 
on the rationality embedded in their ongoing market structure. In this regard, it is somehow 
natural that distributors’ enthusiasm for the movies’ artistic values does not meet the expectation 
of filmmakers or directors since distributors’ profit-seeking behaviors are strictly guided by the 
rationality embedded in their market structure. Therefore, distributors should not be blamed for 
their seemingly insufficient devotion to the artistic values of domestic films.  
                                                 
1 Kim, Beom-Seok. 2010. “Why Doesn’t Won-bin Mention the CJ at Awards Ceremonies?”  Newsen, 
November 29, (http://newsen.co.kr/news_view.php?uid=201011291053251003&code=100300).   
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By the same token, we do not have to label Korean distributors as the film industry’s 
saviors. Although their activities helped the film industry to escape from an unprecedented crisis, 
their individual behaviors were not originally intended to restore the declining domestic film 
market. They carefully analyzed the environmental conditions in which they were embedded and 
behaved in line with their own situations. Those are, according to the production of culture 
perspective, intrinsic jobs that any distributors are supposed to do in film markets. In the 
following section, I will review the ways in which the findings in the four analysis chapters 
support this claim. 
 
8.1 Findings in Each Chapter 
 The analyses in Chapter 4 provide a pilot test that determines whether additional 
investigations into the industry—or sellers’—sides are necessary. Given the main question of the 
dissertation, i.e., where do increases in domestic film ticket sales come from?, this chapter 
exclusively addresses Korean moviegoers’ preference shifts as a possible causal factor of the 
increased domestic film consumers. I conducted this chapter’s analyses based on the premise that 
if the shifts of the Korean film industry during the last decade truly originated from the improved 
quality of domestic films, moviegoers’ preferences toward Korean films must have improved 
concurrently. Although I found some signals of meaningful improvements, preferences for 
Korean films are still unstable, especially compared to preferences for American films. In other 
words, Korean audiences’ improved preferences toward domestic films are not convincing 
enough to fully explain domestic films’ consistent increases in ticket sales. This finding indicates 
that additional investigations are required on the other side of market transactions. 
 Chapter 5 reviews the reasons why film distributors, among multiple kinds of players in 
the Korean film market, should be the main target of analyses. Then, it shows that the 
distribution patterns of Korean films, unlike those of American-distributed American films, 
experienced a significant shift in the 2000s. Compared to the earlier period of data years (i.e., 
2000 to 2002), the distribution pattern of Korean films in the latest four years (i.e., 2003 to 2006) 
became more salient as Korean films succeeded in securing several months as their distribution 
strongholds. Korean films, depending on their release scales, further distinguished preferable 
distribution periods within these secured months, and consequently, they settled their own 
distribution order in the market.  
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 Chapter 6 focuses on the competition strengths within the same kind of films as well as 
between different kinds of films. It demonstrates that the competition levels among Korean films 
(or Korean distributors) have noticeably increased during the seven-year period, while the 
competition levels among American-distributed American films (or Hollywood distributors) have 
not changed much. The competition strengths between Korean and American-distributed 
American films stagnated or fell slightly during the same period. These findings imply that the 
augmentation in domestic film production eventually intensified competition among Korean 
films, not between Korean and American-distributed American films. These are consistent with 
the findings from Chapter 5, which show that more Korean films were released during typical 
periods of the year, especially the months without many releases of American films.  
 The results of such temporal separations between Korean and American films are 
analyzed in Chapter 7. First, it reveals that Korean films avoiding direct competition with large-
scale Hollywood-distributed American films were more likely to obtain larger box-office 
revenues. In addition, Korean films placed in Hollywood films’ typical low-demand season were 
more likely to perform well at the box office when compared to films released in the same week.  
 When consolidating these findings for drawing answers to the main questions of this 
dissertation, the following two points should be underscored. First, the film release patterns 
created by Korean distributors in more recent years (i.e., 2003 to 2006) are not identical with 
those in the earlier period (i.e., 2000 to 2002). As the two analysis chapters that investigate 
distributors’ activities show, the release patterns of Korean distributors significantly shifted in the 
early 2000s, and consequently, the distribution pattern for domestic films became apparent in 
more recent years. In this sense, the new distribution pattern that brought about the substantial 
expansion of domestic film ticket sales is not a natural outcome, automatically followed by the 
appearance of domestic film distributors in the markets; instead, it is the result of repeated trial 
and error by these distributors. In other words, if the shifts of Korean distributors’ behaviors 
positively affected domestic film ticket sales, this effect was only possible because of elaborate 
efforts by Korean distributors to find optimal release points and scales for increasing their own 
profits. Therefore, distributors’ activities should be highlighted as a principal element of the 
resurrection of the Korean film industry.  
At the same time, however, the behavioral shifts of Korean distributors increased 
competition levels among Korean films, and as a result, many domestic films experienced great 
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losses. The increases of domestic film productions inevitably required the sacrifice of many 
Korean films, especially small and mid-sized films. At this point, we should recall the claim that 
the success of Korean domestic films was due to the simple combination of a few successful 
films or directors (Kim 2004b). Indeed, nobody can say that every single Korean film could 
benefit from box-office increases, and in that regard, distributors’ contributions to the 
resurrection of the Korean film industry need to be specified further. Though we cannot deny 
that the activities of Korean distributors galvanized the declining domestic film market, 
distributors acted on behalf of Korean films not because these were Korean films but because 
these were the products for which they had to care as distributors.           
 
8.2 Answers to the Main Question 
 Now, we can challenge the main question of this dissertation: how can we define the 
nature of the changes that the Korean film industry has experienced since the late 1990s? 
Empirical analyses and follow-up discussions thus far clarify two main points: (1) buyers’ (i.e., 
audiences’) preferences for Korean domestic films noticeably improved in the 2000s, but unlike 
preferences for Hollywood films, those for Korean films are still unstable; (2) Korean 
distributors’ efforts to find optimal release timings and scales eventually triggered substantive 
changes in their distribution and competition patterns, resulting in the temporal separation of the 
distribution periods between Korean and Hollywood-distributed American films. More 
important, these changes had positive effects by increasing domestic film box-office receipts. 
These two findings should be the core evidence in drawing the conclusions below, and in order 
to be so, the true implications of those findings need to be more discussed.  
 First, I wish to clarify that the purpose of this study is not to disapprove of the quality 
improvements of Korean films during the past one or two decades. Rather, much evidence exists 
that supports the improved quality and status of Korean films from various areas of the film 
industry. For instance, thinking of why only Korean films, among three types of films handled by 
Korean distributors, experienced such significant changes, we can easily notice that the 
importance of Korean films to distributors became differentiated. If Korean distributors had not 
found any positive signs for the quality and marketability of Korean films, they would not have 
given priority to the distribution of domestic films, and consequently, they would have made no 
significant change in their distribution patterns. If this had been the case, Korean distributors 
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would have had no choice but to rely more on imported American films as many Korean film 
companies did in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
 Instead, I drew attention to the unsubstantiated relationship between the improved quality 
of films and their ticket sales increases. Although it is difficult to reject the improved quality of 
Korean films, it is equally difficult to prove it on an empirical basis. Connecting the quality of 
Korean films to their box-office success is only possible when the qualities of other types of 
films stagnate or deteriorate because audiences make their choices based on comparisons of all 
available movies. As I showed more conclusively in Chapter 4, the possible intervening variable 
between product quality and its consumption—i.e., consumer’s evaluations or preferences—is 
difficult to change or stabilize in a short period of time. Therefore, searching for the implication 
of the Korean film industry’s shifts in the product (i.e., the movie) itself or in corresponding 
audience preferences is difficult to justify.     
 Changes of cultural products and their consumption should be understood within the 
context of the industry in which they are produced (Crane 1992; DiMaggio 1977). In general, 
most changes on the industry side are tangible and straightforward, not only to players inside the 
industry but also to those outside the industry. Therefore, it is relatively easy to provide evidence 
of the effects that one incident has on another. Also, according to J.S. Mill’s basic technique of 
comparative sociology, i.e., the method of difference (Mill 1874 [2010]), my focus on the 
activities of distributors can even be taken for granted because distributors are the most 
significant new players that emerged in the Korean market just before the discussed shifts began. 
Relying on the findings from the three analysis chapters, I can now argue that distributors’ 
activities since the late 1990s significantly influenced overall changes in the industry structure as 
well as box-office revenue.  
  Then, can we treat these newly developed distribution and competition patterns and the 
corresponding growth at the domestic film box office as the core of the shifts that the Korean 
film industry has experienced for the past ten or so years? To answer this question, we need to 
address several more detailed questions first. At the beginning of this dissertation, I asked 
whether increases in domestic film consumption indicate that Korean films defeated American 
films in the Korean market. Now, I can say “no” with a great confidence because we know that 
the growth of the domestic film box-office did not occur from the direct competition with 
American films.  
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In another question, I asked whether shifts made by distributors are enough to erase 
lingering concerns about market stability; we can answer “no” again for many reasons. As past 
performances of individual directors or actors cannot guarantee their future success, distributors’ 
past behavioral patterns do not indicate their future distribution patterns. As I repeatedly 
emphasized above, distributors are purely economic entities that always pursue profits; thus, if 
the conditions surrounding them change—or the perceived rules among players shift, distributors 
should change their behaviors accordingly for their profit and survival. The current equilibrium 
in the distribution market can break down at any moment, depending on market situations or 
major distributors’ interests.  
In reality, another fundamental shift in the Korean distribution market already began 
occurring at the end of 20062 when UIP Korea, a joint venture of Universal Pictures and 
Paramount Pictures, was disassembled into individual companies. As a result, Universal Pictures 
established the new Universal Pictures International Korea (UPI), and CJ Entertainment began 
releasing movies produced by Paramount Pictures in 2007. In addition, Sony Pictures and Buena 
Vista merged their distribution lines by founding Sony Pictures Releasing Buena Vista Film 
(Korea) in December 2006.   
 Therefore, the dramatic increases in domestic film ticket sales during the mid-2000s 
make no promises about the future of the Korean film industry. Hence, we should look for the 
implications of film industry shifts in the market’s structural aspects rather than in audience 
number changes. For instance, the domestic film industry has established the minimum necessary 
conditions for competition with any foreign film since large-scale Korean distributors 
successfully settled in the film market. Additionally, distributors in the Korean market now have 
shared perceptions, as discussed in Chapter 6, which they have directly developed from 
observations of one another’s behaviors. It is less likely now that a small number of powerful 
distributors, especially those from major Hollywood studios, can drive the market because 
distributors’ behaviors are carried out on the basis of these shared perceptions. For the same 
reason, the Korean market is less likely to be agitated when faced with external shocks, such as 
the reduction of the screen quota by half in 2006 (Kim 2006b), because market players’ 
                                                 
2 For more details about distribution market changes, see Kim, So-min. 2007. “Hollywood Distributors’ 





interactions are more contingent on these unspoken rules than on coercive power imposed by 
external factors.   
 
8.3 Contributions of the Study and Additional Issues 
 Because this study has employed two sociological approaches (i.e., the production of 
culture perspective and the sociology of markets), its academic contribution to scientific research 
should be discussed within the framework of these approaches. As noted in Chapter 2, literature 
from the production of culture perspective commonly highlights gatekeepers’ roles in many 
different types of cultural industry. This study has exclusively investigated distributors and their 
behaviors, and as a result, it demonstrates that domestic film distributors are the key players in 
recent shifts of the Korean film industry. By arguing that when investigating any film market 
shift, distributors’ potential influence on that shift cannot be overlooked, this study validates the 
extraordinary importance of the gatekeeping roles imposed by the production of culture 
perspective. 
As a matter of fact, it has been frequently claimed that several large distributors have the 
financial power to considerably influence the commercial success of individual films (Kang 
1993). However, the point that such claims emphasizes is not the distributor’s role but its size; no 
matter who they are, according to those claims, large companies can control the film market. 
This study, however, presents the detailed role processes as to how distributors determine the 
direction of their market shifts. Based on systematic and empirical evidence, it illustrates that 
when individual distributors develop a particular pattern at an aggregate level, their leverage can 
be much greater than we would normally expect.   
 Another contribution to academic research can be found in the sociology of market 
literature. This dissertation has demonstrated that when dealing with idiosyncratic cultural 
markets, economic sociological perspectives, which underscore actors’ and markets’ 
embeddedness in ongoing relationship with external factors, have many advantages over 
classical economic views. It is difficult to explain why and how Korean distributors created such 
behavioral patterns based on definitions of the market from economic perspectives and their 
assumptions about individual players. By interpreting distributors’ behaviors throughout the 
social and historical conditions that define peculiarities of Korean films and Korean distributors, 
 148 
 
this study makes it understood that those observed distribution patterns are the outcome of 
rational and optimal decisions, which are strictly guided by those peculiarities.   
However, the usefulness and the applicability of the sociology of market views are not 
limited to the investigation of new distribution patterns. For instance, as a follow-up question, we 
may ask “why did Hollywood studios not act more aggressively to avoid disappointing outcomes 
in the Korean market although they still dominate the international film trade?” Again, from the 
pure economic view, such a question is not easy to answer, but from the sociology of market 
perspectives, it can be a good example for which their basic arguments apply well. Economic 
sociologists commonly agree that driving out one’s significant opponents is not always the best 
option to pursue maximum profits (Fligstein 2001). Likewise, competition is not an essential 
component in sustaining the market; a more important factor is how interactions among players 
can be maintained (Fligstein 2001; Friedland and Robertson 1990). 
To answer the question above, we need to keep in mind that the expansion of Korean film 
ticket sales was possible due in large part to the temporal separation of distribution periods 
between Korean and Hollywood-distributed American films. The resurgence of Korean films 
after a serious crisis is not necessarily a negative signal to Hollywood distributors insofar as they 
are not losing money. In this situation, releasing more films in order to heat up the direct 
competition with Korean domestic films cannot be a smart choice for Hollywood distributors. As 
stressed by economic sociologists, stepping back from direct competition has no differences from 
competition itself in maximizing profits. 
Lastly, for future research, we need to specify the applicability of the findings in this 
dissertation by raising a few questions. First, if similar conditions are extant in other film 
markets, are similar phenomena possible to appear? Answers to this question need more 
specifications. Obviously, both the importance of gatekeeping roles and the usefulness of 
economic sociological approaches in the domain of cultural industries are universal principles, 
which are unlikely to be affected by any temporal and spatial settings. However, the targeted 
phenomenon for this study is not just the rejuvenation of one ordinary film market, but it is the 
resurrection of the Korean film markets. This implies that the observed distribution patterns and 
the following augmentation in Korean film box-office receipts are not generated simply by the 
given market conditions. As economic sociologists argue, markets and the market rules are 
inseparable from their history and society. Hence, unless all these detailed conditions—i.e., one 
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market’s social and historical backgrounds—are all equal to those of the Korean film market, we 
are pretty sure that the same outcome would not happen.  
Then, modifying the original question, we may ask again whether powerful distributor(s) 
specializing in domestic films can increase the number of domestic film audiences. We need to 
consider the following two points to answer the question. First, even in the case of the Korean 
film market, the advent of distribution companies was not a necessary and sufficient condition to 
cause the increase in domestic film audiences. The existence of large-sized domestic film 
distributors may have helped to increase the domestic film viewers, but the former cannot 
guarantee the latter since those distributors are nothing more than one small part of the entire 
film market. Second, in the previous section, I emphasized domestic distributors as individual 
profit-seekers. The reason why Korean distributors played important roles in increasing Korean 
film audiences is because the market conditions surrounding Korean distributors allowed them to 
do so. Speaking inversely, if market conditions sharply shift, so that Korean films cannot be a 
main source of Korean distributors’ revenues any longer, the priority given by Korean 
distributors to large-scale domestic films can be withdrawn at any moment. To conclude, 
findings in this dissertation cannot be easily generalized in other settings. And this is the reason 
why we have to delve into idiosyncrasies of the market and the industry when studying the 
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Appendix A: Dual-Concept Diversity 
 
Imagine two audience groups, “A” and “B,” each of which consists of 20 audience 
members, and 10 socio-demographic categories to which these 40 (= 2 × 20) audiences belong. If 
15 persons in group “A” fall into category #1, and each of the remaining 5 belongs to one of five 
categories (e.g., category #2 to #6), then the proportion measure for the diversity would be 0.6 (= 
6/10). In the case of audience group “B,” if all 20 members in the group are evenly distributed 
across 5 different categories (i.e., four persons for each category), then its diversity proportion 
would be only 0.5 (= 5/10). However, we can never say that group “A” has more diverse 
audience profiles than group “B.” In short, this problem could occur because the diversity 
measure based on the proportion of occupied cells was not a type of ‘dual-concept diversity’ 
(McDonald and Dimmick 2003).  
According to McDonald and Dimmick (2003), the diversity measure must have two 
dimensions. The first dimension refers to a set of discrete classifications within the distribution 
or, simply put, the number of (occupied) categories in consideration. The diversity measure 
introduced above takes only this dimension into account. The second dimension bears upon the 
proportion of cases allotted to a particular category or the distribution of cases across categories. 
These two dimensions together emphasize that diverse distribution must be (1) widely spread out, 
containing as many categories as possible, and (2) even or flat, without a concentration of cases 
in a small number of categories.   
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Appendix B: Formulas for Diversity and Overlap Measures1 
 
 [Simpson’s D]  










where ip  is the proportion of observations in the ith category ( i = 1, 2. … k)        
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 is the sum of squares of the marginal proportions in 
the ik  categories of the first variable, and m is the number of variables   
 
 
[Variance of Multivariate Simpson’s D]  
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[Lieberson’s D]  











                                                 
1 Formulas come from Agresti and Agresti (1978). 
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[Variance of Lieberson’s D] 
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[Multivariate Lieberson’s D]  
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where m is the number of variable in the model, and mk is the number of categories in variable m   
 
 
[Variance of Multivariate Lieberson’s D]  
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Appendix C: Friedman Test and Its Appropriateness to the Korean Film Distribution Data 
 
The Friedman test (Friedman 1937 and 1940) is a nonparametric statistical technique for 
ordinal variables that tests the null hypothesis that k categories have been drawn from the same 
population (Siegel 1956) or, more specifically, that the average ranks of k categories do not 
significantly differ from each other (Norušis 2003). To apply this method, n sets of categories1 
are first required, and then the categories should be ranked one to k based on their values or the 
hierarchical order within each set. If the null hypothesis is true, the mean ranks of all categories 
for n sets should be approximately equal. By computing the sum of ranked scores across the n 
sets and their deviations from the perfectly equal sum of ranks for all categories,2 we can see 
whether at least one category has a significantly higher rank than others (Gibbons and 
Chakraborti 2003; Sheldon et al. 1996).  
If we can reject the null hypothesis, we should further investigate categories that have a 
significantly higher sum of ranks than others by performing post hoc multiple comparisons tests. 
If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, i.e., P-value is greater than the assigned significance level, 
we can no longer argue that there is any pattern as none of the categories has a significantly 
greater mean rank than others. This finding also indicates that the ranks for each category are 
very inconsistent over n sets of observations; hence, it is difficult to extract any pattern or 
tendency.3                                                           
 The advantages of using the Friedman test for Korean film industry data are manifold. 
First, the ranks, rather than frequencies or percentages, of the categories are more appropriate for 
the purpose of this analysis. Because the two criteria that determine the existence of a pattern are 
relative greatness and consistency, we have to search for the months that have higher film 
release frequencies than others and their consistency over the seven-year period. In this context, 
comparing the average monthly frequencies of film releases across different months is not 
                                                 
1 Depending on scholars and textbooks, the “set” is referred to as “block,” and the “category” as 
“treatment” or “subgroup.” 
2 If categories have the same mean ranks, its chi-square test statistic, 2 2
1









    , will 
be zero, where k is the number of ranked categories (i.e., columns), n is the number of blocks or sets (i.e., rows), and 
jR  is the sum of the ranked scores in each column (Friedman 1937).  
3 Refer to Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance, a.k.a., Kendall’s W (Gibbons 1993). 
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helpful as the annual total of released films changes substantially over the years. This is why we 
refer to percentage rather than raw film numbers in Table 5.1. Relying on percentage, which is 
technically nothing more than a converted value of frequencies, does not measure up to the 
purpose of the analysis because the important criterion in the comparison is the relative 
greatness of monthly film releases against one another within each set (i.e., year). Therefore, we 
should focus on the period (i.e., month) in which distributors tend to release more films without 
regard to film number differences between high- and low-frequency months. 
 Second, ranks of months are a better measure than frequency or percentage due to the 
nature of the data set I use. In fact, the frequencies of released films in Table 5.1 have few 
discrepancies from other data sets (cf. Ko and Kim 2005). Although the cases are very few, the 
Korean Film Year Book includes some independent films. Especially for 2002 data, 18 Korean 
films listed in the Year Book are noted as “a short film,” each of which has only one opening-day 
screen and very small audience numbers. Because I intend this portion of the analysis to focus on 
commercial films, eliminating these films from the list would better serve the original goal. 
Nevertheless, I used the original lists as they are for the following reasons: (1) no straightforward 
way exists to draw the line between commercial and non-commercial films, especially when only 
relying on the description, “a short film”; (2) some cases exist in which commercial movies were 
released with one screen and/or their total audiences were smaller than those of independent 
films. Thus, removing movies from the lists without clear standards may disrupt the unity of the 
data set. Consequently, the frequencies in the cells of Table 5.1 may have small margins of errors 
depending on the film classification criteria,4 and we need some method to buffer such errors. In 
this sense, ranks would be a better measure than actual frequencies or their proportions. 
 Third, given the small n in the data set (i.e., seven years), we should more carefully check 
whether the overall conditions of data and analysis meet the test assumptions. As for the 
Friedman test, its test statistic is distributed as chi-square only when k and/or n are not too small. 
Even in the cases where k and/or n are small, exact probability tables and some other 
complementary techniques have been well developed and broadly used5 (Al-Subaihi 2000; 
Siegel 1956). Furthermore, with regard to omnibus tests for finding mean differences, it is 
                                                 
4 This only applies to [Level 1] analysis (for Korean films) because those movies having small opening-day 
screen numbers are eliminated from [Level 2] and [Level 3] analysis. 




known that rank-based tests have more statistical power than those using actual scores (Brownie 




Appendix D: Influential Distributors – Selection Criteria 
 
Between 2000 and 2006, the number of films screened in Seoul is 2,055 (Domestic – 
541; Imported – 1,514), all of which are distributed by 194 individual distributors.1 Among 
those, as shown in Figure 6.1, 90 distributors had only one distribution record and 28 had two, 
respectively. In sum, more than a half of all distributors (118/194 = .608) who have ever played 
in the Korean market during the past seven years distributed only one or two films. Given that 
the analysis in this study is focused on individual distributors and the changing patterns of their 
competition against each other, if distributors have released very small numbers of films, 
technically, we cannot extract any pattern of interactions from their activities.  
 Three criteria are applied to draw out the distributors whose activities made no (or less) 
significant influence on the market. The first and foremost criterion is the number of films that 
each distributor released. Those who released less than 10 movies during the data period are 
eliminated. Indeed, the number, ten is an arbitrary cutoff point. Also, some distributors released 
those ten or more films in a relatively short period while others widely spread them out across all 
seven years. Based on this criterion, 33 sizable distributors are selected. The number of films 
distributed by these 33 distributors is 1,602, approximately 80% of all films, and the proportion 
of audiences drawn by these films are over 282 million, 97.22% of the total audiences.  
 Although the first criterion can successfully remove the biggest chunk of insignificant 
players, this is not good enough yet to single out only those who made a significant influence on 
the market. As movie production and distribution turned out to be a lucrative business in Korea 
at the turn of the twenty first century, the number of new filmmakers and distributors grew up 
explosively. However, due to the winner-take-all nature of film market, though some of 
newcomers succeeded in both making money and settling down in the market, most of them had 
                                                 
1 In counting the number of distributors, another problem that must be resolved immediately is whether two 
distributors can be treated as the same player or company. Three kinds of sources exist for this confusion. The first is 
the case that distributors have changed their names for some reasons, such as considerable shifts in their ownership, 
business specialties, organizational structure, etc. The second is about the M&A. For instance, one of major 
distributors, Columbia/TriStar Corporation was merged into Sony Pictures in 2005. Thus, Columbia/TriStar movies 
have been imported and distributed by the name of Sony Pictures in the Korean market since 2005. The last is the 
case that two subsidiaries belong to the same parent company (e.g., Walt Disney Corp. and Buena Vista belong to 
the Disney Entertainment Group). If two distributors apparently fall into one of these cases, and they have never 
released films in the same week (i.e., no competition was made between them), they were treated as the same 
company in the analysis.  
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to accept great losses and retreated. This means that no matter how many films a distributor 
releases in the market, if it fails to draw significant numbers of audiences, their influence on the 
market can be negligible. For this reason, the second criterion of elimination is the total audience 
numbers during the whole seven-year period. If the total audience number that a distributor 
obtained is less than 0.1% of the entire audience, then the distributor is eliminated. 
 The final criterion is for more focusing on the distribution pattern of commercial films. As 
noted, small-scale films that fall into independent film genres likely rely on different segments of 
audiences, and the distributors specializing in those films tend to adopt quite different 
distribution strategies and tactics. In the Korean film market, like elsewhere, there are a few 
specialists who only deal with independent films2. They in general distribute a lot of films in a 
short period so that their audience totals can be greater than 0.1% of the market total. However, 
the number of audiences that each film draws is extremely small compared to ordinary 
commercial films. Including those specialized distributors may hinder the process that extracts 
the targeted pattern of competition among ordinary commercial film distributors. For this reason, 
distributors whose average ticket sales per film were smaller than 15,000 are excluded.  
With the three criteria together, the number of influential players in the Korean market 
reduces to 233. Profiles of those 23 distributors—including statistics on the number of screened 
films, the sum of occupied opening screens, and the total audience numbers—are listed in Table 
D.1. As the bottom line shows, these 23 distributors together released 1,332 films (64.8% of 
total) but drew more than 280 million audiences (96.4% of total). Also, domestic Big-3 
distributors, i.e., CJ Entertainment, Cinema Service, and Show Box, are ranked 1st to 3rd in the 
total audience numbers, followed by five Hollywood distributors. This indicates that these 3 
domestic and 5 Hollywood distributors have dominated the Korean market during the past seven 
years as key players. At the same time, this alludes to the point on which we have to focus when 
analyzing individual distributors’ competition patterns.  
                                                 
2 Indiestory, Film Bank, Dongsoong Art Center, etc. can be examples of those special distributors.  
3 The activities of Walt Disney Corp. are included under the rubric of Buena Vista. Also, because 
Columbia/TriStar was merged into Sony Pictures in 2005, the name of ‘Sony’ will be used.   
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Table D.1 Selected Distributors and Their Profiles 
No. Distributor #of films Percent2 
Occupied Opening Screens Audience 
Total Min. Max. Percent1 Percent2 Mean Total Min. Max Percent1 Percent 2 Mean 
1 CJ Entertainment 209 0.1017 7533 1 147 0.1951 0.1775 36.04 61,275,024 301 2,513,540 0.2186 0.2091 293,181.93 
2 Cinema Service 138 0.0672 4987 1 98 0.1292 0.1175 36.14 47,080,400 4 3,660,842 0.1679 0.1606 341,162.32 
3 Show Box 77 0.0375 3914 9 167 0.1014 0.0922 50.83 31,238,938 9,851 3,571,254 0.1114 0.1066 405,700.49 
4 Warner Brothers 86 0.0418 3039 1 125 0.0787 0.0716 35.34 23,147,699 2,730 1,596,000 0.0826 0.0790 269,159.29 
5 Buena Vista 120 0.0584 2526 1 129 0.0654 0.0595 21.05 17,900,040 10 1,525,853 0.0638 0.0611 149,167.00 
6 20th Century Fox 112 0.0545 2930 1 112 0.0759 0.0690 26.16 17,294,389 530 1,401,000 0.0617 0.0590 154,414.19 
7 Sony Pictures Corp. 133 0.0647 2663 1 139 0.0690 0.0627 20.02 16,540,116 0 1,144,795 0.0590 0.0564 124,361.77 
8 UIP 98 0.0477 2815 1 134 0.0729 0.0663 28.72 16,435,025 351 1,584,202 0.0586 0.0561 167,704.34 
9 Korea Pictures 38 0.0185 1225 1 90 0.0317 0.0289 32.24 11,380,845 2 2,678,846 0.0406 0.0388 299,495.92 
10 Show East 28 0.0136 1133 12 78 0.0293 0.0267 40.46 6,366,908 5,100 1,188,417 0.0227 0.0217 227,389.57 
11 Tube Entertainment 48 0.0234 1114 1 64 0.0289 0.0262 23.21 6,030,934 534 545,909 0.0215 0.0206 125,644.46 
12 Chungeorahm 30 0.0146 747 1 58 0.0193 0.0176 24.9 5,681,109 255 1,017,027 0.0203 0.0194 189,370.30 
13 Cineworld 24 0.0117 579 1 71 0.0150 0.0136 24.13 5,263,085 113 1,253,075 0.0188 0.0180 219,295.21 
14 Lotte Entertainment 33 0.0161 1250 2 87 0.0324 0.0295 37.88 4,818,456 6,175 372,051 0.0172 0.0164 146,013.82 
15 A LINE 16 0.0078 402 5 47 0.0104 0.0095 25.13 2,462,548 1,890 763,190 0.0088 0.0084 153,909.25 
16 MK Pictures 12 0.0058 474 12 83 0.0123 0.0112 39.5 2,331,315 9,374 806,193 0.0083 0.0080 194,276.25 
17 Shindo Film 14 0.0068 113 2 20 0.0029 0.0027 8.07 1,172,760 1,561 303,681 0.0042 0.0040 83,768.57 
18 Sinabro  27 0.0131 303 1 34 0.0078 0.0071 11.22 1,006,086 9 245,455 0.0036 0.0034 37,262.44 
19 Hanmaek Yeonghwa 13 0.0063 136 2 23 0.0035 0.0032 10.46 809,963 709 346,279 0.0029 0.0028 62,304.85 
20 Donga Export Co., Ltd. 17 0.0083 158 1 37 0.0041 0.0037 9.29 616,069 510 182,607 0.0022 0.0021 36,239.35 
21 Mirovision 38 0.0185 252 1 43 0.0065 0.0059 6.63 588,354 10 156,859 0.0021 0.0020 15,483.00 
22 Aura Entertainment 11 0.0054 222 2 55 0.0057 0.0052 20.18 471,714 1,400 238,430 0.0017 0.0016 42,883.09 
23 AFDF-Korea 10 0.0049 94 2 28 0.0024 0.0022 9.4 447,067 272 300,169 0.0016 0.0015 44,706.70 
 Total 1,332 0.6482 38,609 1.0000 0.9097 280,358,844 1.0000 0.9566 
 
Note 1: Percent1 - Percentage out of 23 distributors; Percent2 - Percentage out of entire 194 distributors.  
Note 2: Sony Pictures Corp. includes the distribution statistic of Columbia/TraiStar between 2000 and 2004. Likewise, Buena Vista includes films distributed by the  
             name of Walt Disney Pictures.  
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Appendix E: Computation of Competition Scores1 
 
 The first step for computing competition scores is making a film distribution matrix; rows 
for distributors and columns for weeks. Out of 23 selected distributors2, 14 released one or more 
films in 2000. Thus, there should be 14 rows and 52 columns in the initial matrix. However, in 
the case of analyses in Section 6.5, because individual distributors’ distribution lineups are 
further distinguished by the type of films, there are 31 rows, and each row is treated as an 
independent distributor.  
Then, if one distributor released a film in a certain week, the number of opening-day 
screens occupied by the film is marked in the cell of that week. Since Cinema Service launched 
the movie, [The Foul King] in Seoul on February 4, 2000 with 22 screens, the screen number, 22, 
is put in the cell for the row of Cinema Service (1)3 and the column of week 5. In the cases that 
two or more films, which belong to the same type, are released by the same distributor in a week, 
the sum of opening screen numbers are entered for the week. By repeating this procedure over 52 
weeks for all 14 distributors, we can create Matrix A, where values in the cells represent the 
distribution scale (See Table E.1).  
 The next step is calculating the annual total opening screen numbers for each distributor, 
and then divide each week’s opening screen number with it. If we assume the opening screens as 
one of the core resources that individual distributors mobilize, the ratio between weekly opening 
screens and their annual total is commensurate to how great proportion of resources was spent in 
a particular week. In the example above, Cinema Service occupied 277 opening screens in total 
for domestic films in 2000, and the proportion of resources spent by Cinema Service for the film 
in week 5 is .079 or 7.9% (= 22/277).  
                                                 
1 Among the preexisting association measurements, Identity Coefficients (Haber and Barnhart 2006; Zegers 
1991), coined for measuring the degree of inter-rater agreement, have the closest conceptual similarities with 
competition scores (See the formula below). The values of competition strength calculated by identity coefficients 
and competition scores will be compared below.                          
Identity Coefficient (݁௫௬) = 
2
1 1
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   
 where iX  and iY  are scores given by two judges and 
n is the number of judged objects [See Zegers (1991, p. 323)]. 
2 See Appendix D for the selection criteria and the profiles of 23 selected distributors. 
3 The number in the parenthesis here indicates the film type (i.e., “1” – Korean films; “2” – American-
distributed American films; “3” – Korean-distributed American films; “4” – other types of films). 
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 Then, if we multiply the original Matrix A with its transposed ( A ), we can create a new 
symmetric matrix B (i.e., AA= B). Now, its rows and columns represent the same set of 
individual distributors (See Table E.2). In the Matrix B, diagonal cells (i.e., the sum of squared 
proportion of weekly resource spent) are reference values for the maximum possible overlap 
score that a certain distributor theoretically obtains. In an ideal situation, if distributor [A] has a 
competitor(s) who released the exactly same number of films, in the exactly same weeks, with 
the exactly same proportion of annual screens as distributor [A] did, then distributor [A] can 
obtain this value from the competition with that distributor(s). In fact, we can call this value ‘a 
maximum competition level score’ because if such a competitor exists for distributor [A], it 
indicates that those two distributors have an identical distribution pattern. Hence, every single 
film released by one distributor competed with another film distributed by the other distributor 
with the same importance to each distributor.  
The off-diagonal cells in Matrix B show how much overlap in the proportion of weekly 
opening-day screens was actually made between two distributors (therefore, we call it actual 
overlap scores). The greater is this score, the tougher competition they made since their movies 
met each other more frequently with greater (or similar) proportions of weekly screens. 
However, the maximum values of these off-diagonal cells vary by the number of film releases 
and the proportion distribution of weekly opening screens that individual distributors have. 
Therefore we need to divide a set of off-diagonal cells of a particular distributor with its diagonal 
cell. By doing so, we can estimate how close the release pattern of distributor [A] is to that of 
distributor [B]. That is, it shows how tough competition distributor [A] actually made in coping 
with distributor [B] since the outcome value of this calculation is the ratio between the actual 
overlap scores with [B] and the maximum possible overlap score that distributor [A] can make.  
 For example, Table E.2 shows that the actual overlap score between 20th Century Fox 
and Buena Vista (2) (i.e., American films distributed by Buena Vista) is .0165. Since the 
maximum possible overlap score for 20th Century Fox is .1262, the strength of competition (i.e., 
the overlap ratio) made by 20th Century Fox against Buena Vista is .1307 (= .0165/.1262) or 
13.07% (See Table E.3). However, we should notice that because each distributor has its own 
maximum possible overlap score, if we switch the viewpoint from 20th Century Fox to Buena 
Vista, the overlap ratio changes to .1769 because Buena Vista has its maximum possible overlap 
score of .0932 (.1769 =.0165/.0932). For this reason, the overlap ratio in and of itself may not be 
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a good indicator for a competition measure because while the competition between two 
distributors is one entity, the strength measure involved with this single entity is two. Therefore, 
we cannot compare the degrees of competition between two different pairs of distributors 
directly.  
In order to solve this problem, the geometric mean (i.e., m ab ) of two overlap ratio 
values is computed, and finally named a competition score4. In the example above, the actual 
overlap score between 20th Century Fox and Buena Vista (2) was .0165. From the view of the 
20th Century Fox, this value is equal to 13.07% of maximum possible overlap scores, but from 
the view of Buena Vista (2), 17.69%. Then by computing the geometric mean of these two 
overlap ratios, we can come up with a value that defines the competition strength between two 
distributors ( .1307 .1769 = .1520; See Table E.4)5.  
As in maximum possible overlap scores, this measure achieves its maximum value (= 1) 
if and only if two distributors release their films (1) at the exactly same time (i.e., the same 
weeks) and (2) with exactly same scale (i.e., the same opening-day screen proportion out of 
annual total). If two distributors do not release any films during the same week, then its value 
will be 0. The key strength of this measure is the comprehensiveness; it considers both the 
number of released films and their opening scales from the view of each distributor who 
constitutes a single competition.6 
                                                 















   
 
  
where ip  = the proportion of weekly opening-day screen numbers in week i for distributor A, iq  = the proportion 
of weekly opening-day screen numbers in week i for distributor B, n = the number of weeks. 
5 Actually, this geometric mean is equivalent to the squared overlap scores weighed by two distributors’ 
maximum possible overlap scores (i.e.,ඥሺ. 0165ሻଶ/ሺ.1262 ൈ .0932ሻ ൌ .152). 
6 It would be useful to see how competition scores are similar with or different from Identity coefficients 
(݁௫௬). Table E.5 shows the correlation coefficients among three types of similarity measures. If proportions of 
weekly opening screen numbers are applied to Identity Coefficients, the correlation between all possible pairs of 
competition scores and those for Identity Coefficients has an almost perfect linear relationship. (Max. = 991; Min. = 
971). However, if weekly totals of raw opening screen numbers are used for the computation of Identity Coefficients, 
their correlations with competition scores go down a little bit (Max. = .931; Min. = .774).  
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Table E.1 Individual Distributor’s Weekly Film Release Scales [Matrix A] 
 
 
Distributor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 Total
Fox(2) 0 0 12 0 21 0 0 5 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 14 0 27 0 0 0 17 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 158
Donga Export(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Donga Export(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
Buena Vista(2) 0 11 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 6 21 0 2 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 8 18 0 1 34 0 43 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 3 5 0 4 0 0 0 37 0 19 0 271
Buena Vista(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59
Buena Vista(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50
Sinabro(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Sinabro(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Cinema Service(1) 5 13 0 0 22 0 17 0 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 31 0 22 0 277
Cinema Service(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 138
Cinema Service(4) 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 41
Shindo Film(1) 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46
Shindo Film(3) 0 7 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27
Shindo Film(4) 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
Cineworld(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39
Cineworld(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47
Cineworld(4) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Warner Bro.(2) 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 18 0 17 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 14 190
Columbia(2) 32 0 0 18 0 5 20 0 0 4 6 0 0 18 0 4 0 17 0 0 0 6 0 0 10 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 19 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 30 0 263
Columbia(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Tube Ent.(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Tube Ent.(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
Tube Ent.(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 41
Han Maek(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
Hanmaek(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 16 40
Hanmaek(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4
AFDF(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40
CJ Ent.(1) 16 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 218
CJ Ent.(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 0 152
CJ Ent.(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51
UIP(2) 0 0 0 28 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 14 7 19 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 14 12 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 19 0 0 219
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Table E.2 Maximum Possible Overlap Score for Individual Distributors [Matrix B] 
 
 
Table E.3 Weekly Screen Proportion Overlap Ratios 
 
 




Fox(2) Donga Export(1) Donga Export(3) Buena Vista(2) Buena Vista(1) Buena Vista(3) Sinabro(3) Sinabro(2)
Fox(2) 0.1262 0.0290 0.0417 0.0165 0.0492 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Donga Export(1) 0.0290 0.8472 0.0000 0.0000 0.0254 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Donga Export(3) 0.0417 0.0000 0.3772 0.0117 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Buena Vista(2) 0.0165 0.0000 0.0117 0.0932 0.0000 0.0058 0.0101 0.0000
Buena Vista(1) 0.0492 0.0254 0.0000 0.0000 0.3588 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Buena Vista(3) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058 0.0000 0.4824 0.0000 0.0000
Sinabro(3) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0101 0.0000 0.0000 0.7689 0.0000
Sinabro(2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Fox(2) Donga Export(1) Donga Export(3) Buena Vista(2) Buena Vista(1) Buena Vista(3) Sinabro(3) Sinabro(2)
Fox(2) 1.0000 0.0342 0.1106 0.1769 0.1372 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Donga Export(1) 0.2299 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0709 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Donga Export(3) 0.3305 0.0000 1.0000 0.1257 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Buena Vista(2) 0.1307 0.0000 0.0311 1.0000 0.0000 0.0119 0.0131 0.0000
Buena Vista(1) 0.3902 0.0300 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Buena Vista(3) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0617 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sinabro(3) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1082 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
Sinabro(2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Fox(2) Donga Export(1) Donga Export(3) Buena Vista(2) Buena Vista(1) Buena Vista(3) Sinabro(3) Sinabro(2)
Fox(2) 0.0000 0.0887 0.1911 0.1520 0.2314 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Donga Export(1) 0.0887 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0461 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Donga Export(3) 0.1911 0.0000 0.0000 0.0625 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Buena Vista(2) 0.1520 0.0000 0.0625 0.0000 0.0000 0.0271 0.0377 0.0000
Buena Vista(1) 0.2314 0.0461 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Buena Vista(3) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0271 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sinabro(3) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0377 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sinabro(2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table E.5 Comparisons between Competition Scores and Identity Coefficients 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Competition Score vs. Identity Coefficient (Proportion) 0.991 0.985 0.974 0.971 0.985 0.977 0.971
Competition Score vs. Identity Coefficient (Raw Scores) 0.931 0.798 0.823 0.839 0.774 0.886 0.819
Identity Coefficient (Proportion) vs. Identity Coefficient (Raw Scores) 0.951 0.847 0.889 0.902 0.815 0.938 0.899
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Appendix F: Lists of Outliers in Each Type of Films 
 
No Korean Films American-Distributed American Films Korean-Distributed American Films 
1 Joint Security Area (2000) Mission Impossible 2 (2000) Gladiator (2000) 
2 Friend (2001) Vertical Limit (2001) The Lord of the Rings:  The Fellowship of the Ring (2001) 
3 Kick the Moon (2001) Harry Potter  and the Sorcerer`s Stone (2001) Shrek  (2001) 
4 My Sassy Girl (2002) Spiderman (2002) The Others (2002) 
5 The Way Home (2002) Minority Report The Lord of the Rings:  The Two Towers (2002) 
6 Marrying the Mafia (2002) I am Sam (2002) The Lord of the Rings:  The Return of the King (2003) 
7 Memories of Murder (2003) Harry Potter  and the Chamber of Secrets (2002) Shrek 2 (2004) 
8 Silmido (2003) The Matrix Reloaded (2003) Godsend* (2004) 
9 Taegukgi (2004) Love Actually (2003)  
10 Welcome to Dongmakgol (2005) Troy (2004)  
11 King And The Clown (2005) King Kong (2005)  
12 The Host (2006)   
 
Note: * indicates cases whose studentized residual smaller than -3.  
 
